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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the (uattrocento the Italian states reached their cultural apex.
Humanism was in its period of golden splendor as geniuses, under wealthy
patrons, produced a flow of masterpieces of literature, painting and sculpture
The men of the Renaissance were not unaware of the er.ochal significance of
their contributions. l

80th humanists and artists suggested, as Voltaire's

sentence ran, that Itthe glory of genius belonged then to Italy alone, just as
it had once been the property of Greece. 2 In modem times, Jacob Burckhardt
stressed the importance of the Henaiseanee state and the self-interest it bred
The Italian "rebirth .. was not only a revival of antiquity but it was fundamentally the cultural expansion of the Henaissanee Italian, who was in all

lef. ilallace K. Ferguson, The Renaissanee in Historical Thousht (hoaton,
19L8), pp. 1-28.
-

2EalNli

IlUl'

le8 "",eur. et l l e f t des nationa, et sur

18B

ruanc1rw,; fait,

Charlema ne usquTtoiils nIl-first prin
a
eneva
Iii 5:7)6, in Oeuvres completes 'pa S, l88):eS), fir,' 250. Voltaire did not
de IthistoIre, depy.is

take Italy's cUltiii=aI superiority tor granted as earlier writers had done, but
he explained its basis. He stressed the eausal relation between her eommercia
prosperity and her advanced civilization, ibid., 57, 187.

-

1

2

things the f01'eJ'Wmer

ot the modem world.) Serious weaknesles, however, under

,

lay the glory of the "civUta artistic..

,11

the Viconian phrase commonly used to

describe the P..enaiSS8nce. 4 The very brilliance of society tended to delude
Italy and to make her unaware of the impending historical tragedy.

She had no

political force able to operate in her own defense."
The Italian state. stood also to be affected significantly by the major

econardc changes following the discovery ot the New htlrld and a new route to
the East.
cl1ned.

7he economic fortunes 01' the ndghty Venetian Republic swiftly deCUltural pursuits stood to lOBe td th the decline in incoming wealth.

149li, portended future troubles for

The foreign invaldone, beginning in

Italian civillzation.

The brutal sack of Rome in ]$27 merely symbollzed the

pracipi tate course that events had taken.

Nor were the familiar Turkish menace

and the religious divisioms in Germat'\Y wholly divorced from the peninsular

s1 tuation or fran the concern of the Holy See.

lnie CUltur der Renaissance in Italien. Ein Verauch (Basel, 1860). The
edi Uon of Burekhar:!t used' here 18"Tbe clvllizitron of trie RenaisSL"'lCe in Italy
trans. S.G.C. Middlemo:re (London, l~). JoIm Ada:Iniioii'S1iiOnds pl1raued
Burckhardtian lines in his lengthy 11 terery work, The Renaissance in Italr, .5
vols. (London, 1877-1886). Citations are taken trOi""tfiEi eaprIcomedIiIOn of
Volumes I and n of Symonds' work, The tie of the
and The Revival. of
LearninS (New York, 19tO). Not 811Ms
fing toe·oncede & uiilquenees of trd.s period. The RomantiCists attempted to thrust Renaissance
origins back into the Middle Ages while another group viewed the Renaissance U
largely a continuation, or even a decline, of medieval culture, Ferguson, pp.

De.

rianswere

290-385.

40ianbattista Vico (1688-1741.), a Neapolltan and the author of the Nuova
Seien;a, is noted for his emphasis on the constructive as Hell as the critIcsl
nature of historical thought. He stressed the iJIlnortance of understanding the
eu.l ture of a paop1e throu€h lingu1st1c and Jliytmlogical studies.
"Pietro Niecolini, A.r1osto

~ .!! lY cen;tenariO

(Roma, 1936), p •

.3.34.

But the giants of the Renaissance were not wholly uncognizant of the
difficulties of their society.

Familiarity with their writings reveals the

presence, often general and semiconSCiOUS, of dismay, disillusionment, cynicism
fear.

This was not simply the literary melancholy which is relevant to many

periods and which belongs to a certain senre of literary work.

--

,

Nor was it

merely malaise or t.he malady of the m.al du siecle, so familiar, for example, in
the nineteenth century.

The contrast between Italian expressions of upset and

those indicative of contemporary Elizabethan melancholy also are readily
evident. 6
The facts of Italian life were the realistic basis for the concern of thoa
who were able to note the manifestations of decadence.

The majority of these

men, themselves caught in the maelstrom of portentous activities, realized that
their danger could well continue its course. Most frequentJ.y, however, their
bewilderment and anguish expressed themselves when things had advanced se far
that they were personally and bitterly affected.
Even men active only in the isolated society of letters, and there were
not a few, could not ignore the chaos in the Italian states which followed in

6Cf• ron Cameron Allen, "The Degeneration of Man and Renaissance
Pessimism, fI .§!, XXXV (April 1938) ,202-227, for a discussion of Elizabethan
perturbation over the degeneration of man and the growing senility of the world
of the periodts spiritual tension over the ravages of time and its characteristic preoccupation with maxims. Cf. also Lawrence Babb, The Flizabe'1han
Cala~: i Stu5\Y of t,1elancho11a in Elizabethan Literature from ~ ~ ibL2
into
Ese Lansing, ?4:1ciiigan, i95l}. Babbls preface Indicates that
melancholy offered, or seemed to offer, an avenue of retreat from a disheartening world of SOCial, political and religious turmoil. It explains that the
book treats melancholy in a broad psychologieal and Ii terary way, howevel" :;nd
not t!e sobriety and disillusionment then manifesting themselves.

~es

4
the wake of the invasions.

Valeriano, a composer of panegyric and satiric

and an explorer of antiquities in great favor at the court of Leo

to Rome from Fiacenza in the fatal year 1527.

He

.x,

po~

returned

looked in vain for his old

comrades and exclaimed in his dialogue "De Literatorum

l.iJ,il

Intelicitate:"

Good Godl, when first I began to inquire for the philosophers, oraters,

poets and profesecrs of Greek end LoStin literature, whose names were
written on my tablets, how great, how horrible a tra~edy was offered to
meJ Of all those lettered men whom! had hoped to see, how many had
perished miserably, carried off by the most cruel of all fates, overwhelmed by undeserved calamities. some dead of plsFtl8, some brought
to a slow end by penury in exUe, others slaughtered by a foeman's sword,
other worn out by daily tortures} some, a~a1n, and these of all the most
unhappy, driven by a.nguish to self -murder. 7
Valeriano enumerated specific scholars who had died of deSpair or who had
experienced personal mal treatment, whose wealth had been confiscated or whose
houses hael been burned, who had succumbed to madness, hunger or the plague. 8
vmile the wars in Lombardy proved scarcely less fatal to men of letters
than the siege of Rome, S;yJ!1onds explains, those disasters fell singly and at
intervala. 9 The fall of Roman and indeed of Italian civilization was
exemplified by the s}'JJlbol of 1527.

Various poetic attempts were made tc explain this tragedy.

ln essays,

7TMs 'Work, printed st Venice in 1620, is cited in Symonds, Revival, p.

-

9rbid.

epistles and funeral orations, humanists "amply recognized the justice of thei
punishment" whUe all Italy re-echoed with their lamentations.
Jacopo Sadoleto,lO Hieronymus Niger wrote of

"Rome,

In a letter to

that is the sink of all

things shameful and abominable. ttl 1 Lodovico Ariosto, the epic poet of the
"Orlando Furioso," mingled a descript10n of the internal evils of Italy with
the barbarian invasions:

o faIn1shed wicked and fierce harpies whom in blinded Italy full or
error, perhaps to punish old and heavy faults, High Judgment leads
to every table! Innocent children and pitying mothers are perishing from hunger and see that one banquet of these wicked monsters
devours all that might be the sUPJX)rt of their lives.
Greatly he sinned who opened the caves that for many years before
had been closed, whence eame out the stench and the gluttotlY' that
spread themselves to Sicken Italy. Fair living was then buriedJ
and quiet shut out in such a fashion that she has ever since been
in wars, in poverty, and in trouble I and is going to be for many
years.
until one day she will shake her locks at her incblent sons and
drive them out of Lethe, shouting to them. 'Is there no one who
has vigor like that of Calais and ~;.etes? who will free the tables
from the filth and the claws and return them to their happy pur1ty,
as lorur ago the brothers did those of Phineue and later the paladin
those
the Ethiop king. ,12

of

lOCardinal Jacopo Sado1eto (1477-1547) was one of the most important
1515 to the Council of Trent. He served as
papal Secretary to Leo X and to Clement VII, as Bishop of Carpentras and later
as Cardinal. He is commonly associated with the "middle group" of Catholic
reformers who sought a reformation of the Church w1 thin the limits ot tradition
firures on the Roman scene from

-

llc1ted 1n 1bid., p. 323.
12cr •

Orlando Furioso di Ludovico Ariosto, ed. Nicola Zingare1li (Milano,
193L), 3411-~. 'fhIs is the most recent and critical edition of the !X>em. The
Eng'lish translation g1 ven here is from the able effort of' Allan Gilbert (New
York, 195L).

For many years, as Ariosto wrote, Italy was but a mute member of the
European community of states.
Barocca.

Culturally too she lapsed into quietude in the

Not until the nineteenth century did Italy really awaken from the

deep slumber in which she had been entranced since the early cinguecento.13
Although the Ariostean prediction proved to be correct, the realm of the
poets is usually the realm of fantasy.

Literature, the mirror of lite, must

take second place to the world of day-to-day civil life.
formed the tragic basis of the literary cries. w'hat

W8S

And it was this that
the political status

of the Italian states in the pertod of the High Renaissance?

,

One of the lIU:ljor political tb1nkers of his era and of all ages, Niccolo
Machiavelli, linked himself with the poets when he judged Italy to be "la
corruttela del mandan and her case to be desperate. 1L Further.he had a lucid
understanding of the new Eu.ropean power structure.

Venice, Florence, Milan,

Naples and Rome were destined to play but secondary parts on the new historical
stage, occupied by the colossal dramatiE! personae of France, Spain, Austria and
England.

Unquestionably one ot the chief features of the Renaissance was the

appearance for the first time of the national state.

A power struggle among

13Benedetto Croce, Stari}! della F:t~ Barocca .!!! Italla, 2a ed. (Bari, 1946
finds the historical origIns of thenl'iiiteenih-century Italian state in the
Baroccs, a time when the tletbical will It ap]:eared exhausted but actually waa
preparIng for the laborious work it would later undertake in the building of th
new ItalY. Cf. also A. Robert CaJX)nigri, Histo!,Z..!!!! Libertl (Ctdcago, 1955),
pp. 89-ltf, for an elaborate discussion of Croce's concepUon of ethicopoli tical history as applied to seventeentt.l.-century Italy.
14MachiaVelli wrote: "non s1 puC sperare nelle provincie che in quest!
tempi si vemrono corrette, come
l'Italia sopra tutte le altre," t.iscorsi, lib
1, cap. 55, cited 1n Symonds, tespots. p. 282 and n.l.

e

7
the national states of Europe was a natural and logical political developnent.
No one of them could survive without adding to its dominion and consolidating
its strength in new regions.

France is a good examrJ.e of this political

phenomenon as the Habsburg states are classic examples of dynastic statecraft.
~a th

the election of Charles V as emperor in 1519, the Habs'burg-Valois stru ggle

for mastery of 'Europe and the western Mediterranean begal as the final phase of
the power conflict of the Renaissance era.

Following a "manifest destiny"

poliCY, Charles wished to extend his power and to cut out sny opportuni,tles for
French interference with his plana.

Francis I realized thst a strong re-

assertion of French claims to Naples and

~11an

was vitally neces8ary in the

face of imperial. power and prestige.
Since the states of the

f~ninsula

were incapable of coping with these

major powers, they became an arena fer their contests and the object of their
spoliations.

"-!hile the majority of Itallans knew the fury of these

"barbarians, II they were not as a whole conscious of the complex causes of the
changes they were experiencing.

It i8 not surprising that the individual

govemments found it difficult to view events with a clear European vision.
This persJ*ctive was limited to only a, few.

For more than three centuries, the

Italian states had bettn accuctor.13dto a system of diplomacy and intrigue among
themselves.

Like the ancient Greek city-states, their individual loyalties and

petty jealousies kept them disunited at a time of serious and crucial moment.
They had, however, experienced German, French and Spanish interest at
earlier period in their

histo~.

Ii

much

The invasions did not represent a completely

new phenomenon for them, but their placement wi thin the new power struoture
a.fforded ample opportunity for concem.

8
'ltJithin the narrow sphere of Italian politics, t.'1e princes and ruling
groups looked tc the attainment of their own selfish objects.
not only their

o~n

states but ultimately

~ll

who towered over them like Ariostean harpies.
Italian

eQ~.~ilibrium

had been broken by

They involved

the others with the foreign powers
Once the chains of the artiticia

f~incely

selfishness and lack of fore-

sight, no one state was safe from the others.

The first sign ot the alteration about to take pl&ce was the invasion of
Charles VIII in
one hand,

j. t

lL9L, long prepared in the

re1.gn of his predecessor.

On the

made the northern nations even more deeply 4"!are ot the pregnant

culture of Italy. On the other, it eventuated in the increase of the familiar
weaknese t

discord, egotiem and oorruption known to readers of Burckhardt and

S.YlTiOnds.

ot the five major states of the peninsula, Rome acted as the fulcrum.
Under Alexander VI and Julius II, the Holy See had become the chief power in
Italy.

At this period in Venetian met.ory, the Republic's energy was no long-er

needed for the extension of her rule but rather for i te preservation against th
European league.
on the

The Venetian oligarchy, whose attention had been firmly fixed

aggra~di8ement

ot the Republic, was determined to maintain her power.

Flol'cnce, with continuing tacttonsl struggles, now between the Eiagnoni and the
15
ottimati,
concentrated her failing vigor for use in the internal struggle

15In

'

the Florentine political history of Ouicciardini'a period, the
P£P2lari were the democratic party and the ottimati the aristocratiC group.
w.rine; Savonarola fS rule, the otti.'l!ati, rabidly antagonistic to him, were terms
arrabbiati. From 1527 to 1530, arra6'E'iati referred to the advanced democrats
who were uncompromisingly hostile to the Medici. Under SavonarolaI the oopolar
we~ te~ed ~ or ittP~ \:Iy their 9pponen~,. Medici partlsana we~
called the
c or, a I' le~r e
lS10h in 449
the bi i, Ferdinand
Schevill, H ~Flor8nce, (rlew Yo~ 1ge1), pp. tt2, L8U~

-

,
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awaiting hEll' at th, end of the second Cinauecento decade.
not ignore 11 terary acrJ.evement,
Florence.

&~e

never publicly encouraged it as had

But the Medici transferred the £<'lorentine

Rome with Giovanni. and Giullo.

Thou€,h Venice did

tra~.1 tions

of culture to

At Naples the Aragoneae dynasty experienced

continu.al troubles with baronial revolts in the 1480's and later feared Charles
V's pretensions.

The southern provinces of Italy were rent from the time of

the struggle of Ferdinand of Aragon and Louis XII.

But it was I'1ilan, first

among the Lombardian towns, 'Which was doomed to bear the brunt of the
French and German armies.

l~le

vms.,

the Sforzas tried to maintain the semblance of

their dukedom, the populace lived under the hand of their conquerors.
Cesare Boreia, !<4'echiavelli's great hero, snd Juliua II had either destroys
or obliterated the lines of the smaller principalities.

At the

ber.innin~

of

the sixteenth century, Ferrara, Mantua and Urbino alone continued the
traditions of the previous age.
A constant factor dur1ng the periods of stress and upheaval in the

peninsula frior to 1527 was the r:,rimsoy of the papal position, in sri te of the
personal insecur.i. ty of the incumbents, espeCially Clement VII.
important was the oi ty of Rome.

!'k>t lees

Not only did Rome have the pope, revered by

the Catholic powers in spite of his :-eaSllre of temporal potency and the balance
of his diplomatic weight, but also the sacred c1 ty of Cr.rJetenoom had not as

yet felt the scourge of war that was breaking the spirit of the northern
capitals.

Thus it was only natural that the pOlitical and intellectual

10
energies of the Italians should find their center here. 16
To this situation and its variegated facets reacted a figure ranked with
Machiavelli and Ariosto as one of the "three keenest intellects of Italy" tI17
Francesco Guicciardini. 18 The use of the word "Machiavellian" to connote

l6s ;ymOndS" Revival" p • .320.
l7This judgment has been made by a pioneer scholar of the social life of
the Renaissance principalities" Edmund G. Gardner" The lung of Court Poets: a
study 2! .t!!! Work" ill!.!!!.9. Times 2! Lodovico Ariosto'" London, t906~" p. 166.l8In the interests of unity and clarity, a biographical sketch of
OUicciardini is given here. Further details of his life will necessarily come
to light in the various chapters.
The Guicciardini family, like the majority of families important during th
republican period, issued from the l?9P2lani f,;assi or buoni POiilani, the
nouveaux riches of Florence. For more than ~o centuries they ad played a
predOlfllilant role in Florentine government. In its long history of civil
service" the family included ~onfalOnieri" priori and ambassadors.
Francesco (1483-l540) was educated in the humanist tradition by his father
Piero" austere and melanchOlic, according to the testimony of contemporaries.
In his later life, Francesco evidenced a predilection for his grandfather,
Jacopo, who had rendered wise service as a counsellor of Lorenzo de'Medici. Th4
bent of his nature was clearly to political life. In 1505 he took his law
doctorate after studies in civil and canon law at Florence, f'adua and Ferrara.
As a practicing lawyer in his native city, he defended important families and
corporations, but it was not long before the somewhat sterile law of the
Renaissance proved unable to sustain his interest. His brilliant career as an
advocate and jurist, together with the renown his family had already acquired
in the p.l.blic service, led in 1512 to his appointment as a diplomatic representative from his native City to the court of Spain. Although he had received
his commission under Soderini's government, he retained his post upon its fall
and the Medici return to Florence. He was to promote there the interests of
Florentine commerce as well as diplOmacy. Upon his return to Florence in 1514,
he came to look upon their recent restoration as an evident attempt to renew
their tyranny" and he 1mmediately began to formulate his plan of ottimati
government. In 1516 Guicciardini began his long term of papal-Medicean service
for eight years governor of Modena with jurisdiction over Reggio and Parma and
their territories. and finally president of the disturbed Romagna under Clement
VII. He acted as lieutenant-general of the papal and Florentine troops .f'ighti~
the imperial forces until 1527. He relinquished his office of papal lieutenant
after the Signing of Clement. s treaty of peace wi th the Emperor. though he
retained his presidency of the st1l1-disturbed Romagna a short while longer. Ir
1527, with the second expulsion of the Medici, Guicciardini rallied to the
support of the Capponi regime, representative of the ottiroati, and worked for

u
cunning action indicates a widespread acquaintance with the ideas of the
Florentine Secretary's

.!!

Principe.

And unlike Ar1osto, Guicciardini has

the reconciliation of the Florentine Republic with the Emperor. In 1529, with
the succession of the arrabbiati Carducci, Clement took advantage of the
imperial offer to reestablish Medici control in Florence. Guicciardini concurred in this plan and was condemned as a Florentine rebel, though the city
fell to the papal-imperial troops in 1530. In mid-15J1 he became vice-legate
to Bologna, an important post procured for him by Clement. After his recall
.from this position by Paul III .. to Duke Alexander, Guicciardini returned to
Florence a.nd in 1535 became a counsellor, who was to head the city as capital 0
the Tuscan duchy. :During these years, Guicciardini worked against partisans of
a popular government and.. after the murder of the Duke in 1537, proclaimed
Cosimo de' Medici as his successor. He then retired to his country villa to
complete his storia d'Italia.
Guicciard1n1 is wri tri'igs include I R1cordanze and Memorie di f~a and
Storia fiorent1na (150B-ll) J niario del" via~io in S~gna (1)12),; ReaZ!one di
Spae (lSl),; ras Discorsi P2Utlci;Cons:i.stingof onsiderazioni intorno ai
If Discorsi" del Machiavelli so~ra 1& Erima deoa di Ti to L1vio and several
indIVidual writIngs on i)aitles" a!i'iances iiidtreaiie'i (various dates);
Discorsi !!:.! reftimento .2.! Firenze, then Dialogo .2!! reH:imento ~ Fi;""'em:;e
(152i-25)J Scr:i.tl aalofetlc!, fiicluding Consoiatoria>27)' oratio
accusatoria, Defenso a1S27~,; Cose fiorentine (1527-35),; Rioordi (In their
private form, 1512" revised in l~ and in their mature form, 1530), and
finally Storia d'Italia (1535-40).
Guicciardini's own jottings form the best source for l".is youthful years.
Cf. especially his "femorie di famglia, nScritti autobiografici e rari, ed.
Roberto Palrnarocchi (Bari, 19.36), pp. l-5b, and hIs "Ricordinze,1t ibid... pp.
51-98. This applies also to his political and historical writingsu.pon which
this entire dissertation has been built.
Among the general works which afford aocurate and useful factual material
on Guicciardini's life are the following: C. Antoniade, Trois fiS,Ures de la
Renaissance (Paris, 1937): Eug~ne Benoist, Guichardin: Historien et
d'etat italien ~ XVle si~cle (Pa.ris, 1862); L. ChIesi .. !Siio newEiniiia e
rancesco GUlcciardinI gqvernatore della cittA (Reggio
lia, ts92); Vittorio
Cian~ I1 Eerf~tto cavaliere!l! £!rfetto EtiItico della Rinascita, Baldassarre
si.£! Cieti~J.one ! Francesco Guicciardini Firenze .. 1930} J A. Geffroy, "Une
autobiograp e de GUIchardin d;ap~s ses oeuvres, in{dites," Revue des deux
ndes .. I .. s6r • .3 (lB7lJ), 656-685, and "Un politique italien de ia R"f!iiiiSS'Siicea
G cardin et ses oeuvres in'dites, f! ibid., XXXIV, sIr. 2 (1861), 96l-96lJ;
Luigi Malagoli" Guicciardini (Firenze;-I'939); Gino Masi, fill Guicciardini e la
giurisprudenza del suo tempO," Francesco Guicciardini nel IV centenario della
orte (15lJO-19lJO) (Firenze" 1940), pp. 117-139; siro A:-Num, Francesco
G cciardini (Bo1og~, 1936); Andre 01i~tea, Francois Gu1chardin, sa vie
u
ue et sa ~nsee Eolitique (ParrL 1926); Roberto RidolfI vIta~
r c
o~cafBiM (6a, 1960). Aefore the publication of "t"l1'eel'tborate
or 0 Ridoi1'i, otetea' s work was the most com et

nomme-

A

i2
IOlOYnl neither, to use the ~!anzonian19 phrase, ttl faltere e la polvere, ff the

altar of popularity nor t.'1e dust of' the library.20 Rather, as his various
works came to light, 5cholan evidenced a renewed thotlr,h usually temporary

interest in him, and Romanticists and men ot the national revival of the
latter nineteenth century otten interpreted OUicciardini' 8 role to accord wi. th
the view of their own periods. 21
"*.

utilized muoh material from the Car1:.eggi of Gu1eciardini, now in the process of
publication. For brevity, balanoe andiccuracy, of. also Federico Chabod,
"Francesco Guicciardini, It Enciclop!dia italians (Rama, 1933), Inn, 2hL-2L8.
The excellent index
Ridolfi's GUIcciaraini, pp. 536-$L2, provides
ad0.i tiona! chronological material on hIs auSjectfs life and wri tinge.

or

19A1essandro Manzon:l (1181.-1873) a Milaneee in touch with many of the
influences that formed modern Itallan thought, is best known for his novel,
1. Prome.si BROsi, well as many lyrics.

20Niccolini, Ariosto, p. 18.
2lFor m.any centuries I the fame of OU1cciardini rested on the Stana
dtItalia. Guicciard1n1an studies multiplied with the publ1cation
the 02ere
inedite, ed. Counts Piero and Luigi Ouicciardin1 with a commentary by Giuseppe
Canestrini, 10 vole. (Firenze, 18;6-61), though this edition was by no means a
~.ri ti~ai one.
Interest was, however, shifted to the man rather than the
historian. BenOist, Guichardin, used the first three volumes of Canestrin1
together with archiva! _&fla! to formulate his definition of the "political
condottiere.," Following on Benoist's tracks were several prominent writers on
HacEiavem. Nor was his theaia unklliOtl!n to Francesco de ;3anctis. "L 'uomo del.
GuicciardilU," ~. critid., eel. Luigi Russo, III (Bari, 19$2) whose article
was first publiS1iiO"in lUova antologia in October, 1869. He stud1ed
Guicciardini's character ana pointed out his perfidy. Many n1neteenth-century
estimates found in tl1e Riecrdi, in the phrase of r:e 5anctis, flla corruzione
i tallana codificata ed elevaS a regole. di vita. ft F:ven Symonds agreed that tr..i
was a most accurate ciescription of the Ricordi in contrast to the patriotic and
sometimes enthusiastic traces evident in Hachlavelli's !l ~. From this
time untU 1919, variOU$ a~ct. of OUicciardin1's were 8nal.yzed and episode.
of' .his li..f~· :'*,ooMtructed. Fran that date a new phase ot Ouicciard1n1an
studies began with A. Gherardi's edition of the Storia d'Italia sUjjl1 ori~
HSS. (florence, 1919), which had utilized much ii'Chlv'a! mateflai. HeW
edi tiona of this major '!lION and other volumes of Oldcciardin1 meant !ntensif t
crt tical work. Too many pX"$judgments of nineteenth-century historiography had
generated a."l&chronistio applications of the concept of liberty as appl1ed to
Qy!ccia~nils career. Florentine republicans saw in Guicciardini a fierce

or

1.3
~'.hl.le

significant progress has been made in Guicciardinian studies, be

continues tc prove a m.ost enigmatic figure in relation to his times. No sinele
work bolus the key to understanding him.

The Ricordf. for example, are

valuable as a. document of intr'ospect1on, for a knowledge of his 1nt1mate

thoughts" but they present only a very l1mi ted and contradictory side of his
character.

Ouicciardini's critics, a recont l.n'ter has noted, ;ssem to have

forgotten this and to have concentrated their attention on the revelations of
22
the Ricord! ratl:er than on his et.ief work, the stem d l Italta.
.,
Judgmenta of Guicciardini can be made from various angles, but he should

OUicciardini a fierce adversary, a friend of tyra.nny, a corrupter of customs,
almost a traitor to country. Some pX'Ogre.3 toward a more balanced appraisal
was made in the era of the national l'ev1val, 'When the storie dtltalla
const! tuted the prinCipal %"Maon for reprinting his woritii. He narrated the
crisis of Italian liberty and first suggested the history of In~l' not onlY
that of a c1ty or a region. It i8 at least wi til thil traditio
judgment that
modern work can join handel. For a detailed discussion of' the various interpretations of Guicc1ardini, ct. Palmaroechi, studi i'¥!::cciardiniani (Firense,
1947), pp. 113-124, and Alessandro Passerin d~., Liiii8 'POITt:1co e altd
sas&.i (Torino, 1955), especially 1'1'. 157-171.
. 22Ibid., p. 159. The title of the Storia was given posthumously. ct.
RidolfiTiGenesi, also his yuicciudini, pp. Ltl, n. 13, and 513.. n. Ll.

14
be accepted primarily for what he was, an historian. 23

the sonice rendered by- the student of history;

He spoke favorably of

he who recorded events could

f1ive the best evidence of the course of Qffai.r8. 2L

In some respects,

Guicciarciini linked himself with the earlier tradition of historical writing,
but he was no mere chronicler.
L~

lL90 the Neapolitan humanist, Giovan.'li pontana, wrote 1-.is

relation between poetry and history.

~cti::s

Here he set dewn three functions

on the

or

ldstor,y, whieh 100m import.a.!1tly in both the theory and pract·ice of Renaissance

historical writing.
prineipu component.

Fir~t,

history is E!!

i!StQ.e

and war must be its

Second, since war is in the realm of the cont1n{lt8nt, the

historian must pay heed to 0.11 chance, l.ike weath.er, pestilence or treachery,

23:For a discussion of Guicciardini ta technical role ss an historian and
of his placement in the general pattern of historical. writing, cf. Ettore
Allodol1, "Genesi del~ tStofi!1 d',ta1.1&· di Roberto Ridolfi," Francesco
GuiceiardinI' net IV' centena:r:-~ pp. ~2~ Benedetto Croce, HIstO¥, its
!liaory and ~iCi', trane. ~ glu Ainslie (New York, 1921) J Eduar Fuetir,
ItGuicciardini als Historiker, tI Histonseh& Zeitscbrift, C (1908), 486...514°1
Fueter, StiSiI ;:lella sto1"1}?1raf1,8
trans. A. Spinelli, 2 vols. (Napol1,
19LJ-44) J
e aeChari,
"Las
historians
florentine
de
la Renaissance at les
I
/
commencements de 1 teconomie poli tique at socials, n Seances et travaux de
l'Acad$mi~ 088_ science. morale. !! politi9?o,!J ClY t!8'15), »2-~~J
Jameson, If'l.ii'e'i.IeV19iopmeni or Modern fllrOpean Historiography," Atlantic r<!ontlll.z,
L>:vr (1890) I 322-333) Ridolfi, Genee! deUa storla d tltalia d~!ard~nIa.na
(F1renze, 1939) J .lame_ l>'. ThompSon. ii IIIsiOq of Ili.tOr1ciI
i
(New York, 19!J2) J E. Zanoni, La ment'i
Franeiico MccliidIiit
e opere
pelitiche! storlche (Firen2a;-l~'. -

moaerna,

j

J.r.

al

r=:ftOl.

1 _

2hrranceaco Guicciard1n1, Stor.1.a d'Itall!-', ad. Costantino Pa.n1gada (Bart,

1929), V, 318.

which might have some effect on the conduct ot the war. Third, the historian
must report oracles, prophecies, visions, sacrifices and the like" as
mani.featationa to men of the processes operative beb1nd the arpearances of
thinr,s. 25
Both Philip de Commines and Guicclardini follow precepts 11ke those of

pontano, treating of war and of the individuals and circumstances that

co~J. tion it. 26 Al though Commines

might be linked more closely with the

medieval writers, both he and C-uicciard1ni have points in common.

believed in the determ1n1sma of Ood
terpreted by the human observer.

27

Both

and of fortune which could not be in-

Likewise, both believed that the apparent

inevitability of past happenings had been further conditioned by the wisdom,
1'ol11es, virtuea and vices ot the individuals who made the venous decisions. 28
Ouicciard1n1 had the ability' to observe his subjects' character acutely
and to analyze their motives

tor action. His keen estimate of the proximate

and ultimate factors in the French irmasions, or those which intensi1'ied
Italian vulne.rabU1ty to this curse, and of the leading individuals involved is

2~n P. Gilmore, "Freedom and r etexmin1sm in Renaissance Historians,.
i

Studies

!!ll!!!. Renaiss",..nce.

26the last

ed. M.A. Shaaber (New York, 19.$6),

two books of Philip

Italian expedition

ot

de

nI,

L9-51.

Commines t MEnOirs are devoted to the

the French.

27The opening pages of tr..e Starta d t Ital1a present the image ot the
aftairs of men as comparable to
sea- agIiiGd by winds. 'Ihe 1esaonB o!
history can teach us only to reter ourselW8 to nthe ways of God and not those
o! men,tI Ou1cciardim, PR!re, ed. Vittorio de Caprariis (Milano .. 19$3), p. 373

me

28oilmore , 59.

16
classic. 29 Though the form of the storia d'Italia 5s chronological, the work
is fundamentally analytical.

It beg1ns nth the year 1492, where r1achiavell1's

histo1"7 of Florence and related Italian affain ends, and concludes with the
death cf Clement

m

in 15.3b.

Guicciardin1 was, like later scientific historians, conscious of the
complexity of his field.

Though himself of a communal background, he realized

the nec•••i ty of extending the municipal l1mits of communal and humanistic
hi.torlopnpby and of giving national history a European scope. His aim

WAS

based on tl-,. perception that Italian affairs in themselves could on.lJr be judged

erroneous17. Highly variable, in only a few months

many things

vere dit.terent

what they had been, .tor they depended in great part on the activities of

£rom

the grea.t powers.)O
In his historlcal work

al

well

a8

in his active career, Ouicciardin1 was

eminently conscious of change. He WZ'Ote that it was not enough to consider the
l'.lOrld at any given moment, for at any time countleo accidents could arise to

incnue present difficult1.ea. l1 He cautioned also that on s11ght causes

29Cf. infra, pp. 26 31.
4

I'
/
/
,3n..
VJA cose d t Italia s1 possone male g1udicare da per ae, ai
lt; sono
in se malta mutablle, e si vede cha in pochi mes1 variane assai, a1 perche 1.
dependone in grandissima parte da queUo che
loimperadore, el re catoUco
Inghilterra ed e f svizseri ••• , "Sulle mutazioni segu1.te dOpa 1& battaglia di
Ravenna, ff S,cr1tti rtl1tiCi ! ricordi, ed. R. Palmarocch1 (Bari, 193,3)" p. 91.
This piece was va ten Iii spaIii !i'i i:5l2.

perch.

I

tara

,3l

flOratio Accusatoria," BantU !lptobiosrafic1, p. 226. "lJon ci bisogna
solo considerare el mondo come eta ora, rna possono nascere ogni ora molti
accidenti che augumenterebbono sanza comparazione le difficult", .'so.petti e
pencoli. "

17
depended the course ot the most weighty affain. 32 He was well aware that one
could not be secure in the posse.sion of things not in thansel:ves perpetual and
which could be lost at any t1m.e, particularly through changes in court or in

the pope's will.

In his own career he tried to hold these good things as

lIaliene. 1133
Cne could not help but notice that Italian altairs were largely dependent
on the role of the princes. Guicciardini

expla1n~d

that, since rulers were

often conscious of their own inclination to preteI' their interest to faith,
they thought that the same was true ot other princes. 3L Treaties depended for
their eDCU tion on the sineer1 ty and fOod w.Ul of the rulers as well as on
countless other factors often unknown.
Guicciardini contrasted the un1 ty in imperial affairs with the dieun1 ty
in confederate ranks.

At the height ot difficulty in 1526, he recognized that

the negotiations, the provisions and operations of the anti-imperialists were
"delayed, interrupted and varied, according to the forces, the views and the

counsels of the princes. If The Emperor, on the other hand, exerted his utmost
strength for his resolution depended on himself. 35 Though Charles V did not
have the control over his own affairs that Guicc1ardini believed he had, it vu
logical for h1lIl to hold that Yiew.

Guicciardini always tended to equate

32Storia dtItalla, V, 279.
33ccnso1atoria," Scritti autobiografici, pp. 170-171 •

.3l4Storia d'Ital1a, V, 10.

-

35Ibid., 6L.

18
successful action with basic unity. $)IIII.onds tollows Guicciardini in stressing
the princely neglect of their responsibUities.

\\1l1le the glory of Italy Uke

that of Greece lay in letters, the arts and the civilities of life, her ruin
lay in indolent princes and the lack of arms.

The very condi tiona which

allowed her to produce her culture seem to have rendered her freedom impossible
for spin. tual ascendancy was purchased at the expense of political solidity
and national prosperity.J6

In 1526 Ouicciardini criticized Francis I for his

indolence and insinceri't7 in league attaire but he thought that the Italian
rulers were pr:i.marily to blame for their difficulties.

Nor was there any

significant assistance from skilltul miUtar,y leaders who obstinately rejected

all adVice and badlY managed important affairs. 3?
So much for the variable factors at work in human history.
unquestionably realized their significance.
stand the essential unity of history.

Guicciardini

No less, however, did he under-

The past, the present and the future are

fundamentally alike, though they may seem divergent in surface aspects.

One is

able to make an estimate of a situation on the basis ot another which is
sim:Uar. 38 Wise men alone are able to recognize the similarity in events, tor

36Revival, p. h60.
37This was the case with the great French commander, Laut.rec, storia

dtItalia, V, 208, 219, 228, 2)0.

38 ttte COM d6t mondo hanno questa condi.:done, 0 voglltmo dire, ciret40' 00_
eempre qusllo cbs e, ha similltudine eol passato, e queUo cbe sara, sara SimilE
a queUo ehe $ stato. E d~verlO nelle suPGrf1c1e e net colon, rna simile nelli
intr1naechi e eu.tans-iali ta J pel'O non 8i pue errare a ndaurare questo con 18
mieura .:11 queUo J n "Ragioni cha consigliano a Clemente VII di aeeordarsi eon
Carlo VI in contrario," Scritti 2211t19!_ p. 1Sh.

"the faces of men and the outer appearances of thinrs change."

Guieciardini

adds that lIb1stol""J is good end useful beeause it places before you and makes

you see and realize what you had never known or seen.".39
Not. only was there unity in Guieeiardini's vision, but the unity of his
diplomatic and historical careers must be stressed as well. More than almost
any other historical figure, he must be interpreted on the basis of the

intimate link between his thought and the action and events of his times.

He

wrote two objectively distinct types of works, political and historical, but

the two stem from the same mental set fundamentally and are related to each
other in an evolutionary fashion. 40 The early .storie fiorentine
evidenced
.
Ouicciardini's realisation of the necessity for undentand1ng accurately past
events as a basis tor statesmanlike action.

The only way to transoend the

historical situation is to try to discover how it has come to be. His background researches and the judgment acquired in his primary hiatorical endeavor
proved useful tor him in his more active concerns in behalf of his native eity.
His diplomatie mission in Spain gave him a model tor actlon, Ferdinand of
Aragon, aJd.n to the meaning of Cesare Borgia for f·lachiavelli.

Guieciardini 's

thought, especially in its mature presentation, was greatly dependent upon his
practical experience.

His experience. l.a1d the basi. for the cynicism of the

May

39r.etter to Machiavelli,
18, 1521, carteflt.~ Franceseo Gulceiardini,
ed. Plero Giorgio Ricci and Roberto ralmarocch!
ogna, 19.3S- )~ - IV, lb.
40A masterful study ot tId,s evolutionary :relationship has been made by
Vittorio de Caprar1is, Francesco Ouicciardini dalla P21itica alla stor!a
(Bari, 1950).
-
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Ricordi and tor

~~e

sombre atmosphere of the Steri. d'ltalia.

The narrative of

tho Storia began with what became Book XVI, the Battle of Pavia.

Begun in

153$, that york lIas for a time planned as a Ouieeiardinian autobiograp~.Ll
'i'his fact alone 113 a etr.:Ud.ng indication that his own tragedy was part ot one
more vast.
Machiavelli paid a tribute to Guicciardini tor the political experience
and judgment that was his.

Up to

1521, Guicciardini had been busy with

governmental and administrative affairs and had
published nothing.
been

accompl1sh~d

wn tten very

11 tt.le and had

By that :late, much of !·1a.cmaveU:t IS major tfOrk had already

or was being executed.

In 1524, he replied to Ouicciard1n1,

who had given him some erra...,d to perform tor his property at Poppiano, that he
r.ad been spending hie time in the country writing his Steria and would give

"ten soldi-I ,,'ontt say more" to have Ouicciardini at his side.
that he was coming to "certain details" and needed his

~and's

He explained
opinion as to

whether he otfended either by exaggeratton or understatement.L2
Personally, M.aehiavelli was tar different from the aristocratic and somewhat solemn Ouieciardini.

One authority thinks that real friendship and

congeniality between them was not ponible until the fierce storms of Italy

L1ct. the enlightening aocount of Ridolfi, Oeneal della storia d' Italla
guj.cciardiniana; of. also Fa.sarin d'EntNves, n:mia' ~11tlco, p. l6L.
42Letter to Guicc1ard1n1, August .30, 1524, Nschiavelli, Lettere iam1liari,
ed. Fdwardo Alvisi (F1renze, 1883), p. 435.
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tount.! them both in the same boat. 43 They were just as different in the realm
of history, perhaps more so. l-1,achiavelli l s need for advice points up the fact
that he was not interested in the rdIlute and diligent search

tor facts

&0

cvidel1't. in Guicciardini '5 historios. He wrote history to serve the purposes ot
political science, not
he

wisl~

80

much as an historian.

From the facta as he had them,

to derive lS$80ns, principles and doctrloot't, while, on occ&fdons .. he

manifested no scruples about fitting the facts to his th90ries. 4h
\~1rl.le

Guicciardini is (til politico e solo un politico ,11 i1ach1a:velll is

rather of a poetic mentality.

The poet obeys no lawa other t.'1a.."'l his own

f:::.ntaS"J and ca.'l put his intui tiona into a harmonious unity J while the poll tical
writer must follow a complicated and often capricious development of facts,
affirm or deny their relevance and accuracy, and walk through ways never direct
or contUruous.

The poet conquers reality by evading it, a..'ld a light of hopeful.

prophecy illumines hie mela.ncholy.

The political writer, on the contraxy,

finds his liberation only in success.

It t.his is 1acldng to him, his very

ideas become burdens which drag him down and crush him.laS

In this perceptive

judgment.. one finds a guiding light tc the often tortuous road of Gtd cciardinia:
thought and action" tor he was indeed "il 'f-'Ol1tico, tt to whom 11achiave111 "had

la3aido1fi, The Lire of Nicco16 Y~chiavell1 .. trans. Cecil Grayson (Cf'..1cago,
1963), pp. l87-l'B'S': •

L41bid., pp. 196-19'1.
hSThese Views are expresaed by Palmarocchi, studi gu,J.cciardiniani. p. 111.
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always been

.2! plur1mum

a promoter of extravagant opinions and an inVentor ot

new th1ngs.nL6
Ouicciardini •s focus was almost entirely poll tical, for this was the side
of events 'Which conditioned their course within a state down to the most minut

detail.

Neither economic nor theological problems troubled him.47 Still he

not oblivious of his age's pioneering spirit. He wrote some very noteworthy

r..ages dedicated to the commerce of the Portuguese and to the discovery of the
New Horld.

~lith

the Columbian discovery, the Old horld was assailed by the

t~

He praised the brave man and his successors who came upon these good th.1nes,
but he did not hesitate to intimate that their zeal for the spread of the

Christian religion did not always outweigh their cupidity for riches.

Yet, in

the course of events, many natives became converted to "nostra religione. HL8

One-half century after Columbus. navigation and in consequence ot his
discovery, Ouicciardini commented that aome ot the principles (cardini) long
JAU

accepted by revered scholars and sacred writers no longer rule, and everything
remains in a state ot dlscussion. 49 In accordance with his method of strict
marshaling of the facts, usually with a sparse commentary, OUicciardini did no

46aidOlti, Hachiavelli, p. 188.

47 Guicciardini simply repeated the usual humanist cn t1clsms of abuses in
the Church. ct. intra, p. 449.
48storia fltltalla, II, 127-132.

49nNe solo ha questa navigaz10ne conf'uso molte cose affemate dagll
scrittori delle COM terrene, rna dato, oltra a eib, qualche anz1eu( agli
interpret1 della Bcrittura Baera •••• ," ~., p. 132.
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pose any problem here.

Rather he seemed to be suspended between Renaissance

admiration for this New Ulysses and an unnerving apprehension of its potential
violence.
In a sketch of IfGuicciardini vecchio e nuovo, tI the need has been cited for

an explanation of his role in accordance with more recent views of the
50
Renaissance.
This dissertation attempts to illuminate a vital area of
C1nquecento 11fe by portraying OUicciardini as a major figure of that SOCiety,
as one who not only advanced his views but who also examined them. in his latter
years.

The extent to l'hich he vas a cooperati.ng agent in the ultimately

debilitating vagaries of papal and 11edicean service or a retlection of the
general and growing d!sUlusioment of the period are two aspects of the same

question.
Chapter two will deal with Ouicciardini t s views on the fundamentaJ. problem

of his age, namely, the confrontation of the political units of Italy with the
major ::'uropean powers struggling tor hef,emony over them primarily

,tlS

Guicciardin1 handled it in his Stana dtItalia. Chapters three a.nd tour will
deal with papal policies, the first, from Alexander VI through Leo X,and the

latter, under Clement VII. The papacy was indeed the Italian Mcrum, and.
Guicciardinits own disillusionment was intimately linked with the failure of

the Cinquecento papacy to lead Italy

aw~

from the policy of destruction to

which .. wittifl€',ly or otherwise, she was precipitating herself.

Chapter five wilJ

treat OUicciardin1's attitudes toward his beloved Florence, in her past and

5°Passerin dtEntrives, Dante j:£lltico, p. 159.
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present, and his role in connection with events leading to her tragedy in 15.32.
For him the Florentine decline meant the death-knell of his higbly prized

-borghese govemnent,

to him bound with the salvation of Italy. Chapter six

rill investigate Guicoiardinils "religion," important for an understanding of
any thinker, and particularly so for one often held to have been one of the

most i.m.oral, or amoral, men of the Renaissance.
f

Chapter seven will serve

8S

I

a resume of the material. of the thesis and will attempt to make as precise as
possible Ouicciard1ni's own state of mind during his active career and the
latter years of his life in its relationship to the weltanschau!ffi.S of the most
critical period of the Cinquecento.

CEAPTER II
GUICCIARrINI
AND thE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE

Guicciardini t s storia d' Italla was also his J:Oli tical testament. He
surveyed the Italian scene from lL90 to 1534 not onl)t as a carefUl historian of
his age but also from the vantage point of one intimately involved in the

penirumla's struesles. Basic then to a study of Oulcciardini's pessimism are
his views on Ci2Quecento Italy and the fashioners of her policy.
From his own period, the historical situation has becane well known.

Later writers have detailed the power struggle in the Italian arena, but this
does not mean that this topic can bedism1aaed here.

It is what Ouicciardini

saw through the maze of historical facts that is vi tal for the problem of the
dissertation. With an almost

unc~

political acumen, he analysed acutely the

situation that spelled Italy's political collapse in the sixteenth century,
especially the rampant division, ambition and jealousy of the Italian states
and their rulers. One reads 'l'hucydides t account of the Peloponnesian wars not
so much for the accurate historical facts contained therein but primarily for
the picture of greed and individualism eo maeterfully woven into it.
Ouicciardini 'til Storls d' Italis. is of Similar value.

his work 1s not subject to question.

The essential accuracy of

He saw the a1 tuat10n for what 1twas,

hence the value of portraying the Italian scene through

25

Guice1ardini~8 GyS8

alone.

It 1s important to give attention to his analysis of a s1 tuation which

was of paramount sign1ticance to

the e2l1t1cal

~

that be wa..

He not only

wi tnesseC the trend of events and participated in them but he grasped their

real meaning.

His understandi!J£ of t.his Situation, as a participant and later

as an historian, contributed fundamentally to his disillusionment.

In another

sense, as tho dissertation's subtitle indicates, Ouicciardin1 refiecteci the
pessimism, defeatism and disillusionment of his mil1eu.
Guicciardini contrasted the peaceful. character ot the peninsula from the
Peace of todi l ot

1454 to the period

nearing

1494

and the thunderous change

atter that date. The ccmnon interests ot the Italian states seemed predominant over their differences.

In Ouicciardin1 t s judgment, Italy as a whole

had not enJoyed a state ot such cCtl1plete repo.. and prosperity since the decl1n

ot the Roman Fmpi:re.

2

Ouiceiardini addres8ed himself to a perplexing but basic problem, namely,

what factors could account tor the strildng changes that he witnessed there.

He discovered that. the factors in favor of the maintenance ol the status S!!.2

lA. twenty-five year defensive all1ance against the Turks vas signed by
the paracy, Naples, Florence and Milan. Thoueh its elaborate mach1nery never
ll".ater1tilized, the League gave expression to the convictiOn that both the comon
interests and those ol each state derr.anded peace and un! ty wi thin Italian
borders, and it remained an ideal during the continuance ot war. The small
states hailed the Lodi Peace as a guarantee ot their continued existence. In
lL80 1t8 League was formaJ.ly renewed tor a period of twenty-tive years.

2storia d'Itelia, I, 2.

-
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had been subject to e.ha.nge at the slightest provocation.

None of the powers

involved in the league of 11.80 desired war, but atill each tended to watch and

to emulate any apparent increase in his neighbors' power, 3 with the undoubted
exception of Guicciardini' a F'lorentine hero, Lorenzo 11 t4af1lifico. 4
In 1492 there occurred a aeries of events 'Which Guicciard.1.n1 found seri oua
enough

~

upset the Italian calm.5 The non-meddleaome Innocent VIII, whom

6

Lorenzo advised "in all things, tt was succeeded in the papal chair by Alexander

VI.

Following the statesmanlike Lorenzo in Florence was his son Piero,

stroneJ.y

~er

the intluence of the Orsini and unable to cooperate with his

htorenzo was "come uno censore delli al tri potentati. tt His reputation was
so great in Italy that ''no l'".rave thing was deliberated without his will" and no
serious discords were allowed to erupt, OU1cciardini, trElogio {ii Lorenzo de I
Medici," Serittf., politici, pp. 225, 227.
5.FollOldng Guicciardini, S)'mOnds cited the' significance of the y'ear 1492
as "one of the most memorable dates in r.istory." Charles VIII actually took tht
reins of the French kingdom into his own hands. Columbus clJ.scovered America.
Roderigo Borgia became pope. i,j.th the conquest of Granada, Spain became a
nation. Symonds judged that the three latter points wen tlno le•• trui tM of
consequences to Italy than was the accession of Charles VIII.tt The discovery
of America, followed in another six years by Vasco da Gama's exploration of the
Indian seas, diverted the COIImIel'Ce of the world into new channels. Alexander,
eo Symonds continued, "made the fl8fomation and the Northern Schism
certainties." It would be more accurate to indicate that his pontificate gave
strong evidence of the vital and present need for Church reform. Lastly, the
consolidation of spain prepared the war tor the "autocracy" ot Cr.arles V. Ir'j,'hul
the commercial, the spiritual, and the :pol! tical sceptre tell in this one year
from the grasp of the Italian., ft ~eapots, p. 423.
lui. 11

601.'.

!lElogio," p. 225.

"Papa Innocenz1o 8i laaciava in tutto vovernare a

-
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allies .for the preservation of reace.
SSW

His fundamental error, aa Guicciardin1

it, was his strong friendship with Ferrante of Naples and his successor

Alfonso.

To counteract a possible alliance between Florence and Aragon,

todovico of Milan then jkiitiated positive measures. 7
Each of these changes, Guiceiardini noted, portended quick and steady
future ones. .An alliance like that of April 1493, geared to the common safety
of the Pope, the Venetians and the l'iilanese and to active support of Lodovieo
in };is duchy', could not settle the disturbed situation,.

8

Ll)tlovico, realizing

that he had nothing in common with the Venetians, felt that he could not rely

on the course of their actions; he conceived the notion of bringing the French
into Italy to aid his Milanese forces in an invasion of Naples. 9 For his own
reasons, Ercole dlE.te, the Duke of Ferrara and Lodcvicots father-in-law, also
incited him to invite the French.

i't'ith all the Itsllan states at variance,

Ercole thought he could more easily recover the I-olesine di Ronge which he had
earlier lost to the Venetians. lO
To Ouicciardini, the actions of Lodovico i1 Moro and Ercole d'Este were
typical illustrations of the rampant indiVidualism that wrecked Italy.

It was

nothing more than the vain and immediate advantage of certain ambitious Italian

7

storia d'Italia, I,

-

8rud ., 16.

-

9Ibid., 17.

-

IDJ:bid., 30.

5-8.
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the
-signori struggling for power that afforded Charles Vlll and his successors
ll
opportunity to press Angev1n and Orleanist claims to Naples and MUan.

Lodovico was one of Guicciardini' s blackest villains. The LUke t slack ot
responsibility was partlcuJarly accountable for the unparalleled succession of
disastrous events which Guicciardini saw as concrete evidence of "an angry and
punJ. tive divine judgment." It seEllled clear to him that Lodovico must have
harbored some realization of the flagrant canbus;iion he was about to kindle,
else why would he have desired Alexander as an accomplice through the Pope' 8
acquiescence in these plans.12 Upon Lodovico's death, the historian was moved
tc ciwracterize his pan-Italian ambitions as too great to be confined within a
l
narrow Prison. .) Ouicciardini made his historical characterization ldth the
same acuteness as Machiavelli, who wrote of

n

Marois opportunisma

"Lodovico

Sfona, as a shallow !ran, hopes, then fears, and anchors now to one thing, now
tr another. u14 FroM the polic:Les of men such as these, the 'words of Hachiavelli

and Guicciudin1 seem to intimate J stem all the ill. from wh1ch Italy suffers
while they sadly observe. l"eebleneas and clum.s1neas resulted from prinoely

attempts to be teo subtle and too astute.

U Ibid., 1.

Princely self1shness ie

11

constant theta :1n Gu1cc1ardini's

wri tinge:--

-

12Ibid ., 21, 30.

lLHachiavelli, La ~, ed. F. Fanfani and L. Passerini,

13rbid., 393.

from Vol. II
onwards, ed. L. Pasaer1nl""'iiid G. IUlanesi, (; vols. incomplete (Firenze, 187377), II, 1.38.

On the other hand, it seemed to Guicciardini that princely selfishness
demonstrated the moral and political weakness of the peninsula.
even more basic reasons underlying its misery.

He explained

Since Italy was divided into so

many principalities and states, it was Itnext to impossible, on account of the
various inclinations and interests of her rulers, that she should not be
subjected to continual ferments. nl'

Guicciardini understood that internal

division could only breed disorder.
It was not surprising to him that the Neapolitans welcomed the French nor
that no honorable conduct appeared in their kingdomts defense,16 though "the
known wisdom and understanding of the Italian princes" seemed baffled.

As had

all events in Italy from the arrival of Charles VIII at Asti in the autumn of
1494, the Neapolitan capitulation portended further disaster for all Italy.
The beginning of this Italian tragedy was referred to in Guicciardini t s
Dialo~o.

There it appeared even more dolorous inasmuch as it was presented as

a prophecy made in the long past year of 1494. Wi th an analysis of French
fortunes in Italy were mingled musings on the Italian future.

The Neapolitan

undertaking had succeeded so well for the invaders that it did not seem that
they could be easily expelled.

Even if this were to happen, it was most

unlikely that this gigantic effort would be over permanently.

The power of

France was very great, and the French had "tasted the sweetness" of Naples and

l'Storia d' ltalia, IV, 1-2.

-

16Ibid., I, 103-106.

-stirred up the populace, The occasions for their re-entry could no longer be
lacking, for Italian unity WtlS shattered and the chains which had held it .f'1rm
irremediably broken.l7 tiith these invaders entered untold evils - new customs,

new diseases and, above all, new and bloody methods of war. He wrote:

was lett open for barbarian nations to

"A door

invade and oppress us. t,l8

And such a situation could now come about easily.

A mer with ambition,

anger or fear would no longer hesitate tc; follow the example of Lodovico
Sforza. Already Gu1cciardini t e mouthp1ece, Bernardo of the T;ial,oso, noted
:t-:TOposals for German and Spanish help against the Fl'8nch.

Not only did he feel.

that there was no securityagldnet the French but also there was no doubt that
the way was now opened in Italy for some other nation as well. So would come
the ''Ultimate ruin, n with e1ther one victorious conqueror holding the peninsula
in extreme

samtude

or its gradual sl1p into nothingness under the blows of

-

l7Ibid., 67, 113.
l8trhe feeling so evident in these wol'da is l'II)8t evident in the original:
tI, •• ls SJltrat& lore in ltalla e JX)i 10 aequisto d1 que~ta prima impreea
state 8i .filice, ch'io non so se el caociargli riuacira
e
, cost facilmente,
,
quando pure riuscissi, dubi to cbe el giuoco non sara fin! to, perche 1a potenzia
"
,
eli Francia e grande ed aranno g1a conm:d.neiato a imperan la via" d1 venire!,
gustato ls dolcezsa di questa Ir0vincia ed acce8~ gl1 animi, ne mancheranno 1e
eagioni e le cccasiord di farcegl1 venire, J:;Grche la unione di ltal1a •
conqusssata, e $One rotU quelli vincu11 cbe ls tenevano forma •••• ," r1al.o&,>!
dis r,1 ~ reRGt!!.Pto S12'iren,M\, edt Roberto Palmarocohi (Bari, 19~),
p.
•

e

71
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competing fore1gn groups.19

Quicc1ardini's attl. tude seemed defeatist 1."J:om the Ye17 begin.1'ling.

The

Italians could in no way pull together against the momter which some of them

had created.

Internal discords are always dreadf'ul,

especially during a period of invasion.

OUicci~...:i.ni

argued, but

One burning issue was centrol of Pisa.

This was central tor .rdlan, Venice and FlQrence. ana it brought still

anot..~r

"mediatin£" power into the fertile Italian arena, F)nperor 14aXimllian. 20 Then

too the bonds of the alliance ot 149.$ amonr: Lodovioo, tn,a Venetians, the Pope

and the Emperor were superficial and iUnd811'lentally v,;eak, Gu1ceiardini
observed. 21

His mouthpiece Bernardo agreed that the league would provide super ricial

19ttOgnuno abe

ari

ambilione, adegno

0

paura, non potendo satistarsi

0

/

asejcur~rsi per altra via, oereher'a di tare venire oltramontani, e quanta p1u
prosperamente saft riuscito al duca tanto piU Vi piglieramo animo gli altri.
Vedete chs ora per cacciare tranzeai si comi.."1Cl.a a parlare di tedeschi e d1
spagnuol1J perc non solo 10 non c1 veggo sie~ coo a' tranzesi nen sbhino
stare 0 tcr.nare in ltalia., ma dubita aneers che non s1 a,Pra la via a qualohe
altrs nalione. E questa sarebbe 1s. ru1na ultima, perche mentre che 01 staranno
dtaccordo, 131 mangeranno ItallaJ sa verranno a rottura, la. lacereramoJ e se

per sox;.te l'uno oltramonteno cacceft "'altra, l'Ital1a re8ter~ in estrema

-

servitu ••••• ," ibid., p. 72.

20storie d'Italla, I, 126I 121-122.

2l1.2!2., 137-140.

33
unity but, were it to shatter, matters would be more confused than ever. 22
Guicciardini particularly castigated Venice, whom the other Italian states
feared.

She made temporary alliances with than but terminated each one after

the 1lmned1ate danger had r:assed.
of Venetian ambition.

Guicciardini easily pointed to past instances

After the death of

l'~ilippo

Haria Visconte in

1441, in

the times of "padri nostri, ,,23 the Venetians had planned tc usurp control of
the Duchy ot Kilan as the first step of their domination of all Italy.24 Thei
actions, Guicciardini agreed, had made the Venetian Republic "universally
detested. " !4any Italians observed that haughty Venice had long set aside all
regard to justice am public fBi th aa she openly and opportunistically sought
to subject the peninsula completely.

\<,'hen Venice lost much of her empire in

1509, a larpe

se~ent

pleasure. ,,25

Referring to Venetian ambitions

of the Italian population e:xperienced the "greatest

tor Pisa, Guicciardini explained

that 1 twas Iltheir nature always to embl'ac4" such occasions. ,,26
Yet Guicciardini well understood that Venice was one of the most venerable

220uicciardini's mouthpiece Bernardo / stateda "Questa lega
. che ora s1
pratica, quando bene ai conchiugga, durera ~anto units quanta questo blsogno
cha corre ora; di poi reatera ogni con pin confUsa cha m'l11, ft ~al0S2, p. 71.

2~en during Filippo Maria's lU'at1me, Venice joined Florence against
Filippo and took Bergamo and Brescia in 1425.

24 ••• e • viniziani pensorono di usurpare el ducato di NUano, cha non era
altro che la via di insignorirsi preato d1 tutta Italia .... ," [;1alol[o, p. 62.
2$Stor.1a d'!talia, II, 282.
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members of the Italic body. 27 Her plight was strong evidence of the basic
slteration in peninsular affairs wt-d.eb had taken place between 1494 and 1508.
The mighty Republic had been assaulted in her eastern outposts from lL99 to

1503.

The new route to the Indies struck at the old trade t.brough the Levant,

steadily undermining Venetian prosperity.

Simultaneously, the steady Turkish

advance left Venice the alternative of active opposition or accommodation.
Generally the latter poliey was .followed, much to the disgust o.f other
European states.
In this weakened condition, Gu1cciardini pointed out, Venice was prey to
the similar ambitions of Italians and foreigners.

The League of Cambrai of

recember 1508 was successful in its object of despoiling the envied Republic
of her possessions on the mainland zd in Apulia.

1'0 Guicciardini, the

Venetian defeat by the French at Agnadello in Maw 1509 was cn tical for their

position.

Thereafter they surrendered Verona, V1cenza and hldua 28 to

Marlmilian, 'While Pope Julius occupied Ravenna, Rimin1, Faenza and other
Venetian

FOSS8Ssions

in the Romagna.

To Ferdinand of Aragon fell Brindisi,

Otranto and other Apullan towns.
Though the Fowers r.ad expected their ..sault to prove even more successful
Venice 'was obliged to remain on the defensive from that point onward.

For

27Still Guicciardini could not t>.1de tie admiration for the well-ordered
'overnt'llent of the Venetian Republic. cr. infra, pp. 394, Ll4.

them.

28'Ihe Venetians rallied and retook Padua in "~July while Vicenza recalled

Guicciardini, the loss of the "greatest parts" of the Venetian empire and her
fall from the "pinnacle of Italian

p~'erft

had vital meaning and ramifications.

for one thing, he noted, many Italians were shocked into a deeper realb.ation
of their crisis.
Guicc1ardini realized that, as Venice fen to the "lowe8t" degree of

misery," she hed nc resources and few hopes. To him thi8 meant nothing le88
than the absolute stultification of Venetian activ.l. V for the preservation of

her om liberty. While some grou}:S in Italy were secretly pleased at the
Republic' e "catastrophic fall from power," he explained, he agreed with the
oPfcsing group which showed "sounder judgment." For the latter, Venice's
earlier attempts at Venetian danination receded into the background as their
1ndi€"nation increased over the dismal situation intensified by foreign intervention.

usc great a city, so ancient a seat of liberty, which had diffused

the splendor of the Italian nane allover the world" was now driven under the
heel of the foreigner.

Ou.1ceiardini, not oblivious of earlier Venetian pride,

here looked beyond superficialities.

Now, he wrote, there remained no bridle

to foreign fury, for "the most honorable mEmber of the Italic body which had
maintained the common fame above all others was struck dead and useless. n 29
For GuicCiardini, the defeat of Agnadello represented the danger for the
common liberty.

29
storts d'Italia, II, 282-283. Guicciardini's words are incisive and
well chosen. Vei'iIce 1'e11 "in tanto estemin:io."

In a broader sense, the years 1508 and 1509 witnessed the demoralization
of Italy which had been
XII.

since the invasions of Charles VIII and Louis

growi~'J;

Guicciardini noted ooncrete evidence of thi.s fact.

1:uring that period,

the frequent disputes occasioning "wars and revolutions" temina.ted either
bloodlessly or at the expense at the foreigners who had engineered them, and
the rrinces rather than the populace bore the brunt of the sultering.

The

League of Cambrai seemed tc carry with it a train of "cruel events" which
overspread the face at Italy.

Everywhere Italians were personally affected by

seeing nothinr but scene a of devaatation, plunder and alaughter. This waa
attended by military licent1ouanus, the destruction ot friends as well as toea
and the wholesale desecration at sacred objects. 30 As the small fire of the
P.isan war was dying down with Pisa' s fall to Florence in 1509, a tar worse con...
nagration was burning in Italy.

It was at thia cn tical jUl'lCture of affairs that Gu1cciardini began to
participate in the affairs that he was to record with such insight some twenty-

five years later. Until his appointment as a diplomatic representative from
his native city to the court of Spain, Florence had mainta.ined no
there.

repreaentati~

Now ahe realized, in view of the Holy League of 1511 against France,

with whom she was embarrasBingly allied, that it would be to her advantage to

safeguard connections with both powers.

Thus she oould maintain neutrallty.

Piero E«ierini. the gonfaloniere, deSired the ambaasador "to defend Florence

against the accusations of the Pope" and to try to dispose Ferdinand of Aragon

-

-

30Ibid.,

245-246.
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favorably towards the Republic. 31 As an Italian, Ouicciardini understood that
anY peace must be a balanced one and not Spanish.

The Italians were not

expending their etforts nerely to chanfe masters, but the anti-French league
evidenced their desire to free Italy from all tfbarbarians.tt32

Though the ambaseador's ase1gnment was a difficult one, calling for all tho.
33 gave him no helpful adVice.
skill that he could draw upon, the Dieci
,

It

was not unusual for a period of three months to pass without any communication
from them while Guicciardini, on the contrary, referred frequently to that
body.34

The entire situation evidenced, as he testified, that there was a

genuine bitterneea in their relationships.3>
Though Florence, traditionally friendly with France, decided in favor of

3101etea, Gu1chardtn, pp. bo-1&LJ cf. also R:loolfi, :t-lachiavel11, p. 127,
thit, wEn. Soderini and his fac't1on dictated Guicciardini' s
instructions, they were written and handed to him by the well...krtawn Secretary
of the Republic. Hence these two great poll tical wn tel'S must have come face
to face at t:b.1.s time.

for the view

321..etter to Jacopo Salviati, July 4, 1513, Ctu'teut. I, 194. The worde
are "non per mutare padrone."

33The Dieci di Balla were a committee appointed whenever a war threatened
am had the l'espo'iiii'6inty' of complete m.magement of affairs during the war
period.

priors.

In earlier Florentine hiStory, this had been
cr. Schevill, Florence, p. 342.

34Ridolfi,
52.

fa

leading function of the

Gu1cciard1n1, pp. 48, 67.

3%etter to his brothers, Luigi and Jaeopo, r~ay 14. 1$12.. CartefQ., X,
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LOuis XII atter the French victory at Ravenna in April 1512,)6 the Spanish
residence ot Guicciardini had far-renchinr, effects on him personally.
experience in Epain born

r~arch

Uis

1512 to !-ecember 151L, had led him to realize

the folly of the Julian league with its desire to bring t:eace to Italy by
setting Aragonese against French, alrea.dy at fierce odds, and by having
"barbarians more than Italians spend tLeir blood against the French."

He

.f'eare~

that it would not be so easy to expel the already-weakened Spanish troops with
Italy's own arms and forces.

Instead of praise tor the sentiments which

inspired the HolJ" League of 1511, Guicciardini could only indicate the superficial1ty of Pope Julius II's t.ttle, ttr::eliverer of Italy, if and the hope1esenesa

of the task t.l-tat this suegested.

The rampant internal an:1mosities would make

any ctoperatton d1tficult to achieve.

Further, the undistinguished forces of

Italy" v1thout adequate leaderah1p, could not drive the conqueror from ltaly.37
This po1nt was clear to Guicc1ardin1 from
the French.

1495, when Naples had fallen to

From his youthfUl yea.rs, he showed intense interest in military

questions, for these were intimately linked with the strength of a state.
Spanish residence

erystalli~ed

the.. views.

a heterogeneous mixture of peasants and

:rr& n

The

'l'he Italian soldiery consisted o£
of low social strata, all subjects

,36Guiccia.rdini complained that Machiavelli had given him a one-sided
account of this battle. Letter to his brother Luigi, August 22.. 1512.. ibid.,
p. 90. Cf. also Ariosto.s words on Rl,venna in praise of the Lily which deI'eate
the "rich Acorns of Gold," in Julius' coat-ot-arma, and "broke the yellow and
vermillion staff I P refelTing to the Spanish colors, Orlando furioso, 14.2-10.
Ariosto of course had praise for the French with whom his ra ti'On, Alfonso d lEst ..
was al11ed, ibid.

-

.37storia d'Itali., III, 129-130.

of different rulers and se1r1om subjects of the f,rince they served in battle.
Unlike the French 1!fl'fIfY, for example, whlch fought in well-or€anized squadrons,
the Italians d:lspersed themselves in the open country and retired te the riverbanks or ditches at any danger of attack.

38 Guiccardini intimated that this

was cowardly action.

Guicciardini undcrstoo:j that the "Vital spiritstl of Italy were quickly
being

sapped.~9 She Simply did not

have the resources, military or spiritual,

to take unnecessary and unwise risks like the League of 1511.

In 1512,

Guicclardini 'e conservative perscnali ty di d not allow him to be an advocate ot
any plan that was rash or hastily conceived.

He placed himself in the ''Wiser

group" who believed it would be better to shoulder the lesser burden of foreign

habitation than to invite ul timate disaster by unwise action.

God or a happy

turn of fortune would undoubte<Uy bring about a more oPJ.:ortune time for action
than the present afforded. LiO
To Guicciardini, the moat eflective remedy seemed to be a "balance of

power" between the French and Spanish rulers. 41 He felt that this alone would

-

38Ibid., I, 71-73.

-

.39xbid., Ill, 129-130.

4OJ:b1d., Referring to an event of 1$30, he wrote that "the success was no
greater tEa.'l t!1e rashness of the resolution had been extraordinary." At tr..
same time J however, he understood that tensi.on sanet1mes foeds groups to hasty
action, '*1£ those counsels can be called rash which are prompted by tr.e last
necessit,y," ibid., V, 296.

-

4lrurint; t.~e summer following the French victory at Ravenna and their
sudden decline ther6atter, Ou1cciardini wrote from Spain that the Spaniards we~
still watching the French: ROli earebbe dunque piaciute veder declinare Franci
l'!lS non t.anto che gli Spagnoli non le aV8esero ad avere risp.. tto .... ,11 Letter to
Jacopo ..:ialviati, July 27, 1.512,
1, 198. This waa the "balance of
POwer" which he too was then advoca g.

carmel

-

Lo

secure the freedom of those Italian areas not yet subject to foreign control.
ctherwise the

battl~s

of the pO"tTers for supremacy on Italian so11 might be

superseded by cooperative action to subjF.lct Italy. L2
Not yet thirty years of age in 1512, as yet without years of the observsnce of shrewd and oonnivinr: rulers and diplomats, Gulcciardlni r.ad the
poll tical acumen and the natural good sense which enabled him to' note the uncertainty of Ferdinand's proposal to tighten Spanish relations with Florence. 43
As matters v."fJre tending, Gl1icciardin1 con:t1ded to his father that he judged the
lTlaintenance

of "buona amicizia" with the Spaniah King to be good for Florence,

but he was not at all sure that her citizens were "ready to throw themselves
into Ferdinand's arms. tI

The King, and even those not so highly esteemed, 'WOuld

look first to individual advantage in spite of protestations ot £ri.endship. w..
,

It is important to stress that OUicciardini saw this individualism
both wi thin the peninsula and in the ranks of foreign rulers.
trust anywhere.

Of;i)r..:~~~

There was no

'.]hile rulers of all times look to their individual advantsre,

but Guiceiard1ni vie'Wed this situation as excessive within his own age.
Guicc1ardini understood too that, while

l'~erdinand

plied his stock trade in

L2storia d'Ital.t!, nI, 12$ ...130.
43Lettor to the tieci and to P1ero Gu1ceiardini, .september 17, 1512,
"

9arteggi, I, 102.

lt4Letter of Guieciardini to his father Piero, December 11., 1512" 1bid.,
133. These words should be particularly noted I t t ••• sarentene de lui 'ed'a111
al tri stimati. meno J ne fate conto che 11 mostrare arnore 0 fede abbi ne' bisogni
vostri a f'arrl valere di lui, se non quanto 10 conducessi 10 interesse suo
schietto; e chi facessi 11 conto altrimento potrebbe trovarsene inr-annato,
perch~ qui s1 va solo drieto allo utile, sanza respetto di cosa alcuna."

41
papal criticisms, the King was not oblivious that Julius· anti-Freneh endeavors
cou.l:-l benefit h1ll'1 as well.

One strong individual could well recognize another.

OUicciardini lijd net h1t;1"e his admiration for Ferdinand's methods.

From this

period onward, the ruler who failed to keep his promise of safeguarding
Florence, the incomparably succesetul Catholic King, became Ouicciardin1's
model prince just as Cesare Borgia was ?!achiavelli ts.

This face is imjX)rtant

for an underartandinll, of Ouiccia:rd:tni's mentality, for he saw in Ferdinand the
ver:t qualities that were laCking in tlle Italian rulers.

Guicciardini was particularly interested in the :military establiabment of
Spain and in the moral calibre of her people. 45 He stressed that the proud,
mil1 taristic Spaniards were not un:1..fied and in(1ependent.

of the ftRelazione rt builds upon this fact.

'!he underlying thetne

Because the land had just, but

severe rulers like Ferdinand, capable of cooperating with fortune and of
impoe1ng an iron-clad, energetic discipline, she could look ahead to still

greater power and g.lory by casting her views outward.

This she had envisioned

in sending armies into Italy to st.ru!"gle for cont:ro1 of the peninsula. lit: As an
Italian, Ouicciard1n1 did not look kindly of course upon this occurrence, but

he could not refrain from expressinr his admimtion tor a land so ably run that
such a feat was possible.

4'Cf. these wriUngs in Scritti autobioEirat'ici, pp. 101-124, pp. 125-146.

&bad areas 01 Aragon, Castile and Portugal.
Other areas at the Iberian peninsula he handled as subdivisions.

His discuaaion centers on the

L6Ibit

- -'.
l
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He explained that

"8.'

tempi noatri ff Sr.-in showed itself very enlightened,

for, with her consolidation, she left the obscurity that had seemed natural to
The glory of her king and bis outstanding deeds were known to all the

her.

world,47 but OUicciardini continued to elaborate on his Virtues.

He testified

to Ferdinand's kindl1neaa yet ldngllness in his personal audiences. Before he
spoke, he we.ighed every word and made certain that h1.s expressed thought. were
like to those of good and wise men.

Though excellent in arne,

r.e

did not

neglect religion, in him, according to Guicc1erd1n1, ''Very great. n
Guic:cisrdini made no judgment on the r:reed commonly attributed to Ferdinand.
Perhaps a tight hold on Spanish pureestrings was necessary, for there were many
expenses in governing

80

large and important a kingdom.

Above all, Ouicciard1n1 was impressed by li'erdinand ta basic method of state.

craft.

He handled all matters seoretly, and tlis indicated wisdom. He

on no matter unless by necessity.

confelTE~.

A patient man, he lived in an orderly

atmosphere un'jar a strict schedule. Thus hie daai.re that f"reat matters and
small

f.11SS

through his hands could readily be actuated. 48 His subjects were by

no means always aware of this ccmplexityof their ldng's statecraft. He made
certain that any measure he desired to carry out would be proclaimed first in
~rder

tc win popular favor tor it.

This made it appear that the King was simpl~

if'oUOW1ng popular wishes. 49 Nor did Guicciardini hesitate to point out that

47

Ibid., p. 137.
48 Ibid., p. 138.

-

49R1cordi, I, $1.
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Ferdinand "gave lustre to all his enterprises" by causing it tc appear that all

wero directed tc the defenGe of the Church or to the spread of the Christian
'"'0
faith rather than to his own majesty or security."
~1ost

significantly, Ouicciardini did not fail to not$ that fortuna was not

,

lacld.nf, tc a man of such virtu.

Already in

1~2

two concepts fundamente.l. to

F..enaisaa.nce thinld.ng were intermingled in his mind with all the complex1 ties of

Guicciardini's observation of the critical nature of 1509, based largely

upon the Venetian defeat, proved its accuracy in succeedillf; years.
did he look for any silver lining in the Italian cloud.

No longer

Any hopes the

Venetians had at the beg-inning of 1513 tor a retum of ftold times" were brutal!;
shattered}l

Papal cooperation with the 1l'ilperor afainat Venice in that year 181

to further devastation of her territory.

OU1cciardini found the situaticn more

piteous than ever, for the Italian soldiers, includinr those of the Pope, were
as savage

88

the "barbarian" troops.

Guicciardini, sympathizing with the low

Venetian morale, explained how inconceivable it was that a small army could

outrageously insult the glorious name of the Republic ot Saint Nark. 52
\1iith the imperial-Venetian accord of

1516, however, the nobility and

population of Venice again expected the return of better times for they

50Ibid ., II,

142.

>"'lstoria
d*Italia,
•
_ ................
oiiiiIiiiioi... In, 241 •

80
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believed that conflict was finally at an end. 53 Guicciardini stressed that
this reneral feellng existed throughout the Italian states, underscored by the
removal of all occasions for a war between the French King agsir.st the Emperor
and Cathollc King.

This

fJEt8Ce

indeed, Ouiceiardini wxote,

discord in

Italy.54

among all the potentates of Christendom did

..!.!.!! to

haVe crushed all the seeds of ,,1&1" and

But this could. not be, he pointed out, because the princes

of Italy had not come to realize the folly of the common policy of pursuL"lg
their own desires with foreign assistance.

As Lodovice il Hero r.,etere him,

Francesco Marla della Revere in 1517 requested the Spanish troops in Verona, in
addi tion to the French and Venetian infantry, to aid him in the recovery of the
states £rom which the Pope i:ad driven him that aumner.

Nor did the "author of

these new tumults" find it difficult to persuade these .foreign troops to act
wi til him.

Accustomed as they were in the m3.I\V ware to plundering towns

8..'ld

ravaging countries, to them ttnothing was more distastefUl than the peace to
which all the a.ffairs of ltaly, they an, had a definite tendenCy."S,
At the very period when peace eeaned to be a possibility" 1516,
Cuicciardini began his long tem of

papal..;r.~edicean

service, until 1523 governo

of I<odena with jurisdiction over Reggio and Parma and their territories, and
fi.'1ally president of the p.omagna under Clement VII, from

1524 to 1;27.

Certainly he was occupied with detailed and burdensome daily tasks but he never
..,.

55Ib1d.,
-

53rbid., 40.3-404.

54Ibid., IV, 1.
2.

L5
lacked a view of the total picture.

The penetratJ.ng vision that he displayed

while in ,[epa! service served him well when he wrcte the Storia dtltalia. some

fifteen years later.·
Ouicciardini explained the significance of 1521, when Italy became
embroiled in ware greater in scope, duration and dange%' than. those past.

He

described the ambition and poIN"Gr of Fr&neie I and Charles V, their hatred and

jealousy, and their emulation of each other. v:hat bothered Ou.icciardini was
the fact that Italy oould have enjoyed even a longer period

or

dubious "peace." No urgent reaGCm ensted for a major war in
balan~e

her rather

1521. The

of the two princes' power within Italy was almost even; it would. have

been vary difficult for one to injure the other without the assistance of some

of the Italian pwera. King Francis, then nUied with the Venetians, seemed
sufficiently secure in his possession of MUan.

Emperc:r Charles seemed well

control of Naples, and a French attack upon it would have been very difficult

without papal concurrence. Neither the French nor tho SWiss mercenaries wre
apprehensive of azr:I imper1al movement from the southern kingdom or from
Gemany.,56 In Guieeiardini fS jud@nent, it was once again the story of an
Italian prince" Pope Leo X, who broke the peace. 57
v.'hile OUicciardini aocused Leo of unwise action in 1521, he certainly

recogn:b,ed that Leo had to act.

Italy could no longer be free fran barbarians

The diplomat who spoke these words was clearly OUiociardin1's mouthpieoe, and

..

-

50Ibid ., 77-78.
57Cf. intra, PP. 117-118.

he continued that if' theN l'..ad to be a conflict, it was much better tor all the
peoples of Italy that there be two powers involved rather tf..m1 one.
competition would consist the safety of the Italian state ••

In their

SA~

!n any event, by 1525, the wisest course of action seemed to bo an allied
lear:'Uo, headed by Cloment ID, against the po;,,'Gr of

Chal~les

V.

Guicciardini

had .foresPen some of the essential faults of the proposed I,.guo \!bile it was
under discueaion.

He explained tbet in i t3 leadership and its armies were a

{freat variety of intereste and motives so that disorders, 1ndigl'\.£.tion, reeentments and distrust were bound to arise.

Guieciardini pointed at both the

papacy and the Venetian Republic as Inajor examples.

Church weapol'\.8 had

"naturally blunt edges" and those of the Venetians were no keener.

He asked,

it each were fla bad cutter" when aetlng separately, what could b" expected. when
they acted. together?

59

Further, Cu1cciardini knew that in allied ranks there

would be a lack of promptness to take adVantage of favorable opportunities and

tel resist stumbling blocks to pot,ential su.ccess. 6O
Guicciardini did not, lose any OPtOrtun1t7 to show that the Venetians had

S8 nse 1a fortuna buona di Italia avesBi potuto pi; coo 1& imprudepsis. di
Lod()vico Sforza, e poi, ehe 1a nostra 0 troppa paura 0 trappe cupid! ta, non
earebbono e,l trsmontani. in Italia, e· questa suebhe ls feliciU eli tutta r,iuest&
provincia e speaial..rnente la nostra., che eravamo temuti de. 11 altri, ed in fatto
<wvarno .. si puo 011"8, 1e legge a tutti, !'r18 poi che le cose acno scone in 111ogo
che mon si puo sperare ella Italia eia sanza barberi, e mo1to IIlegUo per noi e
per 1i altri ita1181ti. aha ce ne sia due~ che uno, perche'1& emulaz,ione che
arauno queeti dua potenti insieme, sarff 1a guardia de f manco potenti. ed in
spade, cieecuna fa1"8/ a gara .:ii intrattenere 18 nostra republlca. perch'in tal
caso troppo i1'l.l.,POrtera la potenaia nostra, tt ibid... p. 123.
59storia. d t ltal1a, IV, 326.

-

60Ibid.
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not completely learned their lessons. He became deeply aware of this fact
during the 1,20·8. He analj'"2ed their policy, continually nuctusting in 1525,
for they stood aloof as they sought to di. scovel' what
He explained

that they

\>1&S

most favorable to them

would stand undecided as long as they could, and, if

forced to take a stand, theY' would take that which they found most to their
selfish advantage.

Italy.

They certain.ly would not look to the welfare of all

6J.

In spite of the difficulties which the League would faee from its

inception, Guicciardini understood that it was this or nothing. While laboring
in the Romagna, he had heard th.e usual rumors and repone of action on both

sides.

On public atfairs,

to sq.

Upon seeing

S!. rebu~

eT81"'1ODe

eblic1s, he admitted he did not know what

opposed ttl t ald.ng bold but necel88l7 action, the

only course possible, he had "lost his bearingS.1f He wrote.
I never heard of aJl3'ODe who when he saw a storm coming did not attenpt
to take cover, except ourselves, ""710 preteI' to wait for it in the middle
of the road without any protection. So •••we shall not be able to say
that government has been taken from us, but that t~ter
manibus.
.. elai,sa sit de
62
1M

-

_ _

In December he learned that the Pope wanted his services in still another

capaCity.

This turned out to be the job of conduoting the papal-imperial.

armies in war, the "bold coursen to which he had referred.

assured of his position, he regretted that he had delayed

Later, when he was
80

long in accepting

it. He expla1nfS>d that "the greatest satisfaction I can haYe fmm my sem.ce
•

61Ibid., 302-303.
62r.etter to l-1achiavelli, reoember 26, 152>, f.ettere Xmni11ari, p. 4l,a.
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is to see that Your Holiness does not intend to wait to be oonquered.,,63
}1schiaw111 too beard rumors regarding the anti-imperialist alliance under
discussion and on a possible agreement between Charles and Francis as well.

In

Jamtary 1526, before the conclusion of the latter, }'Iachiavelli had news of both

Apparently he had leamed that an Italian league wu being negotiated with
France.

This he favored.

Subsequently word was received that King and

Dnr:e ror had reaohed an agreement, but l-1achiave111 did not seem to know that it

was not yet final as of January.

He judged that Charles made this agreement so

that France would break with the Pope and, when this was done, the Emperor

would then not honor his word with France. 64
Machiavelli wrote at length on !mparlal poll tics.
Charles as a wily diplomat Woo had

0:--;:;

He always described

objective, to make h1mse1t supreme.

"'hi1e he held King FranCis prisoner, he could tenpt now France and now the Pope
with the hopt of an agreement without ever brealdng off negotiations or bring-

ing them to a conclusion.

}~aoh1avelli

'WrOte

ot the Fmperor that "when he sees

that the Italian, are about to join with France, he takes up the negotiations
with France again so that they do not reach an agreement, and he wins the

game. n6S Machiavelli was imlined to think that the Emperor would never
release the King, whatever their agreement.
For a whUe, Machiavelli seemed to be right.

6%etter to Clement VII, fecember,

~etter

-

tSIbid.

Quiociardini wrote later

1525, QP:!r! i.Mdite, VIiI, 355.

to Guiociardin.i, J'anua...$ 3,

:a.;,~6 .. lAtt~'e

!aroif 1ari, p. 470.
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that, despite the manifestations of peace and friendship, Francis was tightly
guarded and given no increased freedom of JI'lOvement.
same time Frallcis was care.ad Uke

Q

As he put it.

"At the

brother, he was guarded like a prisoner."

It was clear that this was tte concord full of discord, an affinity without
af'!'ect1on,» for "the old jealousies and contests between them !franCis and
Charley would on every occasion rrevail over all regard !'or ties and

alliances. nc6 Both Machiavelli and Guicciardini could estimate things well.

In Charles' next step, which Machiavelli had foretold, 1".8 attempt-ed to deal. wit!
the Pope.

Later wi ten have followed Ouicciardini' s incis1.ve account signal1inR the

course of events which logically spelled Italyts political doom. (1uicciardin1
agreed t.hat the King at France was exelusivaly prompted by his own sel:Cinterest.

hben Francis saw that the Emperor would not change the }1adrid agree-

mrmt and that to delay entry into the League any longer sd.ght induce the Pope

to ma.lee other plans, he joined with the Venetians and Duke Francesco Sforza. He
hoped that this alliance, concluded at Cognac on 11ay 17, 1526, would give the

impression that he was in oomplete control of the situation and that, with this
realization, the Emperor might in some way become more fiex1ble. 67 By acting
now as "a sell8ible man," Machiavelli wrote, Francis Ifoould not prevent the

Fmperor from beine made to look a tool. tf68

(:6~toria d'Ital1a,

IV, 351.

61Ibid., 14-16. cr. also Carteggi, VIII, 188, 191, for Gu1ceiardin1 's
explaniiI'on that the League of Cognac was concluded on May 22 but at Rome the
news was that all difficulties were resolved at the end of the day on the 17th.

68tetter to Gu1cciardini, March 15, 1526, Lette.re familiari, p. L76.
I
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Th<>ugh Francis delayed ratification and failed to cooperate by &ending
troops and 1'!I)007, Charles showed fear of the coalition.

He tantelized the

?epe with hopes of peace for Italy if only Clement would not interfere in

affairs between Francis and him.

But the .Pope 'Would no longer listen and all

things tended to a serious break in papal.-1mperial relations. 69 The Pope
comrrai tted himself' to the League of Cofl!lS.C and the balanee of power was

destroyed, but almost insurmountable problems remained for the allies.

Yet hope sometimes makes one
noble ends.

Sf,eak

in glowing terms of gnat projects wi th

Guicc1ardini, as lieutenant-general of the pOntifical armies,. wrot

that the principal aim of this "Holy Leaeue II of Cognac wu the attainment of
uthe £1tneral welfare

ot all Italy and the univtlrsal good of Christian! ty. ,,70

He expressed the opimon of all patriots when he spolre of the war as

Il

"holy

and necessary national event. tin

It was om thing to conclude a formal I,eague, but. there remained serious

problema i t the League was to have any !'ractieaJ, value. Ouieciardin1 realized

this. He and Hach1avelll .tnaeed that the first order of buline8s was to f1.nd
a commander, who" by his name md hi. ability.. could inspire COnfidence. 72 Of

Giovanni de' l'1ediei, the final chtJice of the allies, Macbia.velli wrote I
I believe everyone is agreed that among Italians thet'S 1. 00 leader
whom the soldiers more willingly follow or or whom the Spaniards have

69storta ? 'Ital1a, VI 19-22.
7Cr..etter to Latino Giovenale, August 11, 1526, certegs±' n, p. 124. The
words are " ...per conw.me sa1.u"~e di tueta Italia, ani! bene universale della
Cristianit&."

719Rere 1ned1te, I, 393.
72stor1~ d t ltal1a, V, 16~9.
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more fear or are lllora cautious. Fveryone feels that Signor Giovanni
is brave, impetuous, with rreat ambitions and capable of bold

decisions. 7'3

But G'llieoiardini, like Machiavelli, \<1as a-,mre of the continuing need for
int6!!sive pla::n1ng and for ecnstant enthusiasm and cooperetion on the purt of

the allies to make a BUCce8. or the venture. Though he was ldlline to obey
the Pope a'ld the Venetians, Guicciardini found himself' w"Ondering about hie

personal reason for workinr, eo hardl 74 To the otto75 he explained that his
"infinite occupations .. tI unimaginable to those 'it'ho did not witness them, were·

the cnly reason he clid not report daily.7

6

He spent only s. 11 tUe time on

7%etter to Cuicciardini, March 15, 1526, lAttere fSlfl.iliari, p. 476. Cf.
stod.a d t ltal1a, V, 60, for OUicciardinifs concurrence In ihe
of
!l;aehlavem. After having observed trds soldier in action, he commented on his
shillty to infuse light into a group despised before they came under his
command. Cf. ibid., 92, for a laudatory estimate of Giovan..l11 de' Medici's
character and Cii'ier after his doth.
71,
*Letter to Giamatteo Glberti, July Z1, 1526, 2lJ!t! toed! te, I, L6. Note
Guicciardini Ie languid we,rdSt " ...ncn l!lO a chi!}' fine 10 m! ahH tant8 fs.t.ice
•••• " i.<lith OUieeiardini himself, Oiberti, the r;~o-lrench counsellor of Clement
VII, had been one of the movi........g sptrlte in the promotion of the League o~
Cognac. Pastor obse"ee that Giberti had deceived himself in holding that the
League of Cognac eouJ.c settle the iseue ot the freedom or the rerr>etnal slavery
of Italy. The st1pul.a tiona agreed on were such that, even if tt.. League t IS
armies would prove sueceas.tul, the influence then 4CCruing to France in Italian
affairs would be incompatible with !talian independence, Rister:.2!.!ill! Popes,
IX, 3O~.
.

aew

75The otto di Pratiea, a permanent cOl'lmti ttee tt)r speedy and etricient
action in foreIgiland iilIItary matters, wae instituted in Florence by Lorenzo

de' t;1edici in 14r~o an,j reestabH.shed with the Ne11e1 restoration of 1512,
Schevill, Histo~ s:! r'lo:rence, pp. 39t-'391, 475. This couneil had the funct10m
of the'.lieCI (fU
t&i r,.Hode of Medici dor.Unation, Ridolfi, Machiavelli ..
p. 263,
~.

-no:

ne

76Letter to the ~ S Pratica, Auguat 2, 1$26, Cartegg1J IX, 11-18.

'"

-
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entertainment but found 1 t important to keep his mental balance. Ouiec1ard1n1
told l'1aehiavelll tlst the performance of his comedy, the ''l'landragola, fI unlike

a speedy solution of Italyts .political woes, is something "within our power so
that one is not wasting one's time th1nldng about it.77 Entertainment, he
continUed, is ''more MCessary than ever in these turbulent times. tI
Guicciardini's burdens were well-understood by the Lear-ue in Florence.
Machiavelli's manifold duties included militar,r matters, and he urged the Pope

to (·rganize the papal

a~

along the lines ot the democratic-type militias

already inaugurated in norenoe.

But Guicoiardini did not find such a system

wise or feasible. 78
The all.1ed leaders hoped against hope that the League's difficulties, so
apparent from the ber,:inn1ng, could be sumounted.

Ouicciardini wrote later

that the articles of' the all.1ance "without doubt should have been more distinct
and the security for their observance better established. n Hindsight had made

one pOint very clear, the war should not have begun in the spring of 1526,
before the SWiss allies had started

on hand.

to march and aU provisions were actually

Gu1cc1ardini constantly complained of' the f,wis8 delay and the lack

ot

provisions. Years later he explained the League might also have been
S'ITtS'ICTEENED BY

n~CLUDING

TI-IE English King whom the allies had not approached

nLetter to liachiavelli,
78

59.

feecher 26, 152" Letters

f~ari.

p.

1&68.

Guicc1ard1ni saw too many faults with these miut&s. Cf. illtta. pp. 56-

on account of the distanceS 79 But it was the warning sounded b~l Hachiavell1
on the very day the League was formed that told Italy what she needed to
,urv1ve.

In spite of all complications and problema, he bade citizens to be

cautioUS and dedicated:

"Liberata dluturna cure Italiam. nSO Yet OUicc1ardin1

round 1 t difficult to imagine "that victory would be lacking to us if they

ffihe allie!! would do their duty with pzomptness. It

81

Somewhat paradoxically,

OUicciardini wanted to hope, but the desire to be optimistic could not destroy

bis more basic pessimism.
Yet very early in the history of the League ot Cognac, OUicciardini vas
shaken by the !:uke Urbina's retreat from the gates of Milan in July when it
appeared possible tor the allies to take the City.82 This would have eonstituted a varJ significant success.

'W'h1le realizing the plight of the r'lilanese,

he cr! ticized the selfish motive which guided their actions,

namelY, they

wanted to save their own necks and were wi111ng to cooperate with the resident

imperial soldiery it this could be accompUshed.

On the

other hand,

Gu1ceiardini was quite s,apathetic. The l-!llaneae had too many masters, hence

too many burdens. Not only were they subject to the exactions ot the Constable
of Bourbon but also to t bon ot the League f s sold! ere now encamped around the

City. Ouicc1ardini was highly er! tical of the allied troops as he pointed out

79storia d'Itslia, V, 11 •
•

8Or.etter to Gu1cc1ard1ni, Mq 17, 1,26, Lettere familiari, p. 1189.

8J.Letter to J31shop Altobello Averold1, July 28, 1$26, Carte,S!' IX, 58.

82cr. Guicciardi,nits account ot

36-Ll.

Urbino's retreat in Storia d t ltal1a, V,

that 11ilanese relief at their arrival. now turned to hatred.

83

In the months of tension following the formation ot the League ot Cognac,

Quicciardini t s correspondence renected his concern over certain matten which,
ha.d they 'been handled well, could have given his side an eatry victory.

Aside

from the manifest coldness ot the French King in the prosecution of the war,8L
Quicciardini complained most of the Swiss delay.

He looked back upon the

optimism ot the allies at the beginning of the war and blamed the Swiss for

preventing an early Victory. He pointed out with an obvious pride that an
imperial amy up to the present unconquered had been on the verge of c8feat at
the hands of the Italian forces alone. 8S

Nor were the J.''ilaneae free from guilt

that matters did not turn out well for t,.'1e League. \-/hen theSw1H did not come

83cr.

~., LS-52.

8LGuicciardini made reference to this in several letters. The "good words
and hopes of the King are not enough, for effects are needed •••• ,,, Letter to
Roberto Acciauol1, August 3, 1526, CartesPJ ~, 82. (Acciauol1 was the papal
repreaentatiTe in France). Cf. alao dUIcciardin1' a frank words: "La freddeza
d1 Francia ~ manif'est1881ma•••• , tf Letter to G1am._tteo Giberti, Auguet 9, 1526
ib1d., 112, and another reference to "la freddeza d1 Francia," August 22, lS26,

174.
-mer.,85tetter

to Uberto Gambara, August 3, 1526, 1bid., 83. Cf. also letter to
Roberto Acc1auol1, Auguet ), 1.$26, ~., 82, £or()UI'cc1ardini t s note that, wbe
opportunities (di fare taccende) have once been lost, things do not always turn
ou t the way onewanti-'tli. to (!!. gUal1 !l2!! tornano sempre 9.uando 1 thuomo !!

dee1dera).

55
in time, they lost their enthusiasm. 86 With the passing of many "beautiful

occasions': for victory, Guice1ardini foreAW that the war was likelJ.- to be long
and difficult and to cost much money. He stated frankly that he did not know
hoW long the allies could car.r.y on. 57 Each dsy he awaited new disaster for,
every time the Swiss failed to replJr to new requests for military aid, trouble
occurred. 88 And he believed that a long war was not less a curse for the
imperialists than for the allies. He conf'eaaed that he would hold for a long

war if he was certain that, by tiring the adversary, the League could achieve
viCtory, but he knew it would have been better to win in the beginn1ng.89

8tLetter to Oiammatteo Gibert!, July 31, 1526, ~., 69. The reference
to the League army's position at the time of the }4il8neee surrender to the
imperiallsts on July 2h is as followsr "lJidlail fu bactuto innanzi paseass1mo
e fiumi. ft

87

Letter to Oberlo Gambera, August 3, 1526, Cartese.,

n,

83.

88

Letter to Roberto Acciauoli, August 22, 152£, .!!?!s!., 168. Note
Gu1cciardin1 t s personal anx1.ety in his responsibilities: ft ••• aspeeto o~
mactina qualche grandi.a1mo disordine." cr. also his words to Giberti: . ttE vel'l
ehe aiamo in grande t0n.fUs1one et in grande 80ma de t SVizen, nata per 14
varie~ et difficul ta del levargl1 et in questa ci bi80ena fare qualche
resoluUone ••••• ," letter to G1ammatteo 0ibert1, August 22, 1526, !!:.!.!!_, 17h.
89Letter to Jaeopo Salviati, August 16, 1526, ibid., lUO. Note
" ••• Gt che in dubio, 10 non
accostarmi sempre
alis parte p1u s1cura. Per la qual. ragione, Ie 10 fusli corta che con 1&
lungheza fUuimo per stracchara gU inimic1 et havere 18 victona, lOderei
questo cammino per el piU aicuro, quando bene 10 cOgDOscees1 che anche 14 via
breve fua8i sicura. Ma 10 ho s_pre giudicato et giudico che la lungheza sia
non IilSnCO pitricolosa per noi ahe per 101"0, II ibid., 139-140.
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The many difficulties stemdng from Francis Its defeat at Fevia and the
innumerable problems since the formation of the League of Cognac in May 1526

presented i-iachiavell1 J l.1ke Ouicciardini, the opportunity to make certain
observations on miUtary matters. \,;itbin norence he had already organized a.
democratic-type militia. 90 Maohiavelli waa convinced that" if the rest of
Italy used this system, it would help the Bllied cause.
His interest in military matters in connection with the problema of the

Italian states resulted in his Art of \o;ar.

---

At the critical juncture of mid ...

1$2$, he decided, on the basis ot the evident succeas of his ideas in Florence
not only to seek sUPPOrt for his latoria in Rome but also personally to
acquaint Clement VII with his military proposals.

Not only the Pope but also

his advisers, the Cardinals Salviati, Sadoleto and schomberg admitted their

value. 91
Machiavelli was sent to OUicciardini in Feenza w.l th an urgent papal brief
which explained in the main that extraordinary diseases demand extraordinary
rerr.e!i1es. On the inauguration of mill ties, Gulcciard1n1 was reminded, ttdepen(l
the safety of the papal states sa ",.11 as that of the whole of Italy and

9~or an account of the working of the native army and the dUticulties
Machiavelli encountered in attempting to revive a martial ardor which had
perished during the employment of mercenary troop8t cf. Francis A. Hyett,
Forence. Her Hi.toa and Art to the Fall of the Itepublic (London, 1903), p.
~a. Ouiee!ardIiiIis moUihPIeee;""Bernardo de!' ~lero, itressed th1s very point,
Dial0S2 !!!!. reSfj'.im!nto, pp. 90-93.
91Ridolfi, Machiavelli, p. 213.

$7
practiCally the whole of ct~1stendam.u92 Guicciardini was informed in advance
of Nachiave1l1's arrival by his agent at the court of Rome, Csstu'e Colombo, so

be had his answer ready. Already on June 16, 1$2$, he wrote to Colombo.

"Ask

on my behalf to what end the Pope plans this, for, if he intends it as a remedy
for present dangers, it is a proViaion which cannot come in time. tt9.3
OUicciardin1 t IS complaints on the Italian millt.ary 8i tuation in 1526 were the

more pitiful. in that the hopelessness of the situation had been evident for
over a year!

After f.1achiavell1 presented his business to OUicciardini, the latter
explained that no one could deny the practicality of the militia system.

If

this plan could be realized. it would be one of the beat things the Pope ever
did. 94

The cold and caut10us realism of OU1cc1ard1n1, Clement's principal

milJtary adviser, revealed itself.

arainet the imperial foroes in

His task of working cut a system of detense

Lombar~

was mammoth but no less problematical

was his work in the Romagna.
From experience, Gui.cciardini knew the laole of res!*'t tor authort ty and
the factiousness of the population in the papal states. 95

The Romagna was by

92.rhe brief is included in Monumenta saeculi .XVI, histon_ illustrantia.
Vol. I, Clementia VII ei2istolae, E!!: Sadoietum sci-iiiiU. ed. P. Man (innsbruck
18BS), nO. lIe. Ins printed alSo in Oreste !ommasln1.t La vita e t:;ll seritt1
N1ccol~ Machiavelli (Roma, 188.3-1911), II, 1150.
- --

a

93gpe~e inedite. VIII, 2)6.

-

9L!b1d.,

266-269_

9S0uieeiardini set rorth his doubts to Machiavelli on the wisdom of anoing
the people of the Romagna in 8 letter of June 19, 1525. cr. T. Pandolfi,
"Giovan !?latteo Gibert! e I'ultima
della libertA dtltalia negl1 ann1 1521
152S, II Archiv10 della R. societA romana d1 stort. ~;Qtria, XXXIV (1911), 209-212
cr. also H. aon, Rachiavel {Parts, 19L!!, pp. 38 -3§j.

dif'"

-
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Ear the worst example.

OUicciardini's attempts to impose respect tor laws and

to administer justice rigorously were continually interrupted by the CUria,

often through favontism. 96 He struck at the strong Ghibell.1ne faction at
\

Forli, the most infected of all cities in the Romagna, and at their influential
patron, the Cardinal of Aracoeli, Cristoforo Numai, who had ccmpla,1ned ot
Quicciardinits decisiveness. In defense of his policy, CUicc1ardini avowed he
was impartial.

If he thought that the activities ot a Guelph cardinal were

oreating troubles in areas under bis jurisdiction, he would punish him too. 97
He was loyal

to

the Pope when he assured him that, if the plan were

put into effect, he would devote himself to it completely.

to be

Bis reply showed,

however, that victory depended not on verbal support of a nebulous plan but on

the working out of countless military details,
••• i£ it is to succeed, Your Holiness must do the same; either you
should not berin it, or you should go into it with your mind firmly
made up to help in everything that is needed, to overcome all
difficulties, and to regard it as more important than anything else. 98
Clement tabled t1achiavell1

f, proposals, though they looked tempting to

as a life-saving measure tor Italy in m1d-l$2$.

~

Perhaps Machiavelli ts plan had

merit but, at so crucial a juncture, thos. responsible for pollcyand its
execution could handle only what was moat immediate.

And Clement would have

had -'e1 ther the time nor the detel'mination to support the slow progress of a

96Cf. Ridolfi, Gu1cclardini.. p. 193.
97Letter to Clement VII, June 18, 1$21., Car'teS;Q., VII, 88.
980Eere ined! te ,

nn,

2~,6-269.
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national militia.
The most immediate problem of the Pope and the Leegue was the ruchy of
}~ilan.

In the time of Lorenzo de' Yedici, it had been considered as ''Una

bilancia eli tutta Italia. ,,99

Now in July 1526, as the fortress of' 1-{ilan was

near surrender to the imperialists, Guicciardini again wrote on the importance

of the north.

Lombardy was the weight

(!!

pando) of the war.

Dangers to Rome

and to Siena were secondary because the nerve center was in the north. lOO
Milan above all

~"U

worthy of all allied efforts.

When Guieciardini saw the Pope's continuing indecision, he could not
refrain from think1nr, how he would handle the situation.

If he were Clement,

he would hold back yet not precipitate himself into "pace dannosa, in.stabile et
dishonorevole."

"Non siamo in termini di disperatlone,"

OUicciardini pointed

out, but one has to be resolute in spir1 t and to torce oneself to solve the

difficulty.10l
Not only was Ouicciardini particularly distressed over the r:uke of Urbina'iS
retreat two weeks earlier but even more so over the fainthearted attempts ot
the League t s army to relieve the fortress of f.1ilan.
im~rialists

After its surrender to the

in July, OU1cciardini wrote that it would have been easy enough tc

hold the fortress and even to take all of Milan.

It was evident that Urbino

99storie fiorentine .. p. 73.

100r.etter to Giamroatteo Giberti, ¥Y 31, 1526, CllrteS&t, IX, 71.
Guicciardini t s words are I "e1 puncta e tucto qua •••• "

-

lOlIbid.

-
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either did not know how to accomplish this or he did not wish to do 80. 102 He
cri ticized thc> diffidence of Urbino as a thing which communicated i teelf and
had spread to the whole camp.10)

Then too, Ouicciardini pointed out, the

cooperation of the i3W1ss troops mr,ht have given the League victory within a
month.

Yet he saw that the arrival of the allied troops had at least one good

etrect J it led the im-per:ta11sts through tear to agree that Sforza could freely
come into the League's camp at Lodi.

Guicciardini noted that this was a

change, for the imperialists had always considered control of the Duke more
important for their succe8S in Milan than control of the fortres8. 104
Urbino and F'rancesco Sforza agreed that, because of the surrender of the
fortress, new plans were necessary for the war, and both pressed for an attack

em Cremona. Guiceiard1ni argued !!2! that bold plans do not necessarily spell
suecess,105 for "the situation of attairs affords little hope of victory." He
confessed he did not see bow the Pope could conclude a peace offer, should one
be made, that was not injurious or f:'0rilous to the 8111e8. l06

First,he pointed out, the loss of the castle of l'1ilan had diminished their
reFutation while the freeing of Sforza meant little.

That section of the

enemy which originally guarded the castle was free.

Mal\Y of the important

l02Letter to Giammatteo G1berti, July 27, 1526, ibid., 44. Note
Cuieeiardini's words. /fJrbiniJ "non hill saputo 0 non lia voluto farlo."

-

l°3tetter to Giammatteo Giberti, July 31, 1526, ibid., 69.

-

lO4tetter to Accura10 Gr1neo, July 28, 1526, ibid., 57.
l05Storia d'Ital1a, VJ 58-60.

106r.etter to Giammatteo G1berti, July .31, 1526, Carteg;g1, IX, 70.

-
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citizens now ned, especially the merchants who found }lilan too disorderly.107

\-Jaiting for the Swiss troops made it very difficult to send aid to
cremona.108 If Guicciardin! could judge from his vantage point, all Lombardy,

despairing of the French coming, began to doubt the King's sincerity.

Already

manY of the exiles took steps to settle their di1'ferences with Bourbon.

.

pointed to the action of the Bl.raihi and other important Ouelphs.

l~

He

In view

0

the camplexi ty of these weighty matters, of necessity so interwoven,
Guicciardini felt that Italy would probably have had more security if Francis
were to hold Milan than if it would be in the hand.s of a weak Duke, an

imper;4.alist pawn.

This opinion, he recalled, hed long been held by Jacopo.110

He knew also that money and provisions were needed for the Cremonese
expedition. Though the ''w1ll not to win" dominated the papal camp, Guicciardin:

now expresaed reasonable hopes of victory.

The anti-1mperialist operation wh1c)

had once seemed "easy and secure" had become "difficult' and dangerous." ldtb
good organization and sufficient money, the allies could hope tor success .111
But Clement did not have the resources for a long 'tiiar, and Ouicciardin1.a own
107

Letter to the otto eli Pretica, August 2, 1526, CarteSEi, IX, 70.

79.
l09I.etter to Roberto
l08lbid .,

ACciauol1, August 3, 1,26, ~., 82-83.

U<1.etter to Cesare Colombo, August 6, 1526, ~., 101.
to Cardinal. Jacopo Salviati.

The reterence is

lllLetter to Giammtltteo Giberti, July 31, 1526, ibid., 69. Note
Guicciard.ini's clever uee ot worda, " ... ae 10 non miT Inganno, e in temine ehe
5e haveasilllo buona goveme at 1& spesa ordita non c1 superchiassi, non ci puO
ragionevolmente maneare 18 victoria."

-
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desperation in the late summer of 1526 centered

lar~ely

on the lack of

nnances. U2
Near the end of AUf.'Ust Guicciardini, still in the field, did not know

where to turn for assistance.

The signatories to the League of Cognac cont1nue~

to fail their obligations, military and monetary. His frequent requests to
the T;etariol1 .3 and to Salviati had met with unsatisfactory responses, and he
was grr'atly concerned.
forthcoming.

~rything

would collapse if money were not quickly

Expenses in camp were great and they were rendered greater be-

cause of Francis t failure to contri bute.
that soldiers were not paid

~th

Guicciardini reminded His Holiness

designs in air."

Above all, it was necessary

to have the money in time lest, to all the other disord.ers, another would be
added, that of having provided too late.
vital a concern, for upon cold cash

ll4 There was no time to quibble in so

de~.ended

the preservation of the Holy See ..

Clement's own safety, the weU'are of norenee and that of all Italy.ll5

"''batever Francis' reasona for failing to provide what everyone expected of

ll2cf. infra, pp. 146-148, 161.
~

ll3rhe r.&tario was the papal bursar.
1.l.4r.etter t e Clement vn, August 21.. 1526, Carteggi, IX, 163-164.
Guicciardini concluded I "Ma 18 prudentia sua bisegna che consiata in questo:
di farlo in tempo chs gli glovi) et non tardare tanto che, o1tre alli a1tri
;Jiscrdini, 131 aggiunga sncora questo: d1 havere r.rovisto doppo 81 tempo. tf
115Ibid • Note Ouicciardini's lofty worden 'lEt la prego quanto posso che,
per conservations della Sadia Apostolica et sua, per beneficio della sua patria
at per Ie. salute di tucts Italis, non vadia p1h differendo 81 risolversi a fare
groSS& provisione di danari, perche''' a1 trimente non c1 'e rimedio •••• " F'lorence
was tleus patriae u

-
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h1tn, Ouicciardini did not precisely know.

But he did point out that a good

judge of the situation oould only conclude that Francis preferred a long war
and no early victory.

Ou1cciardini '8 cynicism showed i tsell in his repeated

comment that the "little faith and confidence among princes" probably made the
King of F'rance feel that, as aoon as the fuchy of MUan would be recovered, the
Italians would pay little attention to his interests.

Either they would make a

separate peace with the Emperor or at least they would not pursue the war and
thus render the recovery of his children, then hostages in Spain, more
diffioult. ll6
In any case, he was still bound to the artioles of the League ot Cognac.
i1 thout concrete assistance in the form of man.,. for the army and reinforcement

necessary for battle, the allied undertaking was doomed,1l7 Guiccidardini
stated that the last pa,yment to the Mss had been made without any French
money at all and even at the time provisions from Rome and from the Venetians
were falling off.

He begged Roberto Acciaiuoli to t ake only one course

aotion, namely, flto ory to heaver-I' for help.

ot

The expenses of the Marchese di

saluzzo and "other minutiae" should be set aside if favor of those enterprises
undertaken for theweltare of all Italy.

Guiociardini wished to believe that

this lack of aid proceeded from nothing other than negligence and that the will

116Storia d'Ital1a, V, 60-61.
117Letter to Roberto Acciauoli, August 3, 1526, carteeP, IX, 82. Cf. ala<
letter to the same, August 22, 1526, ibid., 168. Acc!auofi was the piapal
representative in l"rance.
-

-
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to provide it was there; but they had to impress on the King that, i f he failed
then, later he might :have reason to repent his failure to assist the Italians
to his shame and dishonor. U8

Notes of similar distress sounded in
auicciardin1's appeals to the Venetians.1l9
Guicciardini pointed also to the non-eooperation of I'.ngland. Ouicciard1ni
blamed the infiuential Cardinal of York, "willing to amuse everybody and to be

entreated by all." Both he and his king were used to answering requests for
assistance with brevity:

''We have no concern w1th the atfairs of Italy.tt120

Ouicciardini evaluated the entire situation just prior to the allied
success at Cremona 1n the autumn.

He paid careful attention to Crem.ona.

He

believed that taking the city would give the s1l1es much le.8 to fear. l2l But
he repeated what he claimed to have said already a hundred times daily:
part of Cremona would have to be taken to make the move a success.

every

If any of

the territory remained unconquered, the allied cause would be more than eV6r
jeopardized.122

118

119C£.

Ibid., 168-169.

Geftroy, ftAutob1ogra.phie," p. t69.

12On ••• anzi e i1 re • U cardinale rispondevano speaso I
appartengono le cose di Italia," storia d'ltal.ia, V, 72.

a noi non

121Let ter to Giammatteo Giberti, August 22, 1526, Cortesgi, IX, 17.3. Not.
Gu1ccia.rd1ni's wordSI "Sa piglassimo Crem.ona, CrederreI havessimo da temerno
molto poche."

-

122tetter tC' Giammatteo Gibert!, August 17, 1526, ibid., 150.
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In early September Guicc1ardini reported that he hoped very shortly to be
able to re):'.ort victory in Cremona and then Genoa, where prosp.ectB for allied
success appeared wry favorable. 123 Beceuse the Cremona siege wa$ so drawn
out,124 however, he desired tirat-hand information, and on September 10 he sent

Machiavelli, "a man of great competence,tt125 with credentials and instructions
to get that information.

It there were actually 11ttle prospect of an early

victory, Machiavelli was to make every effort to persuade the Venetian
adjutant Fesarc to end the siege and to attack Genoa immediate1y.126
Machiavelli carried out his assig1'llnent by personally surveying the s1. tuation an
by going over it with Pe88J"O and Urbina.

On September lL he returned to the

camp under the walls of Milan with a report stating the confidence of the

oapt",':'l18, and in V"lis he concurred. 127 The city capitulated on the twentythird, but t.tut actual change of hands was deferred unt:U the very end of the

month.
Aside

tZOOln

the temporary victory of Cre."!lOna, autumn witnessed the break-

down of all the allied plane in L01I'lbardy.

2Ll.

The attack on Pope Clement in Rome12

123tetter to Goffredo de Granges de 'Iavellis, September 6, 1526, ibid.,

-

124cr. Guicciardini's words. "Non 01 ei vede, quanta alla speranza del
vincerla, altro male che peri colo di lunghezza: cbe, nello state che sano Ie
cose, ~ bene male assai," letter to Oiammatteo O1bert1, September 7, 1526, ib14~,

245.

-

125~ inedi te, IV, )61.

-

1260uicciardini's instructions to ?Jtachiavelli are pubUshed in the latter'l

Opere, VI, 22L-226.

l~~~l: ~tfil:r.'Jii~u;F~~!S~ite~Mh~W~!~"~ ~ 5LL

!lUov!

128cr. infra, pp. 161-162.

-
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allowed Machiavelli too to reconstruct all the events leading to it, including

the captains' errors in the campaign and Clement's blunder of "living in Rome
1n such a way as to let himself be captured like a child. ,,129

Guicciardini's tasks during this period were just as difficult a8 the
s1 tuation itself.

At Piacenza in October, he became invo1wd in the matter of

the papal reconciliation ....v1th tho Duke ot f'errara.

In August he had already

explained that the cont1.rmati(m of Modena and ReggLo in Eate possession was "01

great importance though perhaps not of such great usetulnen." Ouicclardini
used a Florentine colloquialism.

since the Pope simply had to approve such

action, the Duke "stara tacil:mente in sullo asino. 1I130
The approach of the Qermans and the arrival of the Spanish neet made it
clear to the Duke that affairs were taldng a very favorable turn for Charles.

Alfonso had been "earlier in longing eXpectation" of Guicciardini's coming.
llOW

He

notified him in } arma, where the direction of the war seemed to be tending,

that it no longer seemed fit to discuss any anti-imperialist endeavors.
Alfonso lett it to Ou1cciardini whether he would come to F'errara or not.
Alfonso said nothing, Clement might have been angry.

Had

L'ut Guicclardini realized

that further negotiatioll5 could end only in a cornproIT'.ise of the papal

reputation. l31

He informed hie superior that the Luke's negotiations with Charles were

129The letter containing Machiavellits analysis and his criticism of
Clement is printed in Tommasini, II, 1251.
l3Ot.tter to Giarnmattoo Giberti, AUf'ust 22, 1526, ,cartaggi, IX, 176.
l31Storia d'Italia, V, 90.

-
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evident in many ways and he warned, should they come to conclusion, there would
be "no remedy for our houses. 1t

He did not know the state of their consultatioN
132
but stressed that an irnperial-Ferruese accord meant allied ruin.
On the
other hand, it was possible there was still hOFe, for Machiavelli' s report was
that the LUke had stood tllittle heard" in the court of Charles. l ))

Ouicciardini tendec tc
many years, he held that it

Ferrarase relations.

tak[~

\''a£

the more pes,s1m1stlc, or realistiC, View.

For

simply good sense to maintain £riendly papal-

Not only did he reter to the neutralizing etfect that thi

would have on the problema of one pontificate but especially he looked to the
welfare of his native Florence.

'Ibis was "mOre lasting than the life of one or

two pontiffs." Then t·oo the papa1-ducal association had become intimately
joined with other important interests.

Until OU1cciardj n1 saw clearly the

;:ukets imperial tendencies, he had adVised Clement to "come freelY*' and to

negotiate an agreement that would allow the Duke to reciprocate without any
difficulty.l34

He advised that an agreement earlier suggested at Reggio be

concluded i f it were not possible to do any better.

tor something concrete, when he wrote.

He seemed to be grasping

"We are in atrai ts in which we must do

l.32Letter to Jacopo Salviati, September 10, 1,26, Cartese, IX, 258. He
wrcte plainly.

" ... se F'errara 5i acoorda con Cesare, no! aiame ruinati .... "
also letter to Qiammatteo Gibert1, september S, 1$26, ibid., 2381 " ••• il
chs se riuscissi vedrai malo axite aU. cosa nostre."
-----

cr.

-

l3Jr.etter to Giammatteo aiberti, September 11, 1.526, ibid. 270-271.

-

l34r.etter to B1shop Altobello Averoldi, August lJ, 1$26, ibid., llL-l32.
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everything that is possible to have victory."135 Near the end ot 1526, however, he sadly reported that the Cuke was riving clearer signs than ever that
he favored the Emperor.136 Obviously he was by no means finished playing
clever politics.
A!'ter OUicc1ardini's lack ot success in these papal matters in the autumn
of 1526, he returned to Modena, where matters were worsening so quickly that

the entire state ot the Church was th~atened.l37 Charles' fleet, f~t
certainly as great as had been rumorod but of importance enough, ,,138 engaged
that of the allies.

George Frundsberg's German pikemen, the

landeknech~,

of

whom there hed been much talk for some time, had not been stopped by the

Venetians et the mountain passes and had reached the Po croSSings, where the
r.\lke

(;f'

Urbino was in no pos! t10n to defeat them. l )9 All hopes centered on ffJW

troops and the courage ot Giovanni de' Medici. wounded on November 25 as he was
fi~htin€

11ke en ordinary solO1er against the landsknechte. Two days before

13Stetter to Qia.'!l1'II8tteo Giberti. September 5, 1526, ibid., 2.38. Note the
frankness of his wordfn " ••• siamo in termini che bisogna"""fa'X.e ogni con per
vincere •••• tt
l36r..etter of Machiavelli to the otto, r.ecember 3, 1526, QRere, VI, 230-231
137 start. d tltal1a, V, 90.

138Letter to Gi.armlatteo Giberti, septem~r S, 1526, Cf,'rtese, IX, 238.
l.39Guicciardin1 's letters included freouent references to the
rndsknechte. E.g., cf. letters to Bishop Altobello Avero1di, Aur,ust 22, 152c,
Sid., 1'11, to Ciammatteo Gibert!, August 22, 1526, ibid., 173, and to Pietro
Pesaro, September 11, 1526, ibid., 267, where he shoWi"'Interest in their backgrounds, their Lutheran religIon and their obedience to the Emperor and the
Archduke and House of Austria. In August, he described his naws of their actior
as "Ho{;rgi caldi, domani freddi."

his death on the last day of !-lovember, the Germans crossed the Po with their
pikes aimed at the wry heart of Italy.
This disaster was lout

l:l

.tinal. culmination of OUicciardin1 's many

dirrerences with Urbino, differences which had begun at the time of retreat

ot Milan. Guieciardini had felt that, for

from the walls

the security of the

state of the Church in that region, Urb1no should cross the
the Venetian troop..

Po

southward with

But the Duke delayed, oometimes stating that he awaited

adVice from Venice, and, at other times, alleging wholly different reasons.

Urbino informed the Venetian Senate that, were he to cross the Po, the
imperialists would probably fall upon their dominions on which he had been

140

ordered mt to pass.

Guiceiardini worried that the difficulty 01 making

~:~ere

•• in

Lombardy

would lead the Germans to pau into Tuscany. He preferred that they lay siege
Years later, in the Storts d t Ital1a he finally admitted that it

to :Piacenza.

was for this reason, unknown to anyone, even to the Pope himself" that he

delayed senr:!ing provisions there. He would thus give hope to the enemy that it
might be taken.

Guicciardin1 was caretul to find excuses for his action.

rIe

hoped that, if Piacenza should be beSieged, he would tind the means to relieve
it.lhJ.
l"Jh11e Guicciardini invited the attack on Piacenza, he was thinking not

only of all Tuscany but of florence in particular.

.

1I.OStoria d I Italla, V, 90-94 •

-

l41Ib1d., 95-96.

Nor were the Florentines
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less fearful of their pl1ght. One of Hachiavell1's duties as a representative
of the teague at :1ts headquarters in Florence was its protection. His

responsibilities led him to travel back and :forth on various cOllRiesiona. He

bad many personal meetings with Guicciard1ni.

At the end of November 1526

Machiavelli set otf, on orders from the magistracy of Florence.. to
Quieciardini .8 camp at Modena to in:fom him of conaltions in the oi ty.
ouieciard:1ni was told that he could negotiate as he thought best and as the

times would indicate though the Florentine people preferred. to "sign an agree-

ment" rather than make concessions for their satety.142 Arter iMmediately

-

conferring with OUieciardini, the envoy reported to the otto that, i f the
enemy came to attack the City, no help could be expected outside of six or
HVen thousand infantry of the Church.

Guicciardini had infomed Machiavelll

that an agreement would have to be diseus..d not in the field but in Rome or in
Florence.143
On December

agreement.

31 .. 1526, Alfonso d tEste and Viceroy Lannay concluded an

The Duke was appointed imperial captain-general in Italy, and he

was to assist Charles with troops in return tor imperial protection and support
for his efforts to gain Modena}.44 Though this action of AltoZlSo by no means

.F

14~hese instructions, dated ~iovember )0, 1$26, are given in !"lacrJ..avelli '.
QRere, VI, 226-228. cf. also 'rorumQaini, n , 666 n.
cr.

143t.etter of 1(achiave1li to the otr- December 2, 1$26, Qpere, VI, 228,
also Gu1cciardini's 2E!r! 1nedlte, ,9-10.

~~~~:~t~~Q, V, 100.
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crYstallized his position, he drew ever closer to the Emperor in the early
JftOnths of the next

Machiavelli wrote.

year, as OUicciard1n1 had tear1'ully predicted earl1er.1Ii5
"If the Duke of l"errare. had a bit of sense in bie head and

this weatoor lasted another two days, he could !1.n1sh oft this war with his

eyes ahut.lh6 The sl1O'lIQl" Bologneae weather continued, but AlIeneo went along
for the present with the conv.1ction that the Bate interest lay not with their
old French ally but with the all.powerful Einperor.

The !uk$' s action was typical of the otten selfish and invol'V'$d polley

webs quietly woven as the peninsula was about to enter one of the most reverberat:lnf, years of its long history. For too many of the ru.lers, self-interest
motivated by the lust tor power was the

onl: key to their shifting allegiances.

OU1coiardini was certain of only one thing, that the year 1526 ended. witil
preparations on all sides tor a "WrY vigorous wv. lh7
The year

1527 he characterized as "full of events unheard-of tor

many

ages. ff It was replete w:1 th Ilchanges or statesJI captiVitie. of princes, shocking sacld.ngs of cities" a great scarcity ot provisiona, and a raging pestilence
which spread through It.al7, where nothing was to be seen but death,

rught and

rapine. QUa By that year the intensity of the Habsburg-Valois struggles on

Itnlian soU

B~

1l6c.r. ,SUE4,

l.4~tter

had more than made up for the diversity and llUJnbera of

p. 68.

to the pt;to, March 18, 1527, in 0i!X'e, VI, 2ltB-2h9.

147stor1& cl'Ital1a, V, 100.

-

l18Ibid., 101.
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the various conquerine groups of Spain, a subject which had once interested
him.149 He expl.a1ned that Italian atfairs were more dieturbed f !!'lOre nout-of-

joint, n than they had been for a thousand years,lSO
Guicciardini • ~ distress was intensified wi tb the Constable of Fcurbon' e

march from Milan in Feb:ruar;y of 15'27. 'I'i:lcse towna on Bourbon's route from
1.1i1an to Flol'ence and Rome were well aware of the1r danger though they were
merely stepping stones to the.. two major Italian targets.

Guicciardin1 and

x{acirlavel11 knew something was afoot when the Span1arde left Milan, following

the German ptkem.en who had already crossed the Trebbia.

It was clear to them

that the imperial troops were enroute to sack Florence and ultimately Rome.
Guicciardini had already informed hie fe1low.c1 tiMne of the aid that the,.

- tell

could expect,15>1. but at the beg1nnillf of FebruIi:rT the otto once again sent
r-iach1avelli to OU1eciardini's camp. l1ach1aYelli was to
wishes and find out i t further aid could 'be expected.

ahead of time of the

EUl'f'OY'S

was to "tell the tWce

needed.ttl$2 On th()
•

It

§t

$&:I!'1e

him of the city'a

Qu1cciardini, Wormed

arrival, gave him still another taB. Machiavelli

Urbin;2] and the Marchese £of Saluzzg what is

day as he arrived at Farma, February

7, Ma.chiavelli

.11

1h9ffRelazioM d1 Spar,na," So:dtti autobiograf'ic1. p. 1)3.

15O"•••le cose di Ital1a in tantn agitazione e travagii che da mille auni
in qua non furono mai tante," "Oratio accusatoria," ibid., p. 226.
15lcr. £1U'pra,

p. 70.

-

IS2The instructions for ~iacb1avell1' e mission, dated February ), 1$27, are
included in his Opere, VI. 232...2)). Cf. aleo Ouicciard:1n1's words to the
Cardinal. of CartONi', Who had in1'omed him ot the envoy's coming on February S,
cited in Ridolfi, l1aeb1.avelll, p. 325. n. 12.

13
tt.'1Cl Cuiceiardini went to see Urbina

me tEmporized as usual. The

Duke pointed

out that SnlUZEo vas to enter Tuscan;y- with the vanguard of the army "muG he
l~everthele$a,

would stay in the enemy's rear llith the remainder.

all agreed to

narrant~ everything pen in hcL~n on the day £Oll~~.153
The discussions ended in

&.

plan that, 1f the

e~

would head

£01"

Tuscany

by way of PontrenlOli, all the Fnnoo-VeooUan £orces and the armies of the

Church would begln their march there immediately.

If instead they turned

towards Bologna, Ulan Saluzzo alone 'WOUld enter Tuscany tmlle the Duke would
bring up the rear.

According to OU1cciardini, Urbino was committed to this

plan ..1Sl.

On enemy movements depended the action of the League'B troops.
Hechiavell1 remained with Guieclard1ni to

Bee

''Which way the water

W4~

going to

flow) so that, 1! 1t were coming your way.. I coulrl return tully informed of the
nature of the remedies.... ,,155 Instead

ot the

three or

tour

days he had

intended to remain, Hach1avelli stayed almost th:ree months. He viaited the
papal camps facing the entll'!O" fram Panna to Bologna, where he arriftd on
February 27, and stayed for more than a month while the Spaniards and a~zmana

vere

b~aten down

for lack of money and provisions, not to mention the inclement

weather.

~.

153tetter of ~!ach1avell1 to

- .ppere,

the otto, Fe'bruary

1, 1527,

VI, 233-

154Letter to the cardinal ot Cortona, Fehrue.ry' 1 and 8, QRere inedite,

VIII, 215-216.

l$Stetter to the pttq, February ll, 1527, QP2re, VI, 235-2.36.

•

Several things i.!revented the allies frm dealing a serious blow to the
imperial amy.

The 11archese di Saluzzo a.nd the papal army tried to take

,Bolof1lB., but he could not control the troops there.
Saluzzo was ''more £it to break

til

OUicciardini felt that

lance than to diseharee the office ot

oeneral. n156 Several months prior to Saluzzots present assignment, Guicciardin
had already recognized his inabillty.

He simply lacked those 'luaU ties

essential to an able mili ta.ry leader.lS7 By this time, the Puke of Urbino was
back in Guicciardini's eood r:races, tor he was somewhat more successful than

Seluzzo in building up allied morale .158
But Guicc1ardini found more debits than credi te.

lie referred to the ttnon_

cooperative disposition ot the Florentine people" and the imperialist adherents in Siena.159 The allied campaign as a whole was not proceeding With
1ts in! tial vigor.

Thouch the other members

ot- the League oontimially

criticized the Pope IS inconstancy and the King's dllatory policy and used it as

tor their feeble action, Ouieciardini remarked that they were
"remiss enough of themaelves. ul60

an excuse

Pope Clement, realizing how risk;y it was to separate hin1selt from his

allies, nevertheless concluded an agreement in March with the Emperor's

lS7ttt~11'iarchese di Saluzzo non 81 intende mente." letter to Giammatteo
G1bert1, August 24, 1$26, Carteggi., IX, IBL. Cf. elso another letter to Gibert: ,
September 6, 1526, ibid., ~, where he states the impossib1l1tyof excusing
the J-1archeae's tardIiliis in reporting his movements.
158Storia dtltaliaa V, 118-119.

-

159Ibid., 121-122.
16<>J.bid., 111-112.

-
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representatives in Rome. There was to be no m1lltary activity tor eight montha
the Pope was to pay the Emperor sixty thousand ducats) and the Colonnas,
j,.Jnperlal adherents, were to restore all lands taken from the Church.16l
On t"'areh )1, however.. Bourbon informed Guiceiardini that he had to continw ~

his southward march, for his troops would not obey any comma.na to the .contrary.
He explained that they could probably be stopped upon the payment ot more money

Pope Clement accepted this otter and ordered Florence to provide the required
amooot. 162 OUiceiardini's words intimate his disapproval ot this heavy
obligation on Florence.

Jllachiavell1 too had a good idea ot the situation when he wrote from Imola
in early April.

Bourbon.

The otto, he cOUIll5elled, should not be blaclana1led by

He asked figuratiYely what agreement could be hoped tor with an

enemy ttwho, when the Alps are still between you aD! your forces are still in
the field, asks tor a hundred thousand

and fifty thousand within ten daY8?1t

norins wi thin three days and a hundred

\'~hen

they get to Florence, he continued,

the first things they will demand will be everytb1ng ,eu own, tor without any
doubt (and would it were not so I) their adYance 1s prempted only by the
prospect ot booty, end there is no other remedy against thia evil than to set

them right.

And, i t you have to do this, it 18 better to do it at the Alps thai

at your very walls.J.63
At thia point, in the spring ot 1$27, both Mach1avelli and Gu1cc1ard1n1

-

-

161Ibid., 122.

162~., 12.3-125, 130.
163r.etter to the otto, Apr.U 2, 1527, S;ere, VI, 256-257.
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were seriously concerned about the fate of their beloved Florence.

Machiavelli

exPlained to Vettori that it was essential to beat the enemy into Tuscany and
leave the 'iilatory r-ulce of Urbino to "raw up the rear as he pleased .164

,

Urbino

had only a few papal troops under his command at Forli, and the others had been

stationed here and there along the way as protection tor cities on the road
from l-arma.

165 The two norentines agreed at this time that "help should be

go!ven the Romagna while its territories can be defended at sixteen soldi to the

}ira," but then t'With those Italian troops that can be collected and with what
money ie left come ••• and eave Florence at all costs.166 l"'18chiavelli's words
manifest real tension, for he saw what could happen.

"Things are in such a

state that we must either reconstruct the war or conelude peace." These words

-

were the words of Machiavelli to the Otto on April 11.167
Ouicciardini understood that Fope Clementls hopes for Bourbon'S obedience
to the Viceroy were vain.

He earnestly implored the Marchese di Saluzzo and

the Venetians tc realize that there would be no peace and, tor their own
interest if not that of others, not to abandon the Pope and Tuecany.

Clement

had been deceived, for he sincerely expected the agreement to end in a truce.
By giving him assistance, Guicc1ardini was careful to point out, the Venetians

.
"

woulci simply be carry.1ng out the conditions of the alliance.

This would

!
II

j',1
~.

522.

l~etter to Francesco Vettori,

April 5, 1527, Letta" tamiliari, pp. 521·
..
1

165tetter to the 9~to, April 11, 1527, Opere, VI, 261-262.
lutetter to Vetten, April 5_ 1527, Letten familiari, pp. 521-522.
167Letter to the Otto, April 11, 1527, QE!re, VI, 2€1-262.
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redound to their credit.

And. if they gave him help, the Pope would be able to

make a truce favorable for lrl.nu!Ielf and Florence. and this, in the long

l'Ull,

would prove very beneficial to the League. If abandoned, however, t.he Pope
would be forced to grant the imperialists a large sum of money and make

considerable monthly payments. All Ws money would be used later in a war
against them!

He begged them, as a protection to themselves, to dispatch their

forces to defend Tuscany when Bourbon MO'Ved to attack it. l68
Salu£zo and the Venetians felt that they had been asked to place their
interests in a }::Osition secondary to those in the League.

Perhaps it was true

that to abandon the Pope would hurt the common etfort. On the ot..'ler hand, to
grant military aid would' mean to eXJX)se their troops to danger between the
Apennines and the enemy, an area already
Intrigue played its role.

60

disaffected to them.

OUicciardini observed that many suspected that

the Duke of Urbino had made a secret agreement with Bourbon not to block his

passare into

~~scany.

Though he was in extreme need of supplies, Bcurbon was

able to cross the Apennines.

At the same time Bourbon wrote, though insincerel .

to Lieutenant Guicciardini of h!s desire to show his devotion to the Pope.
The imperial Viceroy, Lannoy, was just as clever as Bourbon.

For many

reasons, he was satisfied with the papal-imperial truce in the sprine of 1527,
"ns for many other reasons, so also, as I !:tJuJ.cciardin!! have heard from trustwc.rthy persons, because of his plan that the azmy should move their full force
against the Venetians. If

Yet he did not carry out the promise he had made at

Rome to remove the cavalry and the greater part of the Spanish intantr.r from

168storla d'Italia, V, 125-126.
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BOurbon's control.

In fact, while he was negotiating at F'lorence, he refused

to do so on the grounds that he l."Ould not cause the ruin of Charles' army. 169
P..oth Machiavelli and Guicciardini recognized that the agreement between

pope Clement and Lannoy was ttuncertain and false, •••Jnade in Rome and not
observed in Lombardy."

Machiavelli explained that an insincere agreement would

be a loss to the allies and

Ii

boon to the enemy.

"They are thinking only of

war as they advance upon you., and they are letting you become confused between

war and truces. n170 While the Viceroy attempted to get Bourbon to agree to
halt his march, Guicc1ardini wrote that
flever W8S there a more complicated and dangerous affair than this ••••
In these difficulties, I feel that the most perilous aspect of all is
the fact that we have the enemy in Tuscany and are without armed forces,
and 80 I have taken the decision on my own initiative, as I have no
aesi.stance from Rome, to send towards Florence all the forces at my
disposal ••••171
Machiavelli was elated by Guieciardin1's decision, for it afforded at leas
some hope for Florence. He stated with a burst of emotion:
I love Messer Francesco Ouieciardini.

I love my country more than my

own tioul and I tell you by the experience I have pained 1n sixty years

that I do not believe tilere was ever a more difficult situation than this,
where peace is necessary and war cannot be avoided, and we have on our
hands a prince who is hard put to it to do what is needed 8i thar for
peace or for war alone. 172

169Ibid ., 126-128.
17Or..etter to Vettori, April 14, 1527, Lettere !.am111ar~. pp. 52.3-52L.
l71Letter to the

£t..l.2,

April 16, 1521, QR!re inedite, V, 409-hlO.

172tetter to Vettor1, April 16, 1527, Lettere fami11eri, pp. 524-525.
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The allied army paesed into Tuscany.
advance.

Ita commanders knew of Bourbon. e

The major officers in councU "dth papal and Florentine agents agreed

that the united arn".1es should encamp at some post beyond r'lorence tc deprive
Bourbon of all means of access to it.

They agreed to Feder1g'O da Bozzolo t 8

recommendation t.o remove the troops to Anelaa, thirteen miles !rom Florence.173
Internal commotion in Florence formed a hindranoe to this project.
Machiavelli arrived in norence on Apr1l 22 and Ouicciard1n1 on the
followj,ng day.
theta

The city wae in a bad mood.

Gu1cc1ardini made the statement

fllf the populace does defend itself the government nll not be able

to. ul7h His pror.heey was right,
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the Medici reRents were driven out and a

Florentine republic proclaimed.
But. the Roman hell of May

6, 1527, was thedis8ster. Guicciardini

wrote

"It would be impossible ••• to relate and almost to conceive the calamities of

tor once

that city....175 In all fairness it l!1\1st

be said that Gtdcciardini

did not give himself the credit due him.

"''hen he learned of the sack of

he sent Machiavelli to eiY! tavecchia.

re.fure there.

nome,

The IUtnor was that the Pope had taken

In any cue Andros Doria was there with his ships, and

Machiavelli was tc diseuse future allied plans with bim.176
l!lhat came as a worse shock to both Guicciardini and Machi.valli was the

173stona dtltalia, V, 129-1.31.

17ULetter of April

2u,

1527, geere inedite, V, h17.

175Storia
V, 1)6-141.
.....................dtltalia,
,

17~etter to Gu1cciardini, Opere. VI, 265-266.
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"dreadful news from Rome, "177 that Clement, without hope, had made a treaty
wi th the imperialist troops on June.
6 178 To Guicciardini this meant only that
the horrors

ot the month of

May

could have been avoidedl

AU past efforts now

seemed so useless'
These views of Ouicciardini further crystallized with the Barcelona accord
between Pope and Emperor on June 27, 1529, where Charles again demonstrated the
upper-hand.

or

this agreement Gu1cciardini wrote.

This peace and confederacy put an end to those long and burdensome
wars, which bad continued over eight years, with so many shocking
events, and all Italy remained free from the tunultuoua noise and
perils of arms, except the city of F'lor·.::nce, whose war had been
conducive to the peace of the reat while the peace of the rest
aggravated its war. 17 9
Florentine affairs, caught up in the maelstrom of power polities, could
not have taken any other course. With Pope Clement and King Francis reconciled

to Charles V, the many small states of the pen1nsula had no choice but to make
the best terms possible with the Emperor and to accept him
Italian destinies.

8S

the arbiter of

Perhaps the motives of the Venetian Republic for a treaty

with the Emperor did have a selfish note, but its very preservation was at
stake. And with the fall of Venice under imperial control, the isolation ot
Florence was complete.
Guicc1ardini fa own sentiments in the matter of papal-F'lorentine relations

177'1'11is phrase, from 8. letter of Machiavelli, referred to h18 and
Guicciardinits react10n when they had learned of the May 6th sack, Ridolfi,
Machiavelli, p. 21.7.
178storia d'Italla, V, lh7.

-

l79These provisions are given in more detail in ibid., 261..
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are

clear.

It was frightful tor Guiceiardini to contemplate the destruction of

the city.leO Hence Florentine submission to the papacy, now cooperating with
the Emperor, was the course of wisdom.

This view Guicciardini held as a loyal.

.on of Florence and not because of any particular loyalty to the

r~edici.

Native-born historians of Florence of i l l periods have held the viewpoint
that, had it not been for Malatesta Baglioni's treason,l€l their city would
have survived the crisis of the

siege.le~ While recounting the facts,

QUicciardini as usual took the more profound. viewpoint.

No single accident of

the papal-imperialist siege could have accounted for the fall of Florence.
'I'he tenor of all his pages relating to the Republic's struggle is that, in her
isolation, she could not sustain herself in the lonp run against the overpowering strength of the two allied world potentates, the Pope and the Emperor.
Guicciardini was pessimistic as he looked at the political scene, both as
an historian and as a political figure involved!!!

centered on many things.

_1Il8
...di
.........b...
u...
s

rebus. His dejectio'
He saw the greed, the selfishness, the individualism

and the treachery which reigned supreme in Cinguecento Italy.

Idlitary ineptitude of Italy.

He knew the

He realized that, without these blemishes, the

barbarians, for all their power and resources, could not have gained so strong

-

180Ibid., 28O.
18J.1iis treason consisted in the fact that he had taken it upon himself to
begin negotiations for the eventual capitulation of Florence to the imperialistl

182Schevill, Florence, p. 495.

-
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a foothold 1n the peninsula. He observed ,ally the apathy, the neglect ot

responsib1li~ and the lack ot ettective leadership183 which doomed the cause
of the allies ot Cognac. 1'ben neutrality was no longer possible, when Italy
understood that her safety did not lie in the struggles between two toreign
powers, steadfast adherence to the anti-imperialist league would have at least
helped :;::eninsular attairs.
hoped against bope.

'Ihis Guicciard1ni believed. He seemed to have

But instead be lived to see each pOlitical unit lose its

independence, including his patriae

Nothing gave him reason to hope from 1$27

to 15.30. He could only despair.

181iere Guicciard1n1' s crt ticlam centered largely on his papal master as
leader of the League ot Cognac. ct. inf.fa , pp. 148-1$0.

CHAPTER III
THE PAPAL INCW.BF-NTS (1492-1$23)
AND THE EASF,s OF'

THEIR f'OLI'l.'lCS
Papal activities are woven into the fabric of sixteenth-century Italian

history. Many of Guicciardin1 ts observations on the Holy See and its
incumbents fit equally well under the topics of power struggle, papal poll tics
or relipion.

This chapter will consider the underlyinr themes of papal

politics in the Henaissance with stress on the period from Alexander VI through
the death of Adrian VI. With it one can see more clearly into the politics of
Guicciardini.
Ouicciardini noted that the prime pen tion 01' the pope and the reverence
due the Christian religion were partial explanations for the developnent of the
political power of the early Church and its acquisition of lands and meney.

He

suq;:ested that the popes, through fear but mostly through ambition, followed

i

the examples of' secular princes.

Before the end of the Censtantinian period,

the popes found it easy to establish control of their "regno celeste" by w.ln-

I"
II

II

ninr support throur:.h charitable works and by the organization of dioceses.

The

transfer of the imperial center to the East crystallized the developnent of

papal rule in the West.
Ouicciardin1 passed quickly over the medieval period and concentrated on

83
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I
I
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biB own time. Though men lost reverence tor the popes, t.l)eir authority was
The popes enhanced their prestige because they controlled various

maintained.

ecclesiastical appointments.

In fact, they were often stimulated to ennoble

their relatives and grant them rich benefices.

Yet Ouicciard1ni seriously

opposed a secular ruler's warring against the pope, who was so highly esteemed,

tor this would bring him grave infamy and small gain. l
In this treatment ot papal power, Guicciardini expanded on the eroliling
problems in the laicization of society during the tifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. One of the fundamental issues considered was the Franco-Span1sh
,truggle for southern Italy which proved to be a

CI'OSS

for the papacy.

Both

the French and the Aragonese violated papal authorl ty in their attempts to gain
the Neapolitan crown. The situation was, moreover, complicated by repeated
attempts ot the Aragonese to make alliances with the Sforza and Malatesta in th.
north, which would result in the encirclement of the papal states.

As early as

1420, the popes were torced to defend their holdings against the encroachments
of the Aragoneae, the French, the Florentines, the Venetians and the
condottieri.

2

With the ending ot the Great Schism and the return of Martin V

to Rome, Rome was in the possession of Francesco Sforza.

By

the aid of Joanna

of Naples and a subsequent alliance with the Sforza rulers, the papal states

lei. stona

d'Italia, I, Chap. 12, 370-)81.

2odorico Rinaldi, Annale. Ecclesiastici !2 anna MCXCVIII, ad. Joanne
T'omenico Maw, n (Luau, 17$2', 71, no. 5, and5Cr-.5~, no. 19.
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saw the removal ot toreign troops and the return to papal control.) Hence from
the beginning, the t1lteenth-eentury papacy had to fight to keep t he papal

states free.
Rome was torn by the continual quarrels of the Orsini and the Colonna and

tile failure of the papacy to insure a stable grain supply tor its territories.
Under Alfonso V, the Aragone•• took Terracina and .Benevento, whioh guarded the
g~dl.U

routes from the southem kingdom to Rome, and used this position to cause

trouble tor a papacy reluctant to support. their claims to Naples. 4
Eugenius IV tried to settle the Neapol1 tan question by recognizing Alfonso
a8 the heir of Joanna II in 1442, but his plan was upset by Alfonso's death in

1455

and the conf11ctiny claims of Alfonso's illegitimate son Ferrante and

another relative, John of Calabria. 5 Yet the papal support given these
Aragonese claimants was in tact :recognition of
predecessor,

8

!!!! aooompli.

Like his

Eugen1us tried to reassert his authority in the papal states, but

he never got anywhere.

The oondottier1,

s~

to restore a Roman republio

and to carve out individual holdings for themselves, plagued the papacy. 6
Eugenius replied to such threats by

creatin~

a warrior element in the

-

>rbid., VIII, 488, no. 10.
pp.

4Emmanue1 P. Rodocanach1 .. Histoire .2! ~ S!.!J2k.! 1k7! (Paris, 1922),

L47-J.. 48.

5John of Calabria was a direct descendant of Louis I of Anjou (d. 1385).
6A1berti , COII'IIl8ntariu8 de co~urQtione forcaria, in Lodc..vicus A. Muratori,

~

Italicarum §rigtores,xxv MedlolanI, i7Sl), :311.
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cardinalate.7 By doing so, he continued in the tradition of the great fourteenth-century Cardinal. Albornoz and foreshadowed Pope Julius II.

Eugeni.us was

eVen forced to seek refuge in Florence, whose inhoapi tali ty .forced him to move
to Siena.

The tittcenth-century popes were forced of necsssi ty to solidify their
political control of the papal states leat they loose them entirely. Mertin V
and his successors were forced to become more and more strict in maintaining

peace in RoM.

The provincial areas were nominally under the authority ot a

papel appointee, but they were actually in the power of a local conctottiere.
Brir,andafe and civU disobedience were commonplace. Pius II attempted. to
restore .ome order by offering amnesty to all except those gullty ot homicide,
heresy and arson and by eatablish1ng a guard for the preservation of civil

peace. 8 Sometimes the popea tried tc regain pol!tical control by granting
concessions to the Romans, but, as Guiccisrdini fS own career as a governor in
the papal territories later deonatrated, after 1170 they took very stern

messures. 9

7Such were the appointments of Cardinals Vitellesch1, Scarampo and
Ficeinino under Eu~en1us rJ.
A

""Auguste 'l'he1ner, ad., Codex f;1ptomati.cus [:mini 'l'empenlls S. Sadis, III
(Roms" 1862), 415, no. J6l.
- ,
90uicciardini·. rule of Reggio and Modena taxed his ingenuity as he
rigorously exercised his papal charge. ~tr1ct punishment of the authors of the
excesses was necessary to curb disorder. Note his wOrdSI "Le cose ••• non
potl"8bbero Gsnre in pegg10re disordine, ehe 'l& come uno baccano •••• , .. letter to
Cardinal de t tJledic1, July 17" 1517, certe~6i, n, 173. ~:isorderly conditions
continued to prevail in ReggiO a1. though e had used almost every conceivable
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In spi to of the turbulence of the state.

ot the Church, the despots and

republiCS \1itbin them did not want to repudiate papal suzerainty completely.
TheY sought a compromise with the papacy which would gu."t1'&ntee as far as

possible their stability and freedom of action.

Thus papal claims l'emained

intact and simply needed reasaertion.

-

type of repression, including the confiscation of crops and goods, the razing °
houses and capital pUni.shment., Oe.ffroy, ffAutobiograpMe," p. 666. He had to
deBl with quarrelsome and rapacious feudal
~
enlisted the aid of
neighboring lords and even notor.1ous Apemi.nfJ brigands l1ke Domenico da Morot to
ibid., p. 66$. Ariosto encountered similar problema in the Eate-controlled
"OQi-1'ag:nana. Moretto was one of the thorns in his side too, and he received
advice from nuke Alfonso on the method of procedure he should take, letter to
todovico Ariosto, April 6, 1$22, in C40vanni SfOrza. ted., Documenti inedit1 E!!
servire alla vita di'1cdovico Ariosto (Modena, 1926), p. 121. Cf. ibid., pp.
Ul-l16, 119, 124-i27, for other letters of Alfonso to Ariosto in 1m-which
show that the nuke was interested 1n Anosto's work and gave him power to
proceed with cemplete :independence in difficult cases. Like OUicciardini,
Ariosto reallY undertook all cares of the goverment, hearing all accusations
and struggles over thefts and homicides. He begged some to cooperate with him
and threatened others, and daily wrote to the ruke for counsel and aid. His
armed men were too few to affront the band! ts and assassins who infested the
terri tory, and he was reduced to the al ternati ve of us1ng the extreme measures
of burning the goods of the bandits, their adherents and aids and even the
churches which, because of ecclesiastical 1mmun1ty, served as a secure retreat
for offenders, Lodovico Ariosto, Letters, Jrd edt by Antonio Cappelli, (Milano,
1887), pp. lxxxix, 200, 163, and, lor references to the ducal COun8el in the
8ummer and fell of 1523, p. xci, n. 1. His task: was 80 difficult that Ariosto
eften spoke exCitedly,
ibid., pp. 21.)-21.6. He even threatenf'l to abandon
the offioe" for "Ognuno
eli iiiravoglia, e dicona mal d1 me, ma piu di V.5.
Lthe rYukeiJ aha pigli 11 loro denari e lasc1 abbandonate 1. rocche •••• ," ibid.
p. 2.3U. ,But, like Guicciardin1, Ario.to took his dUties seriouslY. u ••• f~
che stare in questo utticio non sono per nervi amico alcuno, .. non 1.
giustiz1a, II cited in ~., p. xcii. Of his role as governor for the r;'Uke,
Ar.1osto wrote in the third person that "he acted so wisely that he brought pesc
to the country) when he lett them, he was content, although while he remained
there he was disturbed, It I.e Satire, ed. Antonto del nero (Milano, 194.3), p.
46. Bot only the papal hoI'di"ngs bUt maDY' otl"..er Italian regions
b...t with
problema which were intensit1ed by foreign 1nvasion.

-roras, who

""i.,

_1'0

,

,i
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The papal states never fully providec' financial security to the fifteenth
and sixteenth-centu17 papacy.

A concession was made in tax exemptions, a

practice which grew and grew under each pontift.

10

Under such cond! tiona, they

bad to fet funds by means of 8f!..nates and indulgence money.

The poll tical and economic &eti vi ties ot the fifteenth

L"ld

sixteenth-

century popes should be viewed not so much as a concentration on pa.pal leader£;hip in a pan-Italian movement,l1 but s:imply' as an immediate struggle

tor the

maintenance of poll tical independence. The papacy was forced into the position
where it could make its authority felt only to the degree to which it could

claim "srect as e. political power.
Violations ot papal authority by foreign dynasties and by local ccndottier

were evident proof of the growing secularization ot European society.
Conc11iarism end Gel1icanism too tr.reatened the fifteenth-eenwr,y papacy 1n ita
treedom.

By virtue of their

c\,"l1

princely cr.aracter, ne.tional monarchs kept

mixed m.-itters within their own jurisdiction or looked upon the pope

!!l!:!£ pares.

8S

a

t'r:imu8

Martin V and his successon had adhered to simple traditional.

principle of the separation of church and the aeeul.ar order in a Christian
.n

leThe extreme debt of the Roman government in l.471 was traceable to heavy
expenses during the Crusades and to the dwindling tax resources of the papal

atatea.

cr.

":r:1arium Anton11 Petri" in !'1uraton, XXIV, 977-985.

ll-rhit3 intorpretation was read into the oontl1ct of the papacy with the
French and the Aragon.a. by Cecilia M. Ady, Flue II (London, 1913), p. 184, but
it has also 'been expounded by 8n entire school 'Ofmodern Italian scholars,
notably Ernesto Pontieri, L'eguillbrio e la crisi polities itallana nella
!e?P!lS ~ !!!! peeo}.~ XV (NapeR, 194~";-p. " .
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society,12 bu.t the reputation of the papacy still stood r';u"ficiently high at
tbe time for them to exert pressure in purely temporal matters.

Ouicciarc.ini

noted, for example, that Innocent VIII had suPr,.ort&d some Neapollt.an bs.l'Ons who
trel~C

revolting aeainst King Ferrante. Lorenzo d&t l';edici feared such a polley.

Given papsl a"l'!bi tion, the Croxreh' s power ehown here might prove harmful to
other rulers.13
Althouell the papal dignity was still important, the papacy could no
longer seriOUSly hope to demonstrate its leadership of

cornmon 'ruropean crusade.

Chriet~ndom

through a

Yet both Nicholas V and Cal1xtus III thought they

could obtain support tor a crusade it there would first be polltical peace in
Italy.

The Poaee of Lod! of

11~5L

evidenced a general ltallan desire tor peace.

Theoretically at lea$1i, this pea.ce continued as the basis tor all papal
action.U,

The death ot Lorenzo de' Medici, who tried to keep the balance of power
in Italy" and t."1e accession of Alexander VI occurred coincidentally in the
The Borgia rope and hi. successors, especially Julius II, torce-

same year.

fully Nl:asMrted their spiritual prerogatives and their claims to Church
territories.

Leo I witnessed the accession

ot Charle. V, who maintained that

he stood for peace UiOng Christiana .and the defense ot Christian! ty against

l2cr.

the papal letter to Charl;,. VIII in Victor Martin, Les orinnes du

pallican1~ (Paris, 1937)" Il, 241.

-

.

v

-

13nElogio," p. 225.
lLcf • TheineI', III, 379, No. 324, and supra, p. 26, n.l. Clement explained
frequently that the maintenance of peace was his papal charge, but Guicciardini
found it necessary to challenge his words.
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MOslems and heretics.

The Emperor hoped that the Pope would be his ally.

As

,p1r1tual. heads of the Christian Cnureh, however, the popes could never
acknowledge the etperor as the ultimate arbiter of the religious problems
a£!'licUng Christendom.

the

1mtlativa

It was intolerable that a secular prince should take

in refo:nn:1.ng the Church and should threaten to summ.on a general

council.
Europe ecnceived of Charles

ViS

empire pr1marily in terms of pure power.

This gave birth to the permanent hostility of France, the only other European

power of comparable strength, and then the dependent position ot the les ....
powers, England, the Italian states and Denmark.

Guicciardini agreed with

tanney, the Viceroy of NaplH in 1526, that it was the nature ot the Popes to
fear and hate the Emperors. l5 At the high pOint ot the struggles which
Guicciard1ni delineates, Clement VII was as alarmed as the medieval popes

the control ot Milan a.nd Naple. by one ruler.

OWl'

One of Charle.' major weaknesses

was his 1nab:U1ty to get the papacy to cooperate wholeheartedly in his
policies.

Ouicciard1n1 is at hi. best in detailing the play-by-play movements ot
Charles V and Claent VII. Alone
the medieval character

amon.s

contemporaries perhaps, he saw clear17

ot the imperial politics of the empel"01'.l6 He realized

that a pope could onl.;Y preHr9'e his role as Vicar of Christ it he could maintai

15storu d'Ital1a, IV, 31.2 •
•

16aatraello Ramat,
p. 26 •

!! Guicc1ardini !!! tragedia ~tltal.1,,(F1renlZ',

1953),
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his regr!U!!!.l7 There was an intimate link between the reS!!!! and the

-.8Cf'rdotium.
Ue did not deny that the

pope was a spiritual leader and that his attent.101

to spiritual affairs gave 111m greater esteem in the eyes ot the Chriatians.
Yet, as always, he accented the fact that man and his world an certa.inly not
too good.

w'bo doubts that if a pope did not tend to his charge 'twith ever,y

ldnd of arms and power be would be annihilated

!!2ll!!!. !!! ~ se.ritt:aat

.2!.!:!!!!!!! l!!!!!!a l!:!
With careful and shrewd lOgic, he
-aspects
argued tor the preaenation of the temporal. authority ot the papacy without
t~P2ral?"

which the pope could not exercise his spiritual authority.lS Further
Guicciardin1 knew tn>m experience that disorder in the papal states 'WOuld inevitably open the way tor lay prlnees to seize contn>l ot the church. 19

17The word "regnwn" as used in this sentence refers to the temporal aspect
of papal rule and not as usual to the tanporal. power. Cf. infra, p.129, n.l.
18"Giuatificazione della politics d1 Clemente VII," Scritti 22litici, p.
201. Cf. also the same argument in "Contro 1 taccordo tra Clemente VII e Carlo
V," ibid., p. 185: "Non potete conservare 1a autoriU del papa, Be non
coneervate quelle deJ principe. e que1la del principe resta annichUata, come
ha a rico~noscere 1 tenere suo dalla discrezione di uno maggiore, come ha a
depenc!ere de' cermi suoi." Because ot these views, Guicciardini has been halle
86 a precursor ot later proponents ot the Lateran Fact, Francesco Sun,
"OUicciardini e 18 rellg.1one, It Francesco Guicciardini ne1 IV centenario della
morte (1540-1940) (Firenze, 1940', p. 18L. Pastor callS attention to
OUicciard1.ni •a view that, though in i tHlt it would be a good thing it the pope
had no temporal sovereignty, the world being what it is, a powerless Head ot
the Church would very likely tind himself seriously hampered in the exercise ot
his spiritual ottice or even reduced to absolute impotence, VI, 451-452, Citing
.QJlere inadite, I, 389. Pastor shows that Guicciardini's view approaches that 0
~t Bellaminel ttPropter malitiam temporum experientia c181'l".at, non SOIU11l
utiliter, sed etie experient1a clamat, non solum ut.11iter, sed etiam neceasari
ex singulari Dei pIt>v1dantia donatos .tu1sse pontifici ••• temporales aliquos
principatus," cit.1ng ~e Rom. Pontit., Lib. V, c.9, in ib1d.,452, n.*

--

19 ttCiustifieawne della polltica, " pp. 206-207.

-
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Guicciardini stressed that a pope has the serious obligation to hand on to
his successors what he has received from his ,redecessors.

He shunned violence

in papal activities lest it result in immediate papal defeat.

PrerequiSites

for a just papal policy are a good christian Ufe and refusal to fight to exteb

lands or in revenge against papal opponents. OU1cc1ardini recognized that good
20

example and gentle action are not enough for an effective papal polley.
These criteria made 0u1cciardini a good judge of the popes from Alexander

VI to Clement VII.

No pope ahould dare to take any step which would place him

at the mercy of the tanporal power.

Then too, the papal station was too often

attended \.'ith reatless ambitions. 21 More than any other persons, the popes
22
.
were obliged to procure the preservation ot the peace,
but Guicciardini
accuse,: them of standing most of the time as "lo inst.rwn.ento di suscitare
guerre e incendi nuoviin Italia.,,23 He aceuaed Leo X of having used all his
power to start a war in 1$21.

For difficult cases, the popes should be willing

to five their cwn lives. 2L

He could look impartially at Alexander VI for his own papal semcs did
not ber-in until the reign of Leo X.
20

-

25

He recapitulated Alexander's role in the

Ibid., p. 207.

21Stor.1a d'Italla,

n,

168. Note Guiceiardini's wordsa

comunemente derti im6!zioni e delle azioni inquieti."

ft ••• aedia

-

22 Ibid ., IV, 77.

-

23Ibid., I .. .38l.
2hlbid., IV, 77-78.

2$Aa one of the major directors ot the foreign polley of the Holy See
duri!'lg the reign of Clement m, he felt called upon to justify it after ]$26
a'1d 1527. Cf. intra, pp. 144-1$1.

9.3
struggle between Ferdinand of Aragon and Lodovico Sforza of Milan for the

mastery of Naples.

Both vied for the support of

the papacy. Guicciardin1

pointed out that, to II Moro I s satisfaction, Alexender had been one of the firs
to approve of Charles VIII '8 invasion of Italy but he came to teer for his own
life and took refuge in the Cutel Sant I Angelo as the French passed through
the papal dominions. He was cognizant too that enemy cardinals might take
advantage of French interest in ecclesi4stical relom.

Perhaps the King would

heed their requests and procure the elect:ion of another pope to replace hi.m. 26
In lU9$ Alexander fomed the League of Venice, ail.,ed primarily' at the expulsion

ot the French

King from Naplae.

By'

lL9B the Pope pressed the ambassadore of

Spain, Milan and Naples to plead with the Venetian ambassador tor the restoration of Pisa to Florence as a condition tor Florenc.'s allegiance to the anti-

French league. With the removal of this probl.. among the Italians, it seemed
probable at the time that no one power would ever call in the French again.
Guicciardin1 judged that Alexander was exclusively inspired by selfinterest. This accounted .tor his wavering policy.

It was "well.-lmown" that he

had privately negotiated with Charles VIII for Ceure's benet1t,27 and later
fomed the league against him.

Then the Pope considered a league with Louis

XII when he had been unsucceeaM in gaining Naples. 28 His "immoderate thirst
for power" made him feel that he could achieve his ends more eftectively in a

26p~r1a d t lta11a, I, 99-101.

27Ib1d.,

294.

28Ibid., 304-J08. The Pope first thought that he would gain control of
Naples l)ymarry.1ng his son Cesare to King Federigo's daughter.
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disturbed Italy. 29
In 1497, he took adVantage of the opportunity to seize the Orsini estates.

,,11ile the heads of the Orsini were prisoners in Naples, Alexander declared them
rebels for having entered the French service without his permission.

Cardinal

Ascanio Sforza encouraged this action, for he was friendly to the Colonnas,

enemies of the Orsini. The Fope agreed that the Cardinal could keep some ot
the Orsini lands for himeelf.

Lo&>vioo too approved of the

Po~ ts

action but

the Venetians did not. 30

Guicc1ardini stressed Pope Alexander VI's misconduct.
interest in Cesare's advancement.

He showed excessive

He scandalously promoted twelve men to the

cardinalate who offered him much money' To seize every opportunity to sene
his avarice, Alexander pubUshed the Jub1lee in Italy and in foreign countries.
The prot! t .fxtl1'll the 1ndulgences and other spin tual emoluments and from the
temporal dominions ot the Church he gave to Cesare, who was tl-.en preparing for
his siege of Faenza.31
Cesare, the Duke of Valentino, fell from the height of his greatness in
1503 after the Jope's reconcilation with the French ld.ng.

He had quickly in-

creased his strength by fraud and CJ'Uel ty and by the arms and power ot the
Church, but his ru1n vas headlong.

His enemies used him the same way

his father, Alexander, had used others.)2

-

-

29rbid.,

299-.302.

-

3Orbid., 271.

-

3lIbid., II, 10.

-

32Ibid., 70-71.
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The Pope's major enemies were the Orsini, ColOMS, Savelli, and the lords

of the Romagna, the Harea and Urbino. 33 The norentines and the Venetians
feared him but he won the esteem of the French ldng. He was the' head of an

elCcellent body of troops in the Roman region and he held the balance in the war
between France and spein. l4
Guicc1ardini termed Alexander ttuomo valent,is81mo, ft a man of great judgment
and vi a ion 8S the sucoess of his house shows, but he did not admire the Pope"

methodS.

At the death of Alexander, all Rome hurried to St. Peter's.

As pope,

he viewed sacred and secular things without distinction, diapensed

ecclesiastical ottices profusely, was immoderately anb1t1ous and avaricious,
treacherous and monstrously cruel.

His cupid! ty led him to assassinate those

cardinals and prelates who stood in his wq. From the time of his simoniacal
election as pope, he cultivated all vicea of body and soul. There was in him
no religion, no obaervance of fai th, no concern for justice in a Rome which was
nothing but sin.

He observed only what seemed useful to him.35

A sense of tragedy is evident in Guicc1ard1n1' IS portrait of Alexander.

The Pope's undertaldnga were attended with a very rare prosperity from his

33Aluander Borria aimed to break the power of the great RoJnan fam1l1es.
Ouicciardin1 points out that the Cardir.als del V1ncola, Asawo, those of the
Colonna and Savellitam!l1es, and ~ other enemy cardinals pressed Charles
IDI to r EIllOV8 him from the papal ar.air and tc procure another election in
defense of (Jed's Church, ~., I, 101.
34storle fiorentine, pp. 258--269.
I

35Ibid ., cr. Machiavelli's characterization of Alexander's ambitions
"W1cked"'1'fO'Pe, his head full of his own designs, preyed on ~ilan and Florencel
the times serve him wen, ft ~ ~, ed. P. Fant'an1 and L. Pasaerlni, from Vol.
I~ onwards, 00. L. Pusel-inr"a'ii!"1r. Milanesi, 6 vola. incomplete (F1renze,

1 73-77), li, 138.

youth to the day of his death.
even more than he desired.

He always desired great things and obtained

From this OUicciardin1 suggested that things were

influenced t,y fate or by inexplicable divine justice. Guicciardini came to

think tt-.at justice does not nourish amone men on earth • .36
The historian's interest in Julius II was more poll. tical.

He believed

that a pope was bound not to alienate ecolesiastical posseasions.
did not think a

pOpe

Though he

should be a military man, he suggested that strong action

at times was necessary. 37
•

36S1m:Uar jud~ents, with only differing phraseolof,7, are given in!2!!!.
and in storis d'Italia" II, 97-98. Note the puzzled explanation of
.
OU1cciaraii'd, una\ile to fathom Alexander's good fortune. • ...19 nondimeno, non
trovando at peccati s~ condegna retribuzione nel mondo, ru. insino allo ultimo
di'feliciss1mo ••••e volto l'animo a fare state turono at successi sua p1u'
volte maggiori chte' disegni •••• fu insomma pi;? cattivo e piu felice che mai per
IIlOlti secol1 f'usli forse state papa alC'lll'lO." cr. also the following. "Esempio
JX)tente a contondere l' arroganu. d1 coloro 1 quill, presum"ndoe1 di .corgen
con la debolezza deg].i oeehi umani la profond1ta de' giudici div.1n1, affermano
010 che d1 prospero 0 di avverso avviene agl1 uomini proc:edere 0 de' meri t1 0
da t demeri t1 lore I come se tutto di 'non appar1.ssero mol t1 buon! euere ves.at1
1ngiustamente e molti di pravc animo easere eaaltati indebitamente, 0 come se,
altrimenU interpretando, 81 derogas88 aUa giust1zia e al!.J t:l()ten~ di tto, 141
amplitudine della quale, non rietretta at temini bravi e present!, in altro
tempo e in altro luogo, con large mana, con premi e con euppU61 sempiterni,
riconosce e giuat1 dagl1 1ng1usti. n
37

Cf. supra, PP. 90-92.
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Pope Julius' character is evident in his leadership o.r papal troops at
M1rBndola, where he exposed himself to all the fatigues and dangers of a
JDi11tary commander.

It was an uncOJ'IIfIOn and shocld.ng sight to see an old and

infirm pope engaged :in battle.

This

'W.I:lS

evidence that Julius was a pope in

name only. 38
His energy, like his audsc! ty and resolution, was boundless, and hi.

experience toughened him even more. Guicciardini compared him te· the classical
Anteus, who demonstrated more vigor With each blow of Hercules • .39 Guico1ard1n1
did not att('!'mpt to hide his admiration for JUlius who, NOre than any of his
predecessors, was honored by those who judged that a pope ehould add 1mf!rium

to the Holy' See more than influence eoule by a good example. But for the
latter task, Christ const.ituted popel his vicars on earth. Julius would have
been worthy of the greatest glol".Y i f he were a secular prince or if his care
and intention vere rather to exalt the Church by the use of the spir1tual arts

of peace. Had he been moderate and prudent in the exercise of his papal duties
he would have sustained the Church's reputation, lee.ned princely di8cord, and
bettered the r.'eneral condition 0:£ the times. 40 Either the .fate. or the Pope's

strong constitution kept him alive to serve "come autcre e cagione pr.1.ncipale

38Stor.l.a d fltali&f;e nI, 64-65. In this passage Ouicciardini also noted
the striBi'ii contraSt tween Julius and Louis XII, healthy end Vigorous and
trained from youth in military exerei8es~ Unlike the Pope, he lett the conduct
of the war to l".i.s generals.

39n!2.., 39.

4~bid., 2$7.
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,41

I

di piu lunghe e maggiori calamita di ltalu."

'41th his accession to the pontificate, Jullus relented from fomenting
disturbances in Italy so that he could accumulate money tor his projects. He
"as ::ietermined to restore the lands of the Church which had been taken from it,
and he vowed to use any method to rain his ends. 42 Poth France and the Empire

succumbed t( Julius' desire t, regain these territories. He wanted to maintain
temporal strnegth and decided now to aSfLst the Venetians, against whom he had

entered the confederacy of Cambrai in

ling for Italian control.

1508,

against the foreign states strugg-

Ouicciardini pointed out that Julius was jealous

ot

France and the Empire and V8'lted to involve them in d1.f'.ficultiee which would

divert their attention from him.

1118 members ot the Cambrai league reminded th

Pope that he was bound by its terms to prosecute the Venetians with spiritual

and temporal weapons until the al11es recovered their poss.asions. Jul1ua
aasured the Emperor in particular that he would not torget that the Venet1ane
had seized

SCRe

imperial lands. 43

From 1510 he was set to expel the foreigner fran Italy. His cry was
"Fuori 1 barbar.11" He harbored strong anti-French distaste and,ss a result, an
anti-Ferrarese and ant1-Florentine feeling as well. lab In that year he began to

b2Ib1d., II, 168.. 174-17.$. Note Guicciardini ta phrase:
intenzione molto diversa. tl

IMa in Giul10 era

44Guieeiardini observed that everyday Julius grew more insolent against tht
King of France and the Duke of Ferrara, It • • •w.oltip11cando scop-c·rtamente nella
querela e nella mi.n&cc1e," ibid., III, 25.

-
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speak openly of his intention to change the government of Florence because it

was too French. 45 Nor was the A.ragonese ruler unmindful of what. he considered
imModerate ambitions on the part of the Pope.

On August 19, 1512, a period in

OUicclardini's legateship in ltdch he .llready showed himself to be in excellent
standing with Ferdinand, the King called Guiceiardini to him to discuss this
s1 tuation.

Julius f desire to change the government of norance "sand ragione tt

indicated that he wished to dominate all Italy, and it was Ferdinand's intentio
to defend the City and her present government in every way. 46
The religio-political connections between the policy of the French ruler
and Julius II merit further consideration, likewise events regarding control of
Ferrara, Reggio and Modena.
in~ensive

His i:mmectl.ate successors too displayed the same

interests in these regions.

The Pope attempted to break the Franco-Ferrarese alliance and to gain
possession of Alfonso' s duchy.

The French King thought that Julius had sent

papal troops into Ferrara to oversee the customs and salt works.

The King

agreed that, in the case of Alfonso's interference with papal customs and the

salt works, Julius could proceed against him, since no ally was to intrude into
Church affairs.

The Pope did not wish to disclose his intentions until his

plans matured, and he negotiated continually for an agreement with Louis XII.
But Julius was adamant in his posi tlon that the King must renounce his
protection of the Me.

Guicciardini observed that Julius knew what he was

4'tetter of Antonio della Valle to Machiavelli, August 30, 1510, Qpere,
VI, 97.

85.

46r.etter of Guicciardini to the DieCi, August 22-26, 1512, Cartegp., I,
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"......
do~"E"

for the

r.........
~

did not want to war ac;ainst
the Church and would be w:Ulinft
e
-or;>

to conte to an agreement with the Pope 1n

th~

event of a showdown as to the

french position in the struggle between JU.lius and Alfonso. 47
In 6pite of the

mi8cani~

of many of Julius' plans and the hIJavy ex-

penditures, he had high hopes for tuture success.

P'llo1icl;y he proclaimed that,

with God t !3 assistance tor the restoration of ItaUan liberty" he would see his

labors brought to a prosperous end.
his only true frienda.

The Venetians would aid him, for they were

They had to act with Julius, OUicciardini explained,

for they had exhausted their finances and 'Were in dire straUs.

moved against Ferran troll! Bologna. 48

was actinr

With them he

The K1nr soon realized that the Pope

to subject l"erru-a to the Church.

He had IUTlmged

tor more

papal

troops to move into Ferrara with the intention, i f his SWiss mercenaries were

noted. ellS there, or prooeed1 ng into Milan. After investing the 'Fmperor with
Naples and making secret provisions for attacking Genoa by land and se8, he
tent twelve thQu.sand SWiss into Milan and moved to assist the Venetians to

recover some towns held by the Emperor. 49
Julius excomntWl1oated All'oMO dtEste and all who had or would take arms in

•

-

47 Ibid., 22-24_
48Ibid ., 39-L1. Note Ouiceiardin1 t s wordsl ••• delibero d1 traaterirsi
persona~te a Bologna, per strignere piu con 1& sua pr'esenzs. 8 date maggiore
autori ta alle COS8, e accreaeere 1& caldezza de' capi tani in1'eriore allo impeto
SUo J afl'emando abe a espugnare Ffirrara gll baatavano 1e fofte sue e de t
V1n1zian1 ••• ," ibid., Ul.

-

-

49Ibid., 24--26.
~I

i"
l'i:1

Ij

~,

:'1,
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his defense, including all t!-.:.e principal officers 1n the French army. 50 Even
after Gallican articles were draw up against him. at Or16a.."ls and Tours with a

threat to SUlII'IIOn him to

Ii

Church council, the F'Ope answered tlmt he tfoulrl come

to terms only 1£ the King obligated himself totally to abandon the defense

ot

Ferrara,51
Guicciardini strongly CIOndemnad Julius here.

For a. very long t·ilne the

House of fate held Ferrara as vicars of the Church and Reggio and Morlena by

Until the reign of Julius II, there was no question but

imperial investiture.
tl"..at these two oi ties

were under

imperial jurisdiction, and the Este rightly

possessed them. That Jope, nthe reviver of the old and almost forgotten rights

of the Holy See and the author of much nrl.schiet UI'lder a pious title, "52 made
war u-pon the Dulce of Ferrara

control.

tor

the

~rpo_

of reducing his duchy under Church

First, he kept Modena for hi!'!lsel.t, together with other towns as tar

~

the RiVel" Po, which he claimed had belonged to the Holy See as part ot the old
Exarchate of Ravenna.

the F:mpel"Or MmdJnilian.

ReP:J!io £rom him.

Shortly after, tor tear of the French, he gave 1.t up to

Julius cont1m1.ed his war against Alfonso and took

GuicciardL'li felt with others, that, if Jul1us had lived

longer, he would also have taken P'errara'
He could give many reasons for tile strong papel hatred of the Eate, for
,

.

SOIbid., 47-1.+8. Guiceiardini eanrnented here that, "in the midst of the
battle aiid"the din of tEr.lporsl ama, the thunder of spiritual artillery began tc

rattle from all

-

SlIbid.,

~~8.fl

47-48, 53-54.
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JUlius wss a bitter enElllGY of Alfonso. There were hi. pret..nsions to' I"errareae
territory which once 'belol1f'$d to the Church in addition t.o his hostUity to the
ruke for ha.ving been f'riendlyto the French.

Perhaps the Popels bitterness

stemmed from the implacable ha.tred for the memory of his predecessor, fops
Alexander, whoso daughter L'llCl"8zia

'been married to Alfonso and by wham she

lhe reason tel' Julius' hatred at the Este did not alter

had several. children.

its effects.

h~d

To his lUoca.sors he left Reggio and his ambition for recovering

Ferrara. They believed that Julius' glorious reputation stemmed from these
endeavors} 3
Ria ueaire for the utenaion of Church boundaries soon gave way to the
defense of l:is ow.,h GuiceiarOini detailed the manner in :fhich Jullus during
all cf 1510 drew farther and farther a:way from the French Kinr; as he veered

toward the fuperor.

Cbstinate1y bent on a war, he inveighed bitterly ageirust

Louis" accusing him ot cal.lillg himself unjustly a goed Christian
desir1..'"lg Jul:1.u£' destruction.

aIle of

How could he aver have ae."'lt troops ar;a1nst the

Popel Louis also contemplated. t..1.e meaaures to be taken arainat the Pope i f he

would persist in his alliance 'With the Venetians and in 1".is attempts to subject

Farran.5,

•

53

ThG matters between Pot:e and King remained the same but each month

~.,

278-279.

~1d.., In, L5. Jote OU1eciardin1' 8 vo.rds I lIMa 1 lardo:re che aveva U
pontitiee di oir.ndere alt.r1 si convert( in nee.a.ita{ di difendere le cose
proprie. "

55Ibid ., 56, 61, 63.

-
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POpe Julius' other rrohlems did not d1minish his desire to r,ain Bologna

and Ferugia. Bologna was under the control of the Bentivogl1o and gave a

nominal support to the Pope.56

Already in 1$06 Julius informed the Florentines

that he wanted to clear the lands of the Church of tyrants and requ.ested that
their captain, l'<1arcantonio Coloma, should serve him against the Bentivogl.1o.
ThOUgh the Republ1c opJ'.)OSed this request because it would weaken their forces
in their war to keep control of Pisa, the Enf'aloniere did not
the pope and delayed giving an

answer

88

want to

anger

long as he cOUld. S7 The Bentivogllo

were friendly to the French King, and Florence did not want to incur his wrath
by' attacking Bologna tor the Pope.

By 1511, Jul1ua real1zed that he could not

take it. SS
Pope Julius also

el.uhed with Lou1a over coneUiar1a. The French

aasembly which had threatened the Pope and empowered the King to raise money
from the revenues of the French clergy, called a councll to be held at x.,ons
the following March. 59 Ccmc1l1ari_ was indeed one ot tr... major problema ot
the age, and a pope
involved.

80

involved in pol1t1es u Julius was moat apt to become

Louis preaeed for a eounc1l and wsa 8U8p1e1cus because Ferdinand did

not agree. 60 To procure the good will ot the pr1neea and keep the council tram

-

S6rb1d., II, 171&-175.

57,stor1e fiorentir,te. p. 290.
,aStoria dtltalia, Ill, 99.

-

59Ibid.,
I

48.

60yerdinand claimed that it seemed unwise to call a Church council wb1le
tall' was involved in war, ibid., Bo.8l.

-

lOb
materlalizinr, Jul1us created eight cardinals.

Louis XII went ahead wi til

~'renoh

61

plans I however, and summoned the CouncU

of Pisa in lSll. The cardinals explained that theY' could lawtully call a

council without papal sanction because it vas obvious that the Church needed
reform in both head and members, and it was clear that Jullu. did not intend
to undertake it. They branded the

Pope

an inveterate simon1ac, a man of

infamous and abandoned manners, not tit to discharge the office ot a pont1f'f.
He had undertaken many war. and opened all Christendom to scandal. In this

case, the power of convoldng a council was lawful.:b' theirs.
Cardinals who apprond the Council of Pin argued that the Fathers ot the

COUncll or Constance .tated that a council should take place every ten yeu••
Nothing el. could keep the pope. on the right path.
fraU and life subject to many temptations.

Human nature was very

How could the Church atard secure

if a man with eo JlUch power knew that there were no checks on him?
Guicc1ardini also explained the other side of the conciliar question.
Those who followed the theologians rather than the canonists eiad only a pope
COU1~1

convoke a council, whatever his morel character. The onl.y excepUon wae

heresy.

Otherwise, and th4tY pointed to history to justify- their argument, any-

one could disturb the state of the Ohurch on

a:a:r

pretense, by ambition or

retorm. Louis' Pisan assembly, this papal group maintained, was not a council

a.t all, but rather it was the foundation of a. schism in the Church of God and a
convention inspired by' the deVil. t2

103.

-

61Ibid.,

85.

62Gu1cciardin:1. •s account of concillarism and Pin is given in ibid., 102-
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By the Cambs-ai a.greement6) none of the

of ChttrCh affairs upon tr.emael.vee.

allies

weN

to take the settlement

Yet they went boldly on.

For them, the

political and the religious spherea constituted but one arena. 6!& Even those
wiK eager,ly wanted reform were atraid of a Church couneil

w~.ich,

acting on

conc:1l1arist pr.1nciples, could do more harm than good. In lS11 moat of the
Christian world was well _are that the Pope was at the mercy ot tcrt.une,
polit1c~.

snilltaril)" and

The Venetian troops allied with him were in even

worse condition than his own who were scattered up and down the reninsula while
LoUis was victorious.

If he wished, he could Mise Rom.e and all the papal

state. But the Kinf' did not f'ollow up his victory either because of his
reverence tor religion or because he was afraid
other pr:: nees if' he went further.

6S

or 1nculT1ng

the wrath of the

Heft aga1n religion end Pll1 tics were 1nte ""

linked. Guicc1ardin1 observed, wi. th an eye to the French defeat and withdrawal
from Italy in 1512,

that L0111s, who requested papal pardon tor these reasons,

embraced certain patterns of action more out of piety perhaps than out of
policy.66
JullU8

took measure. to clear h1mse1t from the charge of negUgence and

summoned a rival

Councu of

the Lateran. He condemned the card.1nala who had

convoked the one at Pin. At the .&mIlI time the King thought that papal friendship and ~ace

-

were

I.

~

I

desperately needed to free himself' .tl-om Charles'

M'l'

63the League of Cambrai was tonned against Venice 1n December 1508 by LouiA
XII, !:1ax1m1lian, Julius II and Ferdinand 01' Aragon.

6Lsimilar problema W8ft encountered
6S~tor1a d'Ital1., nIl' 10$.

by Clement

m. ct. ~ntra,

Chap. IV.
.

"

.1

66Ib1d•• 105-106.

1
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imPOrtunate demands. He was man1.f'eat1y cold to the Pian

eounell.

and, in an

attempt to g$t Julius to agree to a peace, he rejected it entirely. 67
In a period

ot

illne.,

the Pope called a conailtory and ordered the

fUblication ot a bull stating that the election of his $"J.cceasor should proceed
eanonicall7. No person vas to aocend to

80

great a dignity as Julius himself'

had. Methods were set up against those who would use simoZ'(Y to be elected ae
pope and for ann.u.l.ling such an election. Gu1ceiardini obsel"fed that tl'..a bull

was seomed by certain cardinals who were already electioneering in the event
of JuliUS' death. 68

In the same year,

lSU, Julius

engaging in a consp1n.cy apinst

n showed his antagonism tovuds tou.i8 by

France. the Florentine s.<;ntalon:1.ere had it

enacted into law, i t the Pope ehould attack Florence, allied with France, the
Church revenues would be used for her deten...f:I)

Florence felt she had realOn

tor animositY', for both she and PiA had been excommunicated. 70
Julius did not want peace with Franee even after her defeat at PAyema.
The entire papal

court, which

had been in tear

the Pope to conclude a peace whioh the French

ot a

weJ"e

~

on Rome, now requelJte

then w11l.1ng to negotiate.

While he had acquired great glory" the cardinalI pointed out, it was apparent

that God w1ehed the war againet

-

?':rance to

67 Ibid., 110, 116, 123.

-

6Bxbid., 119-120.

69S£. Storia d t ltal1a,

-

7Orbid., 12h.

nI,

13t-137.

come to an end. To act in oPPOsition
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to the Divine liill woulJ bring about the ruin of the Church.

It only tho Pope

would make peace according to the Gospel" he would tree h1msel.f and the Church
:from trouble.

But Jullus would not. listen to these appeals.

Seeld..ng to

hUInilia:te the French even more, he followed the addco ot the Venetian and
Spanish ambassadors and ot GiuUo
weak and he could grind more aut

de.~.edic1,

ot the.

who lM1ated that the French ,.,...

Be decided then to

nah everything

rather than conclu<1e peace with his enemy. 71

Julius necotiated with the SWiaa tor six thousand soldiers. The lOpe
c1a:lJned that he would send these mercenaries againat Ferrara where the fatigued

Frenc.'1 troops wish'Dd tor an end to the fighting. The French lost Crem.ona"
Bereamo and Pavia. Parma and Piacenu voluntarily submitted to Julius, who he1~

that the,. belonged to the Church
revolution in public affairs 1n

£ains.

al

rumbers of the T'xarchate of Ravenna.

1512 centeNd on French losses

Th18
"

and papal

72

SQm£l.'"hat p'..12:zl.ed by the Pope ta good fortune in api te of his reckless

polley, Guicc1ard1n1 noted that his bad fortune 88sued at an end. A period of
better luck: vas a,mbol1zed with the opening of the Lateran Council:
...very decent and very holy and of a torce lufficient to penetrate
into the innermost reoeeMS ot the hearta of men, 1t they could only
make thems.l....s believe that the leaders of the eoune1l had no ulteriOl"7)
motives but only what appeared from the obvious meaning of their words.

!
'I
Iii'l

=
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Ibid., 193-19L, 196-197.

72Ib1d., 202-210.

73Ibid., 197, 199.
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}3esides the cynicism in Guicciardini' s observation, there was a cautious
pessimism.

He did not feel that the assembled prelates were really sincere in

their desire for Church reform.
Guicciardini criticized Julius' obstinate policy.

The French ruler wanted

peace in the face of successive defeats in Italy and the Pope looked to war as
his inclination to peace,

g.h! ~ ~

any. diminisrJ8<i.

74

Rather, Julius

thought it prudent policy at the end of 1512 to come to terms with t.he Emperor.
He promised to aid him now against the Venetians temporally and spiritually.
Guicciardini narrated that this volte

!!:!. came

almost immediately after the

Pope had worn himself out ''by exhortations, entreaties and menaces" that the
preservation of the Ve.1etian sUtte was vi tal for the common goed of Italy.
This change in policy brought about a Venetian change

too~

and the Spaniards

feared that they might now again ally with the French King. 75

Pope Julius' great plans came to an end with his death in early 1513. 76
Just before, he ordered the publication of the earlier bull against simony to
attain the pontifical office. He also insisted that the election of his
successor belonged to the College of Cardinals and not to a council.

Julius

requested the College of Cardinals to grant the city of Pesaro to Guidobaldo da
Montefel tro, the Duke of Urbino, since by his efforts it had been restored to
the Church on the death of Giovanni Sforza. He refused the urgent request of

74rbid., 199-201.
75Ibid., 241-242.
760Uicciardini wrote that Julius "ended the course of his pain.f'ul
255-257.

~.,

1ife~1f

,.

-
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Lady Fel1ce, his daughter, and others, to create Guido da Montefalco a
77
cardinal.Julius argued simply that he was not worthy' of the dignity.
Gu1eciardini wrote his View ot Jullus in ille a..'ld when he died.

In all

respects, he retained his "usual constancy and soverity, with the same

ju~nt

and vigor of mind which he enjoyed before his sicknesa.,,78 Julius ~ ad built up
a toasure for the Church even though he had heavy e:xpenaes. But already at
the coronation

of Giovanni de I

ot his succ••sor, Leo X.. it was being squandered. The splendor
l~edic1' s

coronation did not please those

*0

argued that so

solemn an aftair called fer aeriouanese and moderation. 79
He had come to

illon;:,o dtE.te carr.1ed the solemn Standard of the Church.

Rome in great hopes, since he counted on the "gentle dispesi tion of the Pope,,80
who did suapend his censures at the eoronat.1.on.
Standard of the Knights

Ciullo de t

~:edic1

carried the

of Rhodes. 81 He became Clement VII and was later

intimately linked with the future of OUicciard1n1 and the whole of' Italy.
In April Guicciardin1, atill in Spain, was sufficiently

r .....sight&d to sene

•
( j 7 .

.

The Lady Felice and Guido da Montefalco were brother and sister on their

mother's side, ~., 257.
78Ibid., 255-257.

79Ibid., 259-260.

t.

8~n an earlier W1"1t1ng, Ouicciard1n1 recalled the Bingle consolation
remaining at Lorenzo death, 1'.1s aons. The greatest of the.., he thought, was
the youth}'ul 0i0'V'aJ'mi. In him there appeared hcharaoter and signa of probity
and virtu," to thJl extent that it seaned that he would pl"OV8 to be "ornamento
di quella degnita e della Chieea d1 [do, e che a. veninl mai tempo ehe el 8tm:am
pont1f1cato 8i )i..81 per virtt.{, non per amb1t1one e .corrottele. cbe Vivendo lui
insino aUa eta conveniente aveasi unaa. alcuno dubio a e.sere eletto .. "
"Elogio," P. 288.
81star!a dt ltal1a, III,

~

2~9.

-

no

Leo X til letter brimming with sprif.,htly deVotion. 82 twbtleaGly he had heard of

the fan.t'are attending the election of Pope Leo in l-1arob. Although it was Lent,
Florence resembled a town celebrating the Carnival. For five days honf'1res
~

and noat. were built. Each evening one of theae was Wrned in front

the I1edioi domicile.

or

The last one represented "peace" but was not ':urned in

ord.;r to aerve .e an indication that wars would be at an end under the

Florentine Pope. 83
This earlT rejoicing in the city of the Medici could not conceive of the
difficulties awaiting the peninsula during that very year. Mo" and more the

Italian si~~;j Nl grew tense as affairs pointed to war rather t,han peace. 81&
Especiall7 1rl those areas which had aper.i.anceci French control, explained

Qu1cciard:in1, there waa real terror. as

Fran the very beginn1ng of l"t.1s pontificate I Leo worked to expel the French
hom Italy.

Either he thought this was important to the security of the Church

or he reeented the peraonal injuries be ha<i received £rom the Crown of Fra1'lC$. &
IT

,

8~etter to

Leo X, April 2,

1513,

ParteE,

83r.uca Lant'bcci, Diario fiorentino dal

10000co del Badia (F~ze,

rtmj),

p.

337-:-

I, 161.

!!t22. al ~
-

ed. wit.'1 notes by

81&stor:ta d'Italla, nI, 260. Note OU1cc:tard1n1 t s worda. Ma ~ la
mutazione del ponGtice ntI altn accidenti butavano a stabil1re la quieta
d 1Ital1a, anzi g14 apertamente cominciavano til 1ndirizuI'si 18 coae alla guerra.

-

8;Ibid., 262.

86rhe arrival of CharlesmI in Italy brought personal. sorrow to Giovanni

de' Medici, later Pope Leo. Both he and his brothers had been driven out of
Florence. Alter R~, he was taken as a prisoner to Milan and then into
Franc~1 !!;!!!., 266-267.
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While hie father, Lorenzo, and others of his famUy had been i'irm'l.y attached to
the French, Leo thought that Louis favored fOpllar government and disllked the

Jotedic1. It seemed that, whenever nng Louis, Francis' predece.aor,

had eapou.~

their cauee, it was on\Y to use them as tools to

draw the Florent1.nEPinto

a nn
French all1ance. Once this wu done, the King would again forget the Medici. S7
88
Although the new reign had begun in a spirit ot Franc~-papal distrust,
LeO X attempted first to end the Iiean Council.

He entered into negotiations

wi th King Louis on whose will the entire meeting depended. Leo also denied the
report that he had paid the SwillS to ravage Milan. Rather he declared his wiah

tor peace among Christian princes. He was grieved that Louis, by separating
himSelf fran the Church, had deprived the Pope 01' the opportunity of
datl0118traUng how IIUCh he

was

m: natul"!! incl.1rled to be the ling's friend.

tou1

realized that he could never hope to c.e to aDJ" agreanent with the Pope 1n
temporal concems it their spintual d1tterencee were not fil"8t cOJI.p08ed.

For

a better opportunity to pursue his particular policies .. he desired a
reconciliation of h1a kingdom with the Church. 59 By virtue of his poalt1on .a
the spiritual leader of Christendom, Guicciardini stressed, the Pope would
never be without

8'1

allyl

The Pope wae not only reconciled to the French ling but al80 to the

88n. following pages on Pope Leo '. politics reter both to Louis XII and
to his successor, Francie I, who ascended the throne in 1$1.5, almost three
years after Leo became Pope. Leo's pollcies toward France and the Empire are
handled topically rather than in a strict chronological way.

89~tor1a dtltalia. III, 282-284.

112
!fJnPcror ,,11th whom he cooperated against the Venetians.
df)\"8atatlon of Venetian territory.

This resulted in vast

Venice was alarmed by this sssoc1ation and

cor..sidered it a sign. that the Pope :'ever+ntended to 'break with her enemiesJ 90
Venice's problems were indeed a microcoem ot the :problems of the whole
Italian peninsula.

The years 1514 to 1517 constituted one ot the critical

periods in sixteenth-century Italian history.

Pope Leo sought to enlarge

Church holdings and Medici power in the same operation.

To protect the Italian

states, he first tried to steer a ndddl.e couree in the struggles of the French
anc Spanish kings and the Emperor, but then felt that he had to be allied with

one or the other power tor his own safety. In many cases, the Pope seemed to
act agsinet foreign powen out ot family ambitions.

The Aragone_ King . .

oonvinced that the Por.e wanted the Kingdom of Naples tor his brother
Giuliano. 91 Ferrara was also a temptation to Leo. Altonso had promised to
restore Reggio when his brother, Cardinal Ippolito d' Este, retumed from exile
in Hungary, but he delayed. Alberto Carpi, the imperial ambassador and a
hitter enemy to Alfonso, urged 1..eo to follow Julius. glorious example of
extending papal danains. Many pointed out to him that the acquisition of

Ferrara would enable him to bestow this great state upon 01ullano. 92
OUicoiardini felt that Leo did in taot, entertain this desire in favor of his

brother and his nephew Lorenzo, but he was no less eager to get it a.f'ter their

9OStoria d t ltal1a, III, 284-285.

-

91Ibid., 325.

r
113
cteaths • 93

Leo wanted Lorenzo to rule Florence.

Under his jurisdiction, Florence

vas allied with the papacy.94 Yet, according to Guicciardini, Leo wanted
Ferrara more even than the re-estab11s1Dent of the Medici in F1or€'nce. But bis
Medici re1stives teared that the addition ot l''''errara to the papal domain would

make: t more formidable to all its neighborB. 95 Leo also had designs upon

06

Siena which he would bestow on one at his own choosing.'"

Fol.lcw1ng an agreement made shortly before Julius' death, the Emperor gave
the t'Ope the city

ot Modena tor forty thousand ducata.

!.ftQ wanted to erect

Modena, Reggio, Parma. and Piacenza into a vicariate to be bestowed on Giuliano
along with Ferrara whenever the Medici could take it. Here too, Leo manifested
the close connection between pol! tical opportunism and family ambition.
Guicciardini noted how jealous the French lA'.1ng was over the Modenese agreement,

tor to him it was Pl'oof of papal agreements with hie imperial enemy.

97

In Guieeiardini 'a judgment, Pope Leo had unwiae advisors who goaded him
into hasty action.

1515, tor

In

example, these counsellors argued that King

Louis might encourage Alf'onso ot Ferrara to seek tc recover Modena and Regrio
and return the Bentivog110 to Bologna.

It seemed a wiser policy for the Pope

to cultivate the triendahip at the Bate and the Bentivoglio by giving up these

-

94Ibid., III,

328.

-

9SIbid.) IV, 279.

97Ibid., IV, 279,

96Ibid., III, 381. OUicciardini's words are "coniidente a etf...
and

III, 329.
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terri tOrl.SS to them of hie own will.

98

Leo feared also that the Franco...cpanish truce of 1.514 and the cQCperat10n
of HenI"j" Vln meant they would intensity their attempts to gain the peninsula.

Leo remained firm in his early resolution, that the common liberty of Italy
would fO down the drain i f the Duchy of Milan were taken by the .Fl!:peror or by

the French. 99
He knew well what the French King was preparing for and

Pope on his side.

that he vented th

In spite of the truee, the EiRperor -wanted an alliance with

Leo for the defense of Italy.

He argued that toget,her they could detend Milan

against Louis, since they had proved they were powerful enough to drive him

100

from it.

To Leo,

~aee

was important.

If it were achieved, there would be no need

for alliances of any IIOrt. Guicciardini, surveying the larger complex of
Italian arfairs, gave Leo credit for his atteml(ts to act prudently in his

dealings with the toreign rulers tor detense of the various states.

The Pope

pleaded with Louia, and he tried hard to bring about an agreement between the
F.mpel"Or and Venice.

The Venetian senate, thinking

from French trcops in

., III,

-

99Ib1d., 314-316.
lOOIbid., 3)4-3)6.

-

its people were secure

1514, conai.dered the adjustment of their differences wit

Maximilian, but no treaty materialized.10l
..,.

t.~at

lDlxbid., 316-317, 319.

r~_------------~
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Then

t.~e

c:rowing power of the Sultan complicated Leota irresolution as to

boW to rroceed.

Guicciardini felt that it would be a disgrace

f~r

the Pope to

encourp.ge Christian princes to go to war with one another. At the moment he
should rather advise Francie to step r,is preparations.

Francis' 4'>1"Ifl!'mies would

make a French v:tctor.y a blood bath.
Nevertheless, Fre:ncis continued to demand papal help anti Elrrr('l.el .f'(')r his
Jolilanese plane.
rorei~

Though Francis dld not know it, teo intended to oppose an.Y

attempts on northern Italy.

Just how he weu.ld do this was not clear.

He was ltspurred on by his lnclinations and restrained by his fears. "102

times Leo tried to convince himself t.'1at fYerhaps reverence tor

tt~

At

Church might

keep the King from molesting the papal states ••en though ho might attack other
areas.

Bu t the Pope would think himself equally inju red whether the French

attackEtd the papal states or the other Itillan areas in which he had interests.
Arter the Maripnano Victo~O,; Pope Leo had to accept the King's friend ...
ship lest hls forces driye the Medic:!' out or Florence.
his f am1.ly f IS p.>s:t tion.
ruler.

And Leo had to uphold

Finally he ratified an agreement with the French

An agreement seemed wiser

than inviting a French attack upon pr,rMa and

Piacenza or even Florence.1OU
The alliance required the King to protect the Pope and states of the
church, Giuliano anci Lorenzo de' Medici and Florence and to grant lordships in

-

l02Ibid ., 336.
lO.30n september 14,

1515, Francie reconquered Milan

\I';ictory over the .swiss at Marignano.

l04Storla ~i'Ita.l!!, IV, 370-371.

by hie brilliant

U6
Frsnce and pensions to Giulianci and Lorenzo.

The Pope was to recall his troops

!rom Verona where they were aaslating the Emperor against Francis' l".ew ally,

venice, and he was to restore Parma and Piacenza to the French. As compenaatio ~

tor this papal lou, the !Uchy of Milan was to
where the Church owned the salt mines.

buy all its salt from Cerv1a,

The Jope was to grant tree p,sssa.ge

thrOugh papal terri tones to French troops on their way to Naples.

II

To get

I

,I

papal consent for an attack in the BOuth, the King oftered large estates to

LeO's brother and nephews. lOS
Leo quickly seized the Duchy of Urbina and conferred it upon his nephew,
Lorenzo,l06 so that he could devote all his attention to Fen-era.
Ouicciardini expl.a1ned the Pope's almost excessive interest in Ferrara.

Either

he had been prompted by animosity toward tuke AU'oneo or the ambition to ec;ual.

the y,lory of Julius 11.107 He indicated that }ope Leo hated All'onso even more
than Julius though he did not bring this out into the open.

'·1

loa
""'11'

By the end ot 1519 he conspired to gain Ferrara once again. 109 It was

~I

'Iii 'II

I

II!

financially and mil1 tarily strong, for the Cukes of Este had realized the
I I

precarious position of their state. Leospparently did not know this and
judged Ferrara to be weak.

t'eceit was more likely to succeed than open force.

Leo judged that the duchy could· be entered through a broken wall where no
III

-

l07Ib1d., IV, 6u.

-

10Srbid., 279.
l09Ibid., 63-64. Note 0u1cc1ard1n1 t s words, suggestive at Leots cleverness: H ••• non con ami l!'.aniteste rna con insidie. II

117
',,'I

garrison was stationed. v.Jhen the Marquis of

~1antua

informed Alfonso, who found it difficult to believe.

foum out about the plot he
In an;y event, things had

been well 'Worked out and OUicciardin:1 fett that, L~ spite of the duchy's
strength, the pl.ot might well have succeeded.

Al.f()rl-so could have put up but

11t Ue resistance because of' his poor health. f<ialTf citizens were dissatisfied
wi th his a<ininietration and would not r.ave risked their 11VGS in time of

attack.110 In arr:r event, Leo tailed.

But he went on to new intrigues and in

1.520 failed again. lll He had been clever enough to oblige those i!rinoea with
whom he had made alliances not to reveal his maneuvers against Ferrara.1l2

However, the most _r1ous problem ot Italy was the struggle for power
Maximilian's death.

aft«~

Pope Leo was interested above all in this silent war for

"I"

:!II,I

'11'Iii\
"

I
"

he feared the accession of either li'raneis or Charles to the imperial ti Us

&S

a
I

~,~

I I~,

great danger to the balance of power and to the security of the Holy See and
all Italy'. He saw that both princes were already

$:'.I

"I

powerful that he had
11';11

equal reason tc fear the victory of either one of them and he knew that nothing

could hinder the victor from subjecting the whole peninSula. 113
By 1521, Charles V and Francie I saw more clearly t.~an ever that they had

to have papal friendship i f they were tc succeed and both tried hard to get it.
Guicciardini thought that peace would have been possible had Leo remained

';"')1
"'1

'I "

.i

i

110Ib1d., cJ-6~, 66, 279.

II

-

-

lllIb1d., 72-73.
112~., 279.

113;tbid.,

57, 78. Since the matter was "far too important for Leo to

depend upon papal authority with the '!!l.ectors, he had to devise more clever
means to control the imperial election," ibid., .57-60.

-

11'1
,1111

--

U8

neutral and

~lsed

his papal authority to repress the enmity between mperor and

King. But Leo aoted more to disturb the peace than preserve it. \·Jhen all was
considered, what would he gain by war?
past.

It had brought him little success in tru

In 1521 he controlled (-«tensive pa.pal estates, and he had full authority

ovor the 01 ty ot Florenee.

1eo t s lova of ploasures and splendor would ordinarij y

have made him opposed to war.
great m1l1tary campaign.

Then too he did not have the money needed for a

But unfortunately, Ouicc1ardini stressed, he was

"tormented with a restless desire" to recover lama and fiacenza and to get

Ouiceiardini did not believe the possession of these cities was Ifa

Ferrara.

sufficient reason

fOl'

bi.-n

Cr.eoJ to

turn tJ:-...e world upside down. tI Rather he caul

have temt.oriled in expectation of the right time to move. 1l1
illhen Guiceiardini looked back upon the status

~

ot lS21, he saw that the

Habsburg-Valois clash was inevitable. Still Leo ought to have been wor1d.nt7; for
peace.

Ouiceiardin1 saw in Leo t.'1e case ot a pope suffering trom man' 8 greatss

enemy, too much prosperity.
him to be bold in doing

evn.

Not only coes it ruin onets government but incline
l1S

In spite of all th&t could be adVanced against war, Leo devoted his
attention to fonning an al.liance to carry on an Italian war. Leo explained

tha~,

since both Charles and Francj s were unsuccessful in allying with him, they

would cooperate afainst the Church and all Italy. whatever the Fope's argument!

-

-

114Ibid., 77-79.
llSIbid., 78-79. Note Ouicc1ardini's wordeu " ••• non hanno gU uomini
maggiore-uiImico che la troppa prosperiti.. perch. gli fa impotent1 di sa
medesimi, licenziosi (I ar(f,i ti al male e cu:,.,idi di turbare 11 bene proprio con

COBe move."

119
Guicciardini judged him guilty- of breaking t,he r;eace. llt
Cardinal de' Medici, to 'Whom Leo confided all his secreta,117 told
(JUicciardini. of the Pope' IS plan.

aenoa ,

It the French could be ousted from Milan and

it would l:::e easy to fcrce the Emperor out of Naples with

F~nch

aid.

Lea thought that he could get the Kine to assist him by creatine some of his
candidates cardinals and by granting other favors.

To Ouicciardird., Francis

would want more for his 10s8 of HUan and Genoa, and would not be satisfied

with seeing that his rival had met with no better fortune than he heda U8

Though trusting neither, Leo treated with both sides though more closely'
To prevent attack while negotiations were pending, he kept six

with Francis.

thousand SWiss saldiere in the RDmagna and the Maroa

tor several J'IlOnthf'. To

the Italians who thought this was a needle.s expense during peacetime, Leo said

1t was to protect the papal states .from rebels against his author! ty. No one
believed him but thought rather the troops were a defensive mea8'l.1l"e against the
French or an indication that Leo planned to attack Ferrara inmted1atelyor drive
Charles out af Naples.

U9

The Franco-papal maty under negotiation provided for a joint attack on

Naples, part of the terri tory to go to the Pope, the rest to the second son of
Francis.

The King was to assist the Pope against rebellious feudatories of the

Church.

-

J.

116Ibid., 131.
117Gu1ccie.rdin1 was a contidant of Giulio de' Hedici. the future Clement
VU. itkte hie wordsr " ••• come io udi poi (:ire a1 cardinale de' !!leclici conscio
de tutti i suoi secreti •••• ~., 19.
118Ibid., 19-80.

-

-

119Th:td., 80.

,tf
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Francia 5usrected that Leo' e heart was not in their plane so he allied
Nav~.

,n.th the Smse and retook

He came to realize that the rope v., ould not

ttant him to take Naples for himself or his children. Actually, French possess n
of both Naples and Milan would oonstitute a real threat to Rome and upset the

balance of power in Italy. Francis t
be to take the chance of

E'~dVieers

showed him how fool'leh it w:::-\tld

lonne rt.1lan while he tried to get 'tJaplef!. The Fope

would 'll.se deceit tc drive him out of Milan while he was occupied in southern
Italy.

Thua Francis put (1ft ratification of the Franeo..papal agreement made

Rome.l20
Leo began to see the advantage of a treaty with the Emperor.

concerned over the King's procrastination.

He vas

Guiociardi:rd frankly could' not see

the reason tor &.e new papal-im:Perial coneord. 1';115 it to recowr .?lU'ma

~

PiacenZ8, or was the l}ope provoked aver the insolence of Lautrec and his

121

ministers, who refused to allow any papal. deerees to be promulgated.

hatever the reasons, the Pope and the Emperor agreed to war against

!...

Milan.

Charles vas

r.1ad to be allied

was disturbing the Empire.

with the Pope I for the Lutheran problem

Their agreement provided tor the

C011IllOn

defense

or

both parties I l'TI.entiomng ld.th the Pope the House of Mediei and Florence and
declared the reinstatement of Franeeaco Storza in MUm and the dp..iense of his

autborl.ty thert'h122 The papal-1m:perial force. were to retake Parma and
••

t

••

,

.......

1

-

1225£or3& wa.s then in exile at Trent, ibid., 8.3.

r
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Fiacenza for the Church.

After the conquest of Milan, the Emperor was to aid

the Pope in quelling disorders among his subjects in the papal states, and aid

him in getting Ferrara. In the agreement, Cardinal Giuliano de t Medici was
promised a r-e:nsion of ten thousand ducats from the newly-vacant archbishopric
of Toldeo, and an estate 1n Naples with an annual revenue of ten thousand ducat I

was to be riven to Alessandro de t Medici. l23
They geared all plans to the oampaign against

~~1lan.

It was to be

att.acked from the borders of the papal dominions by the Pope.s soldiers, the

Florentines and troops of G10van Francesco Gensaga, the Marquis of Mantua, a
These were to be joined by Charles' army £'rom

general of the Church.

~laples

in addition to lome Oermans.124

OUicciardini reconstructed a speech of La.nr1Cly, the Viceroy of Naples.. in
which he argued in favor of a Franco-1mper1al agreement rather than one between
the Pope and the Faperor. To support his argument, he reterred to the papal.imperial alUance of 1$21 when Pope Leo was anything but trustworth3'.

had a selfish desire

£01'

security' from the French or, more l.1kely,

The Pope

an

uncontrolled delire to take Ferrara ,12$ There was dupUe1 t,. also in imperial
ranks.

Pope Leo, who bore the greatest exposure d.ur.lng the attack

and many- others. suspected the treach817 of their comtIV'nden.

on Parma.

It .. 9med V8r,y

Ukel.y that these jealous officers were NSponsi ble for ending the siege of

123Ib1d., 82-84.

Cf. also ibid., 308, tor Guiecia.rdin1's reasons the war

begun by Pope Leo and Charles V. -

124Ibid., 91.
125Ib1d., 342, 280.

122
rrench-controlled Milan, for they thought that the Pope would (lisoontinue the

e,q:ensive war as lOOn as he would recover Parma and Piacenza.126
The Mse, wl'.o had been hired to defend the papal states and not to attaok

French holdings, decided tb.at they would not attaok and favored marching upon
l27
lal"ll18 and F'iacenza.
The papal-imperial annies also laid siege to Parma.
Al!01l80 d 'FBte began to

war against the Pope in Modena 1:01' his own satety and

to satisfy the French King.

Ouicciard1n1 a.pla1ned that the Wke's ill-fortune

in \'rJ.s war would aoon have reduced h:1m to serious straits had Leo not died

128

just when he was aohieving continual victories.
The 4xmy ot the allies was
,
victorious at Milan, and Lodi and PaVia feU to the League. Leo received news
of theacqu1sitionct' Parma and Piacensa at the time of his death. 129 The antiFrench cause weakened ccnsiderably at the t:lmtl of his death. Francis, well
aware that the war had been 'tbegun and auppcrted" by Pope Leo, undoubtedly
resumed courage at the death of 80 powerful an enemy. 1.30

The Pope was

a<!n.1rably aucceaatul in still another of hi. major aima, bringing the Medici

to renewed glory .1.31.
Leo in Guicciardini ts jUdgment was

"8

prince

woJ:'tih7 of being praised as

well as blamed on many accounts, who did not live up to what was expected of

him." He had not been given credit for the prudence he showed at times but

-

l21U.4.d., 1U, 120.
128rb1d., 280. Guicciardini observed that Leo's death was "just as welltimed for "A!tonao'a purposes as that of Julius."

l~., 130-1.31.
l3Orb1d., 130-133
131W., 327.

r-------------12)

thero was in him ttmuch less goodness" than any had suspected.1 )2 In political
aft'airs, Leo was careful to cover up his deceit.
In his judgment at' Leo X, Ouicciardini gave his View on his ewn age and

on the general character of the men who occupied the

~,pal

chair. Leo was good

as far as in genernl men .are concerned, .for he was merciful, cr.a.r1table and. not
inclined to offend anyone.

Guieci4rdini continued I

I dare not. 8~ /that Leo vail of an apostoUcal goodness, fOl' in our
corrupt times the goodness of a pop!) ~1s commended when 1.t does not
exceed the wickednes8 of other men.1 ,;)

The Popels greatest .fault was his ftxcessive liberality.

The splendor and

magnificence he disp1a.,ved would have been d.azzling even in a descendant of
ldngs md emperorsl

But Leo's liberality

~~ded

also to the purely 8p1ritual

matters of his office, tor be be8towed "all the tavors which are at the

~I" ,
"I,

disposal of a pope. ,,134

There were thirty-nine cardinals at the eonelaw

electing his 8ucceesor thCl;.gh, at his accession, there were only twenty-tour.

Prior to the conclave which elected Adrian of Tortosa a8 pope, G1ulio tried to
gain the votes of those cardinala who had benet! ted by Leo's favors.

13S

Guiceiardini charged that Leo "brought the spiritual authority into contempt,
eeon~

discrdered the

of the court and J because of his excess!"Ie exc)ensee I

found it continually necessary to raise money by extraordinary means. n136

...

~

-

l';'Ibid., 328.

134Ibid., 327~328.

-

-

1l5Ib1d., 14)-14h.

-

13C!b1d., 328.
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!

,
,

l2L
'Ihe careers of

GiOVa.i'llU

and Giulic

·,~e'

Nadici \olere closely l.inked.

II,

The

assistance of Pope Leo's cousin, Giull.o, whom he ra.ised to the ca.rd1nalsb1p
!.

despite his illegitimate birth, was fortune 'a greatest gi.f"t.
Giullo to manage all the importE:nt afft:otire of the pontJ,ficate.

Leo allowed

He restl"ain(::.c

Leo's liberality a~:lJl.oderated many diaordera proceeding from Leote

irresolution.

Oiulio 'B serious demeanor and his dill.gence contrasted with Leo f

~

III
!

indolcnc~,

prodigality and inordinate love of pleasure and lTdrt.'l.

It was

corrm1only believed that Leo we easy-going, kind and desirotte of enj<>Y'.ng his
1

reign and that Ciulto was high-spirited. restloss and ambitious. leo did not
sss. qualified. for his importa..'lt oharge and was dominated by' Ciullo. Hany
logically assumed that Giul10 had iMtigated the alliances, campaigns and
conspiracies cf Leo *$ time.

'lrlhen Giulio became Clement VII almost hro years

later, it became
evident that he had been trrather the executor of his Leo IS
,
pla..'1.S than their direotor.l'l37

name was proposed one rooming only

to pass time, be was u.nan1mouslyelected

pope at 80 troublesome a time in the states of the Chureh. l

found it incredible that many of those
him.

we

.38 0u1coiardini

hardly lm.eM Adrian by name voted for

He f.:ad in no ..lay ingratiated himself with the oti.ler oardinal3 and, above

all, he was a foreigner who had never seen Italy or had any hopes of seelnr, 1 tl

'1'1
'.: ,'1

-

I.
!'I' I

,
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i!

unaware ot its ow reasons tor electing the Fleming, the Sacred College tried

.

')1

to justify this extraordinary step. They placed the blame, commented
ouicciardin1 cynically, on the Holy Spirit, \1;110, itja said, inspires the
cardinals in papal elections.1 39
Adrian t s distant residence intenslfied disturbances in the Church

terri tories. The Sacred College urged Csrdinal Giulio de t Hedici to go to
Bologna to direct the recovery of R1m1ni, which had been seized by Sigismondo

Malatesta, and squelch <ti.sorder in the Romagna. The cardinals promised that he
would have the assistance of JI.arquis Gonzaga ot Mantua.

OUicciardin1 explained

that the 8mbi tion of the cardinals was the reason that no measure tor control
the papal statea took etfect.
passage

ot

0 ~

Cardinal de' Medici's enemies prevented the

eVer:! reaolt'tion which would tend to inczoease his poaition.

Adriants arrival would probably settle the contusion.
without the pope, Rome was more like a

desert

than a city.

To GuicCiardini,
But even those who

were impatient tor the Pope's com1ng were uneasy because he was a foreigner

ill,

".

inexperienced 1n the attairs of Italy, the papal court, and even those nations
which were familiar to Italy_

A plague in Rome at the time of his arrival

teemed to be a bad omen.140 OUicciard1n1 later confused that the papal
courtiers were not diepleued at Adrian's early death, for they wished the
papal chair to be occupied, 1.t not by an Italian, at least by

OM

educated in

139Ib1d., 146. Note OUicciardini'a words: "Della qual. estravaganz8., non
potendc con ragione alcuna a.cuasarsi, t...""8sferivano 1a colpa nello Spirt to
Santo" Bolito, secondo dicevano, a isp1.rare nella elezione det pontefici i
cuon de. cardinal.1 •• _• ft

140~., 168, 170-171.

i,
I

r

...,,------------------------------.,
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their country.l.Ll
Arter Adrian arrived in Rome, conditions got worse rather than better.
:secause he was inexperienced, the cardinals flaunted his orders and kept the

castles they had taken !rom the Church.

As govemor

ot

Modena and ReggiO,

OUicciardini was in a position to learn or the.tr conspirac:i.es and he 'hltiful17

:informed the Pope.

Once again, Adrian ordered them. to restore these castles

I

,I

to the Churoh.1h2
But Adrian understo(Jd some of the problems which had long been the causes

of riva:.l.ry.

He wanted first to recover Rimini143 and to settle the differences

be'bleen Alfonso of Ferra.r.a and his two predecessors.

During his tirst month in

Italy.. he reinvested Alfonso with Fen-ara and with all the Church la.l1ds he had

possessed betore Leots war with Franoe.

,I

The ruke bound himself to assist the

Church whenever the Pope needed soldiers tor the defense of its territories.
Under penalty of forfeiting his rights as duke he would refrain !rom injuring
the Holy See in the future.

restore Modena and Reggio

to him, but then he realiz.ed that this would not be a

wise ltep and refused flatly'.
hardly last.

Adrian led .Alfonso to believe that he would

Good will between the papacy and Ferrara could

In 1523, however, Adrian gained

Rim1n1.l.W.t
I

Adrian was well a.ware of the difficult situat.i.on in which he, as a foreign
pope, was placed in view or the itnperie1 intereste in Italy_

143cf. ~m, p.

125.

1l"4storla d t lta1.1a, IV, 171, 17h, 280.

Before his

,I

I,
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srri"VSl in Rome,

he had ben xeluotant

to wait for the homage whioh the r:mpero

bad promised to render as he proceeded southward. He suspected that Charles
,dshed hill'! to put of! his passage into Italy while 8Waitinr his homage and he
did not wish to give basis to the view that imperial interests would diotate
hiS

J-"Ollcies 8S pope.lJ6

.I\ctually, Adrian VI hoped tor a general peace in Christendom.

He

entreated Charles, Francis and Henry to end the war, especially in view of the
TurkiBh menace.

Negotiations tor peace proved fruitless.

The flnperor did not

want a short truce bocauH he would gain nothing, and Francis would not consen

to a long one. l.drian thought that Francis did not really want peaca and ..
influenced by hie earlier Mendship for Charles, went over to the imperial

,ide. He explained that his obligation as the Vicar of Christ was to pr.erve

peace among the fa! thtul and to be tealous tor the publio welfare.

He had no

-

choice other than to join with those "who labored to crevent d:i,sturbanC88 in

,

Itsll because ~ !!:!1 depended

l!!!

~ce

2!..~ wh0lti; world ...146

In the late

sumrr.er of 1$23, an anti-French leae,~e was formed under papal headship.

Adr.tan

desired the m&'llber:s to praUse that they would act on the principles of justlce
rather than on military might. 147 Venice was the onl.y Italian state which
refused

to jOin.

The death of Pope Adrian less than a JOOnth after the conclusion of the

-

lL$Ibid., 170.

146Ibid., 187-189. F}nphasis

d.

added.

147 flBulla propoeta latta
Venezian:l d 'antrare nella lega centro i
Francesi," 029ritti E2lqtt1c1, p. 120.

THR BASr:s OF PAPAL POtrrICSt

The events of C1E'.ment VII's pontit1cate are detailed with the politica1

and d1plomatic struggles in the
].0081

atom

dtltalia. 1Jany problema at one time

became entangled with foreign problema under Clement \'1:1 J like Alfonso

ot F'ermra 1S a1l.1ance to maintain his territories against papal claims.
The present chapter w.tll stress the pollcy of Pope Clermmt. as
Ouicciardin1 knew it fitom personal axpt>rience and explained 1t ln his po11t1
ical tracts, and 1 te relation to the 2fflE!!!! and the. sacerdotium. This conaideration demanded analys18, tor tlw political st:r'!lggles of: the sixteenth-

centur:t involved also the claim of Charles V to the Ml exercise of his
impc·rlal powers.

j",:bat he maintained these powers actual.ly were eondi tioned

his r0lationship to Clement VII.

Seco~f

since concll1&r1sm . . not only

a religious problem but also a poll t1call.7 useful tool for enemies of papal
pf)W('r, this ohapter will discuss

too

calls for a general council.

it .1111 treat Gu1cc1ard1n1 '8 defonse of Clement \'11.

Thirdly,

Oulcoiardini was per-

sonally 1nwlved here, for he 'WaS one of the Pope's major advisers on foreign
pollcy.

129

Arter a r:tf'ty-day conclave, Cardinal Giullo de I Medici succeeded Adrian
VI as Pope in 1523.

Under Leo, he had already handled many papal duties. 2

Quicciardini was surprised that Giulio had tried eo hard even before Adrian fS
election to win his own, for a pape had to cope with the explosive situation
in all Italy and the papal states in particular.
Guicciardini claimed that Clement t s accession brought security to the
Church's territory.

With the election of the strong-willed Giulio, Al.fonso

d'l'ste temporarily abandoned his hopes of obtaining Modena, while he felt
also that he could not trust the French who promised help.

The Romagna, one

of the most faction-ridden regions in Italy, became quiet. 3
Yet Clement's troubles had not really begun.

Guicciardini indicated

that, as Cardinal, he was knOTm to have favored. the projects ot Charles V
and to have encouraged his Italian ambitions. 4 As pope, he understood that
continued friendliness to the Emperor might only hurt his own position. 5
During his entire reign, Pope Clement was faced with the delicate poll tical problem of how to maintain papal position in the power struggle.

For a

short time he attempted to maintain the neutrality of the Holy See and to
secure peace between Francis I and the Emperor, then he tried to use the
torce of papal diplomacy to assure the political autonomy of the peninsu.la

2Cf. supra,
3Storia d 'Italla, IV, 209-211.

hE.

g.,

cf. supra.

5nGiustificazione della poll tica," p. 203.
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or at

l(~st

the !.ted101 sphere of interest.. 6 He sought a delicate equilibrium

bPw/cen 'France and the Filp1ret to be adjusted by the application of his

et."'Il

w:plomatio weight. 1 But nu.morous and unstable ..r1abl~ elsted, namely,
th€"l

Pope's irresolute

advisers.

9

t~ent8

and the conmeting views of his polit1oal

Clement pursued no one course.

-

6cl~,nt' s neutrality came to an end in December 1524 when he ooncluded
a sooret agre~..nt with V<mioe tu"A Fnlnce ~YlI:It the H::~fCll"Or.

The Pope did not mean to defy' the r::mporor as moh as to gu.arantee
etattu", ~ in ltal..v, but the new shift to Fi'l!mce produced a holocaust in the
p;:an;ili-wtdch rumbled all over ''''urope. On the very day of the publication
of the treaty, Cl~..nt explained in a letter to Charles that the agreement
with ~'leis -s a ltcounsel of peace," d_tlftoo to secure ltour ~ulllity"
and the v;el:far;", of Christendom wi tbout prejudice to the l~eror or thought
of private advantaget Morru.menta saeoul1 m b1storiam ~trsntia. p. SO,
no. 35. The treaty was"({ese~'~ ~--v!!! as a d~ iO end the _r
and to protect the Holy See, ibid., no.
and to the G'ermtm ':!lectors as an
attempt to gual'llUltee the Pope, Vdee and France ~edom from harm in a pact
whioh Vias by no means hostile to the FmpiN, no. L.1.

,8,

101• Pandolfi,

PP.

14"149, 110-231.

BOne of 0u1cc1ard1n1 '8 passages pointed up this dift1C".llty of the Pope.
he regretted that he had sat idly by awi t1ng the success of the Battle of
Pavia, for he was reproached for his timidity by his whole court and all
I talyl, storie d 'I tal.1f., Vt 10.
9In politics, Cardinal Badolato, unlike !llIm7 in the CUria, did not
thin..1{ in terms ot Modena or even or Italy but rather of Ohl"'let1an furope.
HE" argued that the poll tical role of the Holy See should not be that of a
self-interested part~ tmt t!1at of' •. father towards hia son, Arch. Vat., tim••
diVf?rae 2.38 t Fol. 00 , c1 tad in Douglas, p. 39. Sadoleto stood for strict
nootral1 t,. and poll tical detachment but Cl~t RS also sttbject to discordant theories of inwlv~:ment prassoo on h.'1m by Giberti and the imperialist
Hioholas 'VOn Sob.omberg. Castigl10ne and Cardinal Salv1ati, holl~.r.t assured
him of: Cbarlee t p()QCeflll intentione. ibid., pp. 39. 43-44. 1Uthough the
Pope gave b:i.e secretary, Sadoleto, a ~ with dispatches of mmcioa to
Germany and f:!&stem FlU"Ope, he p.?rsonally dealt vr1 th those inwlving I talian
affairs and therefore with envoj'"S to tnt:., r\tlpt~l'Or and Francis I, ibip.., 1'. L.a.

In the spring of
trt'!aty

1525, 5.t seemed to Clement a '€lise

or "perpetual al.3.1.ar.H::te and

policy to conclude a

friendship" wi"h Charl..

confessed that the Pope's association ".1.th the

l~~ror

Ouiccia.rd1n1

at this point seemed

wen-founded, 00" he criticised the provisions of their agreement which called for the r'f:tum of Reggio, Rubiere and other tcmns seized from the Cmroh
by .Alfonso d tEste.

It

was

cl~

to Gu1cciardini that Clement wO'tUd have

contim.loo the policies ot Julius and Leo for the recover,y of' Church lands
bad not m:>re serious problems como to demand his at'bmticn.

t\s it'1i/as, the

very oritical juncture of Italian affairs called for the reconc1.1iaUon of
Alfonso and Clemmt and not for further trouble beti'leen them.
casti~ted

the Pope for having selflshly il'Tltated his country's wounde in-

stead of having SO'tlght a method of healing them.
~red

0u1cc1anHn1

He

was certainly not to be

to t110ee ph:fsicians who laid uide all care ot lesser

bodiq

prob-

lems as they diligently attended to that whioh seemed essential to the

patient 1s

ove~

health.

Still Quiccurdini paid no hem to the widespread though ignoranit 01"'1t-

icism ot the Pope for ba'V1ng made this treaty, namely, that he had railed 1n
his duty of un! ting tho Italians acainet the tlmpel"Or.

In AprU 1525

Guicciard1ni was not yet convinoed .tWit the imp:n:'!!.al l1l"C11Y could

poes1b~

successfully be resisted. IO
~','hile

Gtdcciard:1n1 and Uach1awlli were studying the mill tary potential

of the Romagna in m:td-1525 in an attempt to work out this necessary system

.....
lOxb5.d. , IV, 275-28l.

13.3
of defense against the imperial forces in Lombardy, the Pope \va.rml:y greeted
the Constable of Bourbon, then ominously at large in northern Italy-.ll It

_6

firebrands like these that Ouicciardini, Clement's prinoipal military

adViser as well as governor of the Romagna, was desperately trying to
iJnI!lObili2le1

In one of the most oritioal periods of the papal reign, Clement

seemed most undecided a.bout a method of prooedure and allowed his diplomaoy,

as that of Leo X's period, to be steered into several directions.

Guiooiardini t s detailed aooount of Clement's activities in the Storia

-d'Italia olearly indioates that his commitment to the LP...ague of Cognac in

May 1526, if it accomplished nothing else, at least simplified the problems

of papal diplomacy.

Guicciardini defended Clp..ment's desire to ally with

France though he knew that he could not find firm support there until King
Franois was .freed.
way to war.

Policies of neutrality, equilibrium and appeasement gave

Sinoe the fighting was conoentrated in Italy, most of the

negotiations with the imperialists were oonducted directly between representati ves of both sides in Rome.

Curial business came to be oonoentrated

primarily on military matters. 12
After the sack of Rome in the spring of 1527J howeVer, disa®reement
among the Pope IS advisers, both olerical and lay, was intensified.
Sadoleto oonfessed that autumnl

ftWe found. ourselves in oonflioting opinion

llMormmenta eaeculi XVI, p. 159, no. 115.
12Douglas, p. 51.

Cardinal

and

tho!'(YJgl1l"v confused about wha.t we should do. flU

But OI.:l.icciardini, who

had a roa1.i.st1c knowledge of affairs, already saw the way mtters were
wnding in S~temOOr of
Cnn"Ch were

to

1526 "Then

he _8 L1'lformad that the attJioa of the

retreat across t..l1e Po.

For ra&lV monthe he had tried

to

make

the best of a situation. rtmdered dH.'i'1oult by the 1"a1lure of the s1gnato1"1ea
of the League

ot Cognac to

honor their obligations and a lack of cooperation

began to wane, and d1plcmlaoy proved

amone them. The prestige of the

~e

to be no substitute for action.

Gul.OOiardird·8 continued

ClemJ'mt t a flagging courage had 11ttle effect.

at~ts

to bol.8ter

His deep con'ri.ction that the

enef!lY could be Msily overcome because they were .. few in l11lI1ibor and bad

li. tUe monqt teU on deaf" ears.

He oame to eee that th:1.e undertaldng which

bad once seemed "-87 and sClCUre" was now "difficult and dangerous,"
"the \,1.11 not to win" had settled like a claIld over the papal camp.

tor

lh The

sack of P.ome. for all the ot.her factors involved, was blt the culmlnation of
a lengthy succession of problems whioh the all1ee did not meet

auccess~.

Guiccl.a1"d.1ni •s long aamoa to Clement; (>..spocial17 at this eri tical

juncture of war, Pl"OtlPted him. to urge that the Pope mat not allow 1118 leadership to fail, hmos, he should avoid aI\Y coopel'l.t1on with the

He believed that this policy was os81?.ntial even

Vthen

~eror.

matters seemad deepexste.

..
13The curial counsellors could agree only to send rmneioe to all the
kings and princes, into:m1ng them or the plight 0,(, Ibngar.y and tho urgency
of peace, as well as of the Colon..,. 's Wmtliat1ng assai1~t on Rome,
rtoIlUmmta saeou11 ~ I p. 244, no. 18S.

14Lettmo to Gi. . .tt,~ Gihf'.rt.1, July 31, 3$26, Cartegg:t, IX, 69.
facto questa iq>roaa, d1 facile at sicura.

" ••• ].a yo~ di non vincere ha
di~~~cile at periooloea •••• "

A continuation

01'"

revival of the d.evious and uncertain course that Clement

had followed 1<fould have htal implications for Italy.

The sack of :Rome was

not thl? only event that gave reason to Guiociardini' s judgment.
\

1n'Portant and more deadly for the l1bel"'ta
to Charles V the following month.

dfltalJ.~

"(\ten more

was Clement's ea:pitulation

Guicciardini thought it

SO

humillating

The evolution of Guicciardini' s thinking on the papal role can 00
leamoo from a study of his poll tical lvn tinge during the crucial years from

1525 to 1530. He pointed out to Clement that rulers should always have

the

desire that things remain stable. Tranquillity alone would enable tbem to
maintain their greatness and dignity'. Sinoe adversity could corne at any
ti.'l'l~,

however, they had to have a reservo of !)rud<mee and strengtb u!'On

which to draw. 1 )
Ouiee1ard1ni was determined

wh1ch the Pope bound himself.

to unravel the diplomatic corrplexities in

He considered the dangers involved to leam

which ones weN eert.e1n and. which were lesser in their bad effects.

It

certain one, similarly to take a remedy against an evil that is just as
dangerous as the end itsalf. 16 These werE> Quicciardini's criteria .for studyw
ing the d1l"QQtione whioh ClemP..nt's policy should take.

l$ttSulla proposta di alles.nza ratta da Carlo V a Clemente 'flIl .. " Scritt1
15.3. Note Guiooiardird f s 'WOrds. " ••• bisogna che el 'OrlriClpe
aia prudems1a e vir111ta' per potere 1.11i1&rf'! 1 'una e 1 'autre. nelle" avversi tA
si."1'lill."
~11 tic!. p.

-

16n,id.

He directed his examination to the grounds for undertaking a war against
the

""~:ror.17 He knew l"()ll that the spiritual and

--

,acerdotiURl and the

~m,

the

~ral powers, the

did not operate1:!!. vaCllO but rather us pL'lrt of

the whi teo-hot poll tical milim. of the early' Cingueoento.
On the one band, he thought it lvollld be most dangerous

to allOW' a build-

up of p<)\vcr though, on the other, it would be very dangerous to run head on
against Oharles.

18 It was right to believe that he wished to increase his

power primarily by aChieving the dominion of Italy to which ho had very easy
access.

He was young, powerful and fortunate in all his undertakings and he

had the advantage of being able

to oloak his undertrudngs with apparent law-

fUlness. 19 In:flaot, where there

\1&$

some lawful basis, princes could actually

convince themselves that t~.ir undertak1n~ were vcry just and holy'.20

Moreover, a majority of' the

~eror's

ministers ardently stimJ.etoo him to

direct aU his aims and efforts to a nxmarcb;r bastlld on Italy' as the focal

d1

17Ibid., p. lSL.. To the Pope, Ouiceiardini explained. rt ••• 0 1& volante./
Dio Oli diapomione de' fat!. ahe 10 eoae tue sono ridotte in grandisaimo

di ffteulta. tl

18

,

Ibid. Ct. Q!Jieeiardini fS worosa " ... soo. adunehe 1n termine ebe e
pB'rieolO a stare, per1co1o a fare. n
19tfGiustif1oamione della politiea." p. 201. Guicoiardini 'a words area
el quale aveva faeulta d1 eoprire 1e imprese amb1z1oee con ti toll
appar(?nti d1 rag1one. u
If •••

2~.,

p.

206. Ouiociardini here statesl

tt . . .

che dove hanna qualche

appa~di ragione 81 persuadono faoilmente 1e iJl'Jpraae sue essere

giustissime e santtS81me."

r.____---------,
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pOint. 2l An ambitious prince could easily believe that all his policies were
fliSD, especially whm they w~re lauded and supported

b:r his advisers. 22

Since Cbarle,s V aimod at total monal"lhical power, wl1ere did the fortunes
of Clement VII f'1t in? Ouiceiardini looked l'lOt only to the specific dldfails
of Cinguecento poli tical
~

and

sace1"doti~

~li ty

but also to the h1stori.c connict between

sincn the oldest l'1:Qaon that the popes

rear~ ~erial

encroachment was grounded in exp('!rienoe. On1:r:rarely 'ttU there a state of
concord and coopet"G.tion 'botiwoon the two powers. 23 !Me did not surprise
Gu1ccial"dird., for the pope claimed that spiritual care belonged
the

to him and

emperor claimed that be _s the admimstrrator of all tes!7pOr&l concerns

and in law, the lord of the whole world.

Yet, in Guicciardini ts historical

rC!'4ding, neither was wholl.y satis:f1ed with the province assigned to h1ma
/

,

Bono queste dua potesta, e10e la spin tuale e la t.enporalo, nomi
eel arret-ti diversi, ma. tanto ~ene ocrrispondono e quadrano ltuna
con l'altra, coo s~re e' r>rincipi hanno Oet'Q8to d1 ~rle quanto
hanno ~tutol pam ad e t pontifie1 pigl1ano speaso piu della
autonta t~rele ehe non rioeroa 1 'officio 101'0, ad Of prine1p!
aecularl., sempre quando n 'banno awto occasiona, s1 sono f'att!
padroni d~J.lo spirituale. 24

He
(l!VO'!'

at~od

to discover the basis of this desire and noted that thfli',s$

n.u.merous examples in history demonstrated the union of spirltual and

2~d., p. 201. Gu1cciat'd1n1 here writest Dei ea.peva che era ardentomente .~to cia molU suo! ndn1st!"1 eli aprtre e1 SG.'lO a tanto ravon della
fortuna, ~ dirilza.re 10 animo a fa":. uno monat'Chia, della Quale era el
prine1pals .f'ondamento stabilire a wte SIlO le COle t,tltal1a."
22nProposta d1 alleana, It p. 15$.

n...

23"Giust1t1ca1£ione della poll tie&, ft p. 2~1. Note Ouiceiardinits 'WOrc:hn
qu~e ct;ll1 fJ",lp~ potesta e state. vera unione e

ra:re volte t1'"4
concordia."

-

24Ibid.

tC1:!Poral rule.

Among the Hebl'C\'lo, many timos one man was both prince and

hieh pri.ost and, if not one man, them the hicrh

!'rlm~tJ

usually a son, brother

or nephew'" was a creation of the prj.noe and dependent upon h:.lm.

The romans

Guiooiardin1 t";xplained that, in the Christian ere, the precepts of
%'f':ligion did not pemlt this conjunction to be easy.

The early C1'llrH'lrora,

thctugh Chr1stians, wanted the papacy to be dependent upon thE>lll.

suoh

~t

They had

authority that no pa,al election could be effective without their

conf1rrnat!on. 2S
a1.,~cciard1ni

looked to

th:~

vcl"7 recent past to confirm hie statements

~eh

is the tk-:::mory of Mu:1m1lian, CharlEl6 V's
26
grandfather, who. as a widower, planned to :make himself pope.
Since
on 1q)erlal ambition: Still

countless rulers have desired. to um. to splrltual power to the

t~ral

on

thr-ir climb to universe.l rule, Guiccia:rd1n1 wondot'f;,;d if any would marvel if'
27
Charles had a similar thought1
The iltt>erorta politics were unquestionably

The papal states and Rome

togoth~r

with Florenoe oould not help but

,2elrbid., 202. Ouioc1ardini noted th1a as only one ot
ohimere;-tft. also ffPronosta di alleanH," p. 155.

~.mlian·s

27"RagiCni ch@ conaigliano a Clemente VII d1 aoeordarsi con Ce.rlo v.
In Contrarlo,lf p. 18u. Note (h:ncoiardird.·a words. " ... semp~ ehi ~ stato
grande ha desiderata un1re al.l..a pot~ia temporale ,.a autorl t4 spirttuale....
Che e1 marav1glierem se uno ponsicro e1mile nasc~ra in Cesare pl"t18oote,
quando veggiamo cbe per le pedatr:> deel! altri grandi tende &1 oar;mno della
mont:!. '!"Cbia? It

139
attract the attention of a ran 'who sought un!vereal rule. 28 One who bad
struck at Venetian and French power would find the l2,q«er

-

esoncialll

:Y.!!! .2! Clement,

2! ('Var"l

~ ~

verI formidable. 29 The Pope had to watch all

princes who bad an opportunity to obtain these territories.

It vms logical

to assume that the satest method for F'ranc:e to strike at t.'1e Pope would be
by

an attack on Florence.. erities of Francis I could not construe this as

IJTeVfO"rPnee for the Church..30 Above all others, however, ClemE!'llt had to

280uicciardini felt that the French would realiZe that Leo Its power
would lead to the y;eakerdng of their power in Italy. ~';ith the ancient domain
of too Church the Pope now held theRomagna, Bologna, and Florencel " ... e
tanto pill' quante per e t progress! di questo papa. _ramo capaCis8imi. che a lui
dispiaceia ~te 1a grandezza loro in ltaliaJ e ].a potenzia sua avendo
congiunto al, dominio antiquo della Chiesa 10 state di Romagna, di Bologna e
eli Firense, e da teneme conto, e mass1m.e venendo el fftltello e nipote in
opinione d1 velere attendere alle a1"!'M3," "Disoesa di Francesco I," pp. 116-117.
29nProposta d1 e.lleanza," p. 15S. f1Ilphasis added. ?~te Ouiccie.rdini's
\'fOrds In ••• pereh~ inaino eOO lui non ha ro'vinato e' vinis1an1, non ba battuto
e' franzesi in Francia, la potonzia. di ogni papa" e la tua massime che hai 10
,tate della Chiesa gr&ndissimo e queUo d1 F1renBo, • form1dabile..... n For
Ouieeiard1n1 's strong statement of the tooaning of Medici a.nd Church power in
one r'ttl~, cf. "Oretio acousatol"'1a," Scrltti autob1:K:f1~rLt. 2191 "l!e' ~ /
buona 0 vera distinzione dalle coss dl ttrenze a qu
e de
Chicea, perehe
,e tu ell avesei ved:uto n:alvolentierl graneR a Firense, arest! awto anoha
per male ].a grand.sa del ponti.f1cato. e 88 tu amavi quella, amavi anehe d1
necessita' questa altra, perohe' erano congiunte e connesee in modo 1ns1eme, Coo
non potovano ruinare nell t una che non ruinassine nella altra."
30nDieeasa cii !Tanceseo It" p. 117. Note Ouioeial"dit'.1's O'ml 'WOrdsl
I
"... vineendo etiam Milano e Napoli, s1 astenessi da toecare la Chiesa. S8 g1a
pE'r mf'!tte~ un freno in booed al papa e d1m1nulrlo assai d1 fOl"'ZG, non
1'01tassi 10 state di F1renae, parendol1 che non sendo co_ ecclesiastica,
questo uno modo da battere el papa same. concitare 11 altri prlneip1."

tea:!' the !mperor, who pretendt:!d that he bad t1 tle and right to the papal
,tates and to all Italy as well.

Ouieciardin1 claimed trat he considered these possibilities only
be was ccmcemed for the papal welfare.

~ause

Perhaps the:Pope realized mren more

tbIln he did that prince,s cannot trtlst one another when their ends eonflict

and 1Thm l'ihat is useful to the one harms the other. 31 Clement must have
krtCJWTl too that the power of the papacy had already suffered eclipses in the

past when the world had grc&tp.r revnrence .for the Holjr See. 32

JiUrther it is

the nature of princes, though they may be :f"ree from ambition, to be gl*e4tly
.rfeetPd by disdain or the suspio:lon of others. 33 This was the danger which
the whole Utpe:r1al plan brought to the Pope, who stood, to clash with :1 t head-

on. He had to consider his mPthods of meeting the dangers to his position.
To Charles, Clement was too great an obstacle and unquestionably, the
Pope had to rear him, eS1k1C:1ally ",hon :1 t "'las almost a certainty that Charles
'IOUld

mov~

against him. 3L. Ouicciardini went so far as to say that perhaps

31

,

(
frProposta di alleansa," p. 155. Ouicciard1n1 writes: " ... non puo tra
principi assere AmOre 0 confidermia quando a f fin! non solo sono divers1, ma
quello ahe ), utile all f uno nuoce allo altro. If

32Storia d'I~) IV, 268.
33ttGlult1 f'1C&Bione della politica," p. 206.

3L.uProposta di aUeanza," p. ISS. I Note Ouieoiardin1 '15 roq>ression. /
It1 adunche da t~re di Casare pereh~ e eorto ahe non si/provedE;'ndo sara in
poteet,,{ SlUt el tart! mle, eO. ~ quasi certo ahe to ne ftlra. n
I

~------------------------------~

W.
eVen Charles t personal hatred for Clement inspired his action. 3~ Moreover,

the somewhat vague

prerogati~s

a t"l"!al snare tor the papacy.

attaching to the imperial offioe constituted

The maintenance of good order or the rf!lformation

of abl.1SeS wi thin the Church call@d for the cooperation of the emperor. 36

The

~erors

advanced the opinion of justices favorable to their cause

that t,he-y 'Were simply 1"E'.1ntegrating into tru empire what their predecessors
bad heM.

37 "{,hat certainty did Clement have that Charles 'WOUld be aatian.ed

to restore the empire to its Mrly majesty simply by appropriating papal
dominions.

He might even attempt to oontrol and dominate the POPE" and to

make him dspendent upon the t~ral power. 38 Ouicoiardini teared that
Clement l'muld be too slow to
trnsting of him.

s~e

Charles' intentions and that he

WOtlld be

too

In view of the !:nperor's past racord, it would not be

prudent for the Pope to trust in his so-called goodness, but it

'flOtud

00 in-

viting danger to his own person, to the See of Peter and to the common good

3S"Qiustif1cazione della politica," p. 206. Ouieciardini's words are
"••• oon chi .£'one aveva odio."

36n proposta dt alleansa," pp. 154-155.

Ct. Ouicoiardin1's words here.
quale pl"Ovinoia tenendo 1a Chiesa apoetolic~ tanto state quanto
tiene, ad a te essendo aggiunto 10 state di t1renze, e treppe. parte questa da
ess~re disprezzata da uno che aspin al tutto, ed in termtni pari _rest:! da
temere da ogni principe obe avoss1ta.nta opportun1t1{, ma mo1to pill'dallo
imperadore, el quale non solo in lb_, e nelle alt" terre che time 1&
Chiesa, ed in F1remse, pretends titolc e ragione. me. sa a.neora chs 10
imperadore 18 una certa oonnassit4 oon 1& Chiesa, cbs in uno certo modo gl1
appartiene pensare alla reformu1one e buon1 ordini d1 qualla. If . . .
n ••• nolla

37Ib1d., p. lSS.
36t10iustificas1one della politica.," pp. 206, 203. Uote G'J.icciardini's
1'IOl"dss " ... d.epri.m.ando 101'0

0

reducendogll dependent! da ea."

r
of rtaly'.

Ouiceiard1n1 pu.t hir:'lself in the olass of "wise men," who under-

stand that no prince or privato oan be judged securn from others ,vtw"n there
is any possibility that they can Sllffer injury.
Guicoial"din1's pessimism is strongly indicated in his statemMt that
one's insecurity is guaranteed if he depends upon another's good will.

Flach

pm:-eon uses his :tree will and can ohange his mind as o.f'ten as he desires.
All things are as

obscu~,

uncertain and. fallaoious as the hearts of men are

tull of dark recesses and labyrinths.

0u1ooiard1ni seemed to be looktng to

the brute realities of his own age when he Obs9rved that a prince who truate
in others and al.J.owa h1.mselt

to be led is powerless. Such a one retains cmly

the name, garb and aceeuarias or a ruler. 39 Gu100iardini advised that a
rulr;or has to aot with indept'ttldenee and dooision.
After bav.l.ng described the power of Clement and. l'xnr Charles 'WOUld seek
to d0Stroy it, Ouiociardini turned to an examination of the method Charles
would use.

Tak1ng away but a 11ttle papal power would not be enough tbr him.

Charlf.!s oould begin by taldng Florence and oontinue to WMken the Pope by
taldng a g'n'.at part' of the papal states. 40

This done, Charles would have no

39nm.ustificasione della Y'l"\olitica,1t
'0. 206. / 0u1ee1ardini's
aotual words
/ '
I
significant. Ifni poi che 0064 piuoscum, piu incerta, piu fallace ehe a'
ello1"1 delli uo.mi:ni pien1 di infi:nite latebre e laberinti .... e quando b~rul) ne
potessi resta~ aicurissimo, aiascuno pr1nc1pe ebe e veduto depend,re in tutto
dalla discrezione d1 altn, l"Psta sensa rlpu1ialione" ssma degn1ta:, sensa
meata, pili' presto col notl'19, con l'ab!iO, con~gn: ornament! di principe ebe
con la potesta, con la sustanzia eel effetti. ft 11rlphasie added. For the imPOrtance of reputation in Guiooiardini's thought, of. infra,
AN>

40"proposta eli alleamsa," p. 156. 0u1cciardini 'SI words are. " ••• a
ridtl.rti in termine OM non abbia per Qonte MSStUlO p1u da temerti, 11 ohe non
petra' fare se non t1 teglie buona parte dello state che tiene la Chiesa. n

~son

to fAar

Cl~ment.

disarmintr of' the
hlVC:>

'Pop~

The attack on

nor~nce

would be follOT!OO by the

and finally the OCcu1')Qtion of P.ome.

He.re, Charles \':ould

to make use of Colonna troops and, 'Very possibly, Clel'.!lMt could be taken

as anotMr Colonna had seized and disgraced Boniface VI!I.41

i1nt tlw.l"e was another way, and Ouicciardtni infol:'ll'.led
directly.

Before Charlms

~er

r:rench,

the ""'Ir!pel"Or could roa.lce Clement to

status of a sm111ns1gnifieant pope.

tion.

RfO'l"'e

He lvould simply destroy his posi-

the conciliar theory came into diroet plq.

assert that he, as supreme overlord of all
order in the Church.

of it very

pasaoo into Italy or before the Pope could

cone to make an alliance with tho
th~

Cl~nt

Cbrist(~ndom,

Tho r.'ltperor could
was roepons1ble for

Through the means o.f a council, he could attt.'!!lPt to

have papal author! ty cut to nothing.

In the mld. he would haTe a pope whom

he could manage, a llttle bishop of Rome, not pope of the universal Church. 42

Clment knevl the lnf'inite particulars of the ease better than
Ouiceiardini or anyone else, but Guicciardini feared that this alone would not

l!I)Ve him to action.
tions of the '1!peror.

He cautioned the Pope not to 00 decei vad by the protesta-

Pven if he does not move on the papal. states, a

possib5.1i ty Guiceiardini always
Cl,CInont
ob~

st~sed,

Charl(cls would try to takr:'i £'rom

lrl.& authority, dignity Il.'ld _Jesty.

all imperial wishes.

Ulrbid., p.

As pope be 'would Of:! forced

to

Ouieeiardini \vrote forcefully.

1$7. r~cciard1n1

wrote of a possible imperial occupation

ot RomeT""":•• questo sarabbe uno grande smem.brartl. 1f

42Ibid., p. 156. FOr a discussion of' the eonciliarlsm under Jullus II,
PP. 103-106. FOr the suggestions regarding a emreh ecrclncil under
.1, et. In.tra, pp. 153-159.

1f.

ef. sup
Clenrmt

:,

••• che ~ queUo graM che e' eaJi dioono che uno princi!(~~ debbe
fuggire Quante 1.a mo~e, porche quando ~ condotto qui, ~ principe
in nome, ma in f'a.tto e ogni altra. cosa che principe, ad a chi d
uso/ a dorninare, el mondo ed e.ssere stimato ad ambito dB. er:::ndissimi
principi, e quello cbe
solito a dare el fOOte alle cose, come en
tu a tr-mpo di Lione, (:' come da uno tompo in qua sone stat! eli
antMe5Sori tuoi, io non so quanto sia m1nore male che.la morta e
la p~l"dita deell stati) el rldurei in condizione tale. 43

e

Tho world of the latter 1520's wes a world

ot

hard r~lity.

to preserve one's authority. Guicciardin1 advocated that Pope

One had

Cl~t

should

take the offensive and meet Charles h!3ad on, for there was no other choioe

bUt ru5.n. 44 Of course, this involved other dangors but they had to be risked.
Cl~mont's

eneT1'!'lJe

defeat by Charles would be his ruin.

Charles would trAat him as an

'3ut it was tar bettor to suffer in noble self-defense than to wi tho-

draw and not face the issue.

At the ti.'f!le of the f1z1peror t s overtures to the

Pope, Guicoiardini advised him to nm the risk of the greater evil with the
mpe of final ll.be-1"'t7.

4$

In latfitr y98.1'"8, when Guioe1ardini attempted to justify Clement's leadership of the League of Cognao and his anti-imperial ventures, hI!) usad. similar arg'tunants.

It is incorrect to assume that Clementta decision to W'ldEll"-

take war against Charles was imprudent because 1 t failed and !"Csilltoo in the
.ok of Rome, the Popete 1qlrieomnent and other cala!';:eities.

He argued that

whoever y;ants to condemn the ?ope of rash action mst, if he does not wieh

43Ibid., p. 157.

~. Gu1coiardini concludes.

QUa womodocumu~ sit, n~ssuno non
non e1 fa opposizione a quEIJsta grandezsa, tu ba:1 a temere
Krandissima ru1na •••• "

negh€'l."a ehe se

lt~-'id
. 11'" ~;JtUl.}
.'1.~G·
"']b el",·.

I.
.1

lJt$.

!!II
I

I,

to

nak~

dilif':~ntly

a snap judgment,

examine the :N'.Asons which motivated him. 46

Ouiceiardini further discussed his basic cr!teria for entering into any
n~ess1 ty,

war, first,

and second, 1'ac1li ty.

One bas to be threatened :more-

ovf'1', and has to have good gl"O'nnds tor victory.

considered lightly, for all

mer.'

its risks.

To begin a val" is not to be

So is the case .for a"f.lY prince,
I

and mch more is it necessary tor a. Roman pope to take a good look at the
$ivlstion.
sPiritual

'W~ltare

of his nook a"Kl that the temporal power was

41

to him

b'J~t

he admitW he wa.s not too certain when

to measures aimed at the recovery of the tetlporal st.:'1tes of the

Church.

t'h~ther

these canst!tuted sutf1eient justification tor war,

Ou.ieeiardini hesitated.

""'11"

giVf'l1

It was justifiable for the Pope to take a.rms to defend

the authority of the Holy' See,
CS!!'lO

I

Guicoiardini admitted that a pope has the duty to maintain the

only secondarily.

1t

!III

1'"ere this recovery in the interests of the faith"

\'lOuld be justi:.f'1able.

It C1El'ntel1t undertook

48

_1'

tor

&l\'f

reason but defense of his poSition

and the Ch!.u."Ch, and, if there were but 11 ttle hope of vieto17, he was con-

demnable.

If' he had insuffiCient forces, he -s foolhardy.

'Aut none of these

statemmts applied to the present case. At first. Clement saw that the 1..mperlal domination would diminish papal authority and that of the Holy See in

46"Giust1f1casione della politica," p. 198

47Ib1d., p. 199. Ouicc1ardini's words are imoortant.

rt . . . di chi •
e state. data" la potesu( temperale s.
aoc9ssoria e sustentaeolo di quella •••• "

princi~la cure. apirl tuale,

non

p~r

ne gli

halbid•

-

:11

genora1-

At th(l! time Clement delayoo. maldng a decision, ()uicela.-rd'lni argued

that ~!i.r

\18S

necessary and arms could be taken 'with soma hope of suecess. 49

Since there existed. widespread realisation of the strength of the
rorc~sJ

~ria1

Cuicciardini tanned the best possible remedy to be a }"rench alliance

with the Pope, the Venetians and the other Italian powers and. the Swiss.
COUrse, danger existed, uncertainty of the end.

Of

The imperi.allets already had

a strong hold in Uxnbardy.
Arter Pavia there could be no peace wi tbout Francis' frlOOtdom.
complieated all negotiations to that end.

coopAration in the
Swiss.

This

The French, by their half.hearted

.'1', made matters more di.N'1oult

for the Vonetians and the

Unde:ro the cil"CUlDStances, it seemed wiser for them to defond the few

areas tMy" hfl'ld in the north ratMr than to attack the st:roong impmalists
in

l~lan.

Guicciardini was a;WQ:re of the unQertaintd.ee of the remadies he suggested
tor carrying on the war.

He did not k'n<m' if the allies could hope for con-

tinuing Msa allegiance or whether the Venetians 'WOUld remain on the allied

side.

~,t;mey

was essential ft)r success, and all looked to the papal puree.

It was almost a certainty that the first blow of the impl'lrialists
the papal. states and F.lorenoe, not at Venioe.
J1X)l'f"j

C1E!lllellt had

be at

but be had,

otten than not, to work alone. SO
It seemed to Guicc1ardini that lack of' money

~('Its lOS8

-

all1~s

lVoul.d

of l'leal-t.

49"Cdust1rlcasione

W8.S

at the bottom of the

Rls resources were insuffioient for a long v»'1!I.r whioh

d(lJ.la. politica, tt pp. 199-200

50lt'proposta di alleansa," pp. 1$9-160.

r

II

this was likely to be. Gu:1oc1ardird. argued, however, that Clement could have
overcome aome of his dif.f1culties 1n the latter mnths of 1$26 and the be-

ginning of 15211! he had taken advantage of methcda of raising money which

other popes had been accustomed to take ·oven tor oarry.lng on amb1 tioua and
unjust en1;.$rprises.· '!'he need for mney, Gu1.cc1al"d1n1 thought, would lave
j1lst1fted the a1mord.acal creation of cardinale, tor the Clmrcb itself stood
in a most serious state of

j~.S1

I,

,:"1

Nor did Ouicc1.a.rdim hes1tate to make such a augeetioD pereonally to

hie master.

'I",
·.ill l

Be was certain tba:' Clement would ultimately have to provide

II'

'I,
'I!I!
'

"

the needed ttmds, even through those methods which he had bvmled upon.52
'then he 'WOUld lave onl7 the blame, 1'lOt the benef1't. 53 Gu1cc1aM1ni 'IIIliabed
that the Pope could 8ee the a1 tuat10n a8 he d1d aM act accomingly.

Near

the end of August 1526, Ouico1a1'd1rd did not know vrhere to tum far aeaiatance.

'l'he signatories ot the Leape of Oognac continued to tail in their

obligationa, military and

JDOnetar.r.

illl'

The Lictenant's frequent PEqueats to

the Datar1oS1r. and to SI.1v1ati had met with unttatia.tacto1'7 responses, and he

5lstor1a d 'Ital1a. V,
52Letter to Clement

60,

m.

m,

Cam'

,Ii!,

August 21, 1$26,
IX, 163-l6h. Note
Oaicc1an!1ni '. t.rank word... ifF!. 8e 11 . .~. auo ordinarJ. gl1 !IVi1'.IoC8nO,
credo abe la oons1der1 OM 1& G nec_s1 tato 0 proveder'd atraordinaJ"1.am&nte
o deponen 1e ame. 'Flt queato secondo ha in e8 tent! male. che e mali del
primo eono piooola co_ a comparat!one d1. questo.... Pezod • nee.sario che la
dellberi, et . . . d1.latione d1a principie a quelle pzoovi8ione ahe sono manoo
contra alla mente sua....Il'l8O!!Da io veggo tante di.t'f1cul.tA nel deponere le

ame con mdo ragionew1e et eiouro. ahe 10 sono certo ehe la necess1 tA
conduma Vostra

Sanct1ta •

provedeJ'e de d.anari. et1am con quaUi modi cbe bora

gli displaec10n0...... "

S3stor'1a dfltalla, V, lJ6.

~

Data.r1o

was the papal bursar.

"1

1

'1. .""

)

"
1

1•

~b1ne

was greatly concerned.
~ee

!brthcoming.

would collapse it monq were not quickly

in caq> were great and the;r were rendered greater be-

cause ot King F:rancis f Mlure to contribute. Guicc1ard1n1 rtminded

m.

Holiness that soldiers were not paid tf\'dtb designs in air." Above all, it

was necessary to have the -money in time lest, to all the other disorders,
another 'WOUld be added, that ot having provided too late.>S '!'here . . no

time to quibble in so vital a concern, tor upon cold cash depended the

preservation ot the

ril~

See, Clemant's mm safety. tM 'Welfare ot F.l.orence

and that of all Ital;r.SO

\1b:t1e Ouiceiardin1 understood the ~ papal probleme in 1$26 and 1$26,
he eontimeCl to be bighl:v ar1tical because Clement did not seem

help bimeelf.

Not

to be able to

onJJr did he wish to awid any simoniaca1 daal.1ngs,

when

there were many persons who were willing to P&7 mge sums for ecclesiastical

ti tles, but also the

Pope let eT~e know of bis poverty and fear.

the boldn088 a:n4 lr;)pee of those who sought

to attack him

i~sed.

In Ouicciardird'. judgment, the Pope'. actions indicated his
1

Tm8

~.

•

$Letter to Clement VII t August 21, 1$26, _Carteggi~ IX, 163-l.64.
Guieciardini concluded. UlFa la prudent1a Qua b1aognac cons1sta in questa.
di !'Ula in tempo eM gli giov1. et non tardare tanto cbs, oltra &111 altri
disordini, si aggiunga
questo. d:1 bave" proviato doppo a1 Wmpo.tf
$6
~ 'fete Ouicciardini'8 lofty words. fl~ la prego qJtmto posse OM,
per conservations della Sedia Apostol1ca et :ma, per bene.f1c10 della SIl&
patrla et pmr la saluto d1 tucta Italla, non wdia piu d1fi'o-:rend.o Hl
risolversl a fare gro_ ~e1one d1 danari, peraru{ altrimento non ci 'e
rimedio.... n F1o:t"'et'1Ce was tt SUA patria. ff

&nCO_

r
Ih,9

HI':' had not even entered the war 't't.!. th fla aui table and f'lrm rGSOlution...57
Not only was the terrltor.r and poei.tion of the Cblrch endangered as a result
of Cl(!!loot's irrasolution but also the F.1orentinc state and the Pape's own

1nfluenoe.S8 But, if he moved fast, he might
cooperate with him.

yet get the VenetiantJ

$'Vert

J.tUan _s already loet and 10

was Alfonso of

to

F~.

Ouieoiard1n1 saw that the next papal move hinged to a great extent on

that of Franee.

He could only hopE! that Clement, could defend himself while

the French were naki."'lg up their r..inds, and _intain the

TI1orence.

!t:!tup

~

in

If the Pope tmmd it necess&r,y to take the otftmsive without the

French, then he bad to act fast. $9 l~le he _s to

lnOV0

onl\?' with reason, he
I

OUght to reallie that despel'\1ltG cases call tor aotiom that mtght appear rash
but

I

.

are the beet that can 'be done. In the state of affairs Gu1oc1ardini . .

considering, one sdmp17 had to act. 60 To sit around and wait for ruin and
doath seemed. 19nom1n1.oua to him. Ouicc1ard1n.1 argued. that

., P'

1

57~

Note GuicoiardiDi fa

entNto~

woma. "...U

guerra eon la eost.anza dell f

ponte.tice, 11 quale non era
oonvonienta...... '*

ard..m

\ ,S"Propoeta eli all~,ft p. l61. 'fbte G-.licciard11U'S words: " ...1'.1
am .to:ree mtato sotto 10 state d1 lI1renIe."

S~.

~, p. l.6O. Guicc1aroini's words Wm'"G 1'loll-chosen. The allies
faced a (Jesperate situation' " ... in tale caso 1& neoeBS1ta'la strlgne a
g1ttand. a ogni ~o et1U precip1toao••• "
. il
, II

I'

150
regions ed ogni aperem&, effett! tel1c1asUd..

61

Guicc1ardini later discuesad the plan 'Of action be bad laid out to
Clement and wbich the Pope final.ly tollcJWed.

vJhen lTane18

was taken prisoner,

aU the 2"!llers 'Of Italy, especially the Pope, were prq to the imperlal

pow".

Tension waa wb1 te hot wtth the imperial occupati'On 'Of lfUan and the ruin 'Of
SfOrsa.

The

difficulty.

~1'Or put

As an

MUan under Bou.!"bcm and th18 Cl"e&t«t serious

invetere~

en., 'Or Francia., be ...

~letel.y

dedicated.

to Charles.
That

powe1"

I'6&Cbad

its might witil JI'ranci8'

freedom, fer the

Kins Jield-

ed his lfil.ane8e cl.a1u with promie. that he would inteJ"V__ no f!K)re in

Italian affaire. Charles'

~

wanW control '0£ the Perd.n8ula.

wtth Francia . . a clear e1gn that he

He knEnif that b1a artIblt10na 'WOUld be stopped

",

it he had to oppose ltal.y' and PRnce together. 62
Clement

ful.l7 reali_eel that the all1ea could not resist the

Francia would 'Observe the pl'Om!.Se8 he made to obtain his &eedom.
quite likel7

that the King lIOUld lE'l8gl1e with the Pope

assist the Dl1ke 'Of Uilan.

join the League.

lIem7 nn

~eror

it

, . Ii

It.eaned

and the Vmet1ane and

con't1nwal.l7 promlsed that he too WCI.1l4

Ou1cciardini a8kedwbat . . Clement to do when he

.w .

"I'

possibility of Victory?63
Neve1"'t.heleae, Clemem

was

t~

to negotiate peace through deal1Dp

..

6l.n.u., p. 16l.
"

621fQ1u.uf1OUione della pollt1ca, U pp. 200, 20).204, 209.

France, UDCler

ita regent, Loutse 'Of SaV07, 1!IOUld go to war tel" Francia' releue if it coold

be 'Obtained in no other \V87.

63nnd., pp. 20h-20B.

:

td th Cmrles t agents in Rome.

He thought he might obtain very favorable

terms if' Charles came to realize that
teaC'lle.

_1',

lirano1a might 1rI;>art nmv life

into the

Then too, Oharles' ministers and captains, who had. always advised
Ugo di 1foncada went

nmv wanteci peace.

with the Pope.

t{e

to Rome to come to

SOl'IlG

accord

explained that the 1mperlalists might ha\"e to abandon

}.H.lan tor they were in serious etra1 tall'

The Marchese del Guaato and Antonio

.1
I

di Leva, the 1IOSt important of the in:pe1"lAll military captains, wrote ot
their desire fbI" peace to Iomada and to the Duke of Sessa, the 1rzrper1al

I

•

, i

ambassador in Rome.64 Moncada's commission met VIi til 11tUe success. Clement

eaw that less . . to be gained

by peace at this point tbI.n by a just and

honorable war to 1"efItore the Du.clV of Milan to Sfofta.
ed that all Italy wanted th1e

the

~ror

Ouiccia.rdini explain-

war, ttneoeesa.:r1a alla 8'&lute univereale. u6S

Guiociardini turned suddenly to

Y1-.t:!\ ....v:t.1

in Florence.

fa

dotaUed discuasion of the papal role

Plrst, he explained tthat the Pope dtd not

aspire through thi,s _r to occupy the lands of otbera or to acquire
66
1'01"

the Church or for his fa.m1l.y.

title _fEft;y.

Yihen the

~eror

destroy F.torence because

ot

!

'I

~ng

lht rather be was concern('d tor F.loren-

came into Italy, he wa. disposoo either to

her French incl.ination or to take a::,vay

the
'I

~

-

6hThese letters and those of Moncada to Charles en ..................
route £rom S1ena
inte1"Cepted, ibid., P. 210-

6StP1d.,

pp.

~p.,

p. 210.

208-210.

-
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Signoria. 67

Perhaps his ultimate plan was to make her the camera

~

imperio1

68

-At the very least, he would seize Pisa, Livorno, Arezzo and the more important
places in Tuscany.

Clement's one consideration was to save the patria as far

as he could. Since he thought of himself as a Florentine citizen, he found no
other expedient than to capitulate to the Emperor at Barcelona, but with the
promise that there be no change in the cityfs administration.

It was to have

free government with liberty for all Florentines and it was to pose no threat
to the Pope or to the French King. 69 In 1530 Guicciardini agreed that, whatever the plans of Clement and Charles for Florence, it could only yield to the
Empire as the other allies had done. 70
In the Storia d'Italia Guicciardini took a somewhat different poSition on
Clement and Florence from that taken in his earlier political tracts. He
emphasized rather that the Pope's dealings with the Emperor at Bologna in 1529
and

1530 were prompted more by his long-favored and hidden project of rein-

stating the Medici in Florence than by his desire for her security.7l In

67The executive and legislative government by the priors, known collectively as the Signoria, dated from the constitutional reforms of the late
thirteenth century, Hyett, pp. 46-L7.
68
Guicciardini thought that the central location of Italy might influence
the Emperor to make it the center of imperial government rather than Spain or
Germany.

. I~

69"Ragioni che consigliano la signoria di Firenze ad accordarsi, con
Clemente VII," ,Scritti politici, pp. 214-215.

-

70I bid., pp. 217-219.
71Storia dtItalia, V, 215-216.
1111
I

C1.dooiardin1 'a judgment, Cl£ftent'a nogotiations with Cbu-las nt tttts point
eo{::!tted more sincere than his promisee to the allies.

Il$ observed that the

two h:J.ChABt powers of Chr1stendo."!1 "treated Imre about private concerns...
than about the un1vemal b.lsil1e8S

ot peace. n12 Guiociardini

Cleme..¥it, thcnl3h realising the darleer of Charles'

rr.ore easily induced than King
rule. 73

felt

~~t

he oould be

to restore the Ued1c1 to Flormtine

Nol" did be Ml to cr.ltic1ae the Pope fbi> al.lowit'.g puni&l:!meniie of

~)11hli~..na

bl.at1e

Fm..~is

~,

arr;'tloo that

in F.I.orenee afi',er hm." SllmmdV.

aqua~

In .fact. Gu1ceiardini placed the

on Clem.ent's ah:mldersl tbia ftwq the intention of t.."le Pope

thou~h manifeated

to few." 1h

still another aide ot Clement 'a re1gn

Clement's pol.1c,- toard the SWl.'ImOning of a

~

emuoh

to be discussed. This 1.

~

which -s to handle

Cblrch rat"oftl end the metl:'lOd of reestabl1sb:lng peace among ChrletUna.

In a atud7 of papal policy, the Popel. efforts tor Cmroh reform carmot
be omttted.

Though Leo X did notlttng to

~r

the retorm sent1msnt eo ...

plioitl3 demanded in the LateJ'8n 00unc11, Clement' a pol1cy.. even mre

caut1ona. It

'flU "~benod by

the doubt8 or op~ ~e of llImJ' ~

dinals 'Who were mYare ot the political d1frieultiee it woUld

create. The

I!
I'

i'l
i"j'

.' 1

72~. 24.3-2hU.
7~., ab.9.

~., 299. .l\t the time,bmlevex-, Guico1a.Z'd!ni de!.'ended these bIreh
l"eel"'.1..tml.M'Bone as neceaaar.r for ~ oonacl1dation of the state. Ot. ~

P.

~

umarcha oould use the 1esue of reform to cmt doml the Pope'. poai-

tion. '!'he UIIljoriV of the Sacred College and the CUl"1allsts looked upon the

conciliar

NtOl'mf$l"8

1alk of

~"J

with suspicion and tear. "IS
am1d8t the din of ~.r,

was

l1nked closely 'vn th the

proble of .. council to treat of Cb.trch reform.
~

a vital role in the preservation ot un!ty' ancl ord'3.r in

Clemmt reiterated hie cla1m that
.. fact

~ch

publi~

to

tbth Pope a.'1d tnperor claS ...

h1ndered bim from

pope he had the dnV to 'm)rk for peace,

e~

that it was 1::Ji8 dnt.y' to

C:l"~te

q

C~ettlom.

ftvor1 tism to

c~e

an:r ruler.

He argued

quarrels 8lll)ng the pr1nces and not

them. And. comlCil mtgbt J'81se more problams than it

10.114

aolve.16
In ~~

lS26. Charles mx1lftnc1e

public not.1C8, as econ as poee1ble, of a

~ to request the

gmlel."Il

Pope to give

eounc11 to treat or peace

among Chrlstlatls. 71 The p3:'Oblen . . that _r not ~ w:rGOked C~
and split it up the ldddle, 'With Italy
and Rome the ~, btt

log.tcal 1881l..

One

as the t.tu-get and the papal. statfJI

that peace atllOng Chz':tat1ans irrvolvad

can~ered

on the Intberans,

~

~oue

th«J-

gone .from the fold,

and the other IlOUlt a politiC&l1nYas1on into the powers of the eac!!l!gt1um.
..

I

•

Ml

~ArcHbishop John l'1aber of Rochester _mad that the tul.e tor ~
c1l1aUon with the heretios hid pa$l!~ and that a ~8 to a COWlCil now

'fmUld be tantamount to a conceea1on toward tmee who bad n$1ther the 'Will nor
the intention to abandon thm.r l!t"ft)!'S, Dmlglas, P. 38.

1'?torla d'ItAl1a, IVJ 2ho-2h9,

eepee1al.ly

2hh-2b5.

77Th': rulers _moo to organize a ~gn against infidels and heretics
and bave the Pope gnmt a general Crusade for three ~, ;b1d.. )SO.

one can only recall that the struggles of Pope Clement were based on the as'...
old con£liot of saoerdotium yersup
Clement

~eatedly

of peace and reform.

~

answered the demands .tor

8

general council to treat

He apolOgized for his inability to lead the Christian

priMes to compose their quarrels and to undertake an e:x:pcd1tion 8.[!:ainst the

po'W"rtul and advancing Turks. Just as Pope Leo had made a

mtiOl'1

sultations to be held among the pl"1nees for a war against the

and his hot'de,78

80

also Olement was concerned that the

c0n-

pcm~

Tum would

secure the whole Iingdom ot Hungar.r to the detriment of 1a:!t !c!
He did what he could to stop their march.

tor

Se11m

t17 to

l!. Cr18tiant.~.I

The Pope explained that he had

conUnually exhorted the Chr'1st:1an leaders to make peaoe among themaelve8 to

term a united front against

t~ts

from outside.

Amidst 80 many other

weighty conoema, he gave monetary uslstame to lJunpl7 tor defense against
the TtL%"b.

The Pope said he went to war against his wUl, Gu1cc1ardini related,
because ot his al11&nce w1th the League.
See in Italy.

There

was no peace tor the

Ho~

Clement observed tbat God wished tbat the head of Christendom

be wounded, perhaps for some good end.

He tried to look to the

~n weJ.,..

tars while the t.emporal beads ot ChJ"1stendom were distracted by ooncems not

conduciva to the Christian commonweal.
rlhenever there 'lmuld 'be a _spension of aru in ltalT. Cl.ant promlaed

tbat be would meet w.l. th the Christian princes and obtain a ut'd.:vereal peace
among Christians by prayer or persuasion.

him in hi• •anta 22~.19
•

78nM.,h2.
19Ibid., V, 16-18.

He begged the Cardinals to ase1st

",

156
The

i~r1al

Bro.'Celona led to more spoci.f1c plans against the heretics.

to use apiritual

and his brother

~es

to

The POPE-': agreed
, ,

cooperate in any "fR!J.Y they could. CharlE'tS and
I,:

obstinate whUe

Cl~t

would see to it that the

oth~

Christian

pri!lC0S vmnld give mlitar,r assistance too. 80
So

1'IUJ

'l"&1g1on oven

8eoo~

papal rule, and, .fu.ndamentall1, of papal. EJlistence itself.
l1I.r

fOr

a CO'.lncU which he bad made

earU.~

I

I
I,

I
,i

I,

Peace among

against irt..t1dele, ratorm of

eceler.r'AStical arosee-tllase wert'. the issues which made continual
a general councilinG'rl.:table. In 1$30 the

I,

I

i

to eldgenc1_ 'Of' papal policies, of

Christians, sp1r1tuaJ. unitY' within OM fold,

I

I

his 'brother WOttld use their mllitary strength against the heretios if tMJ
~lned

~1"Or

esna

bltansit!ed the

for

~esta

at Bologna. lie Ydshed to oatisi)' the

d!':1l'l8l1de wb1ch bad a!"iseZl all over G~. and it

was conducive

to hie

own

! •

affaire thore to suppreu all 0pp01"tu.1'1tties tor a display of the "ttmnltuows
and ref1"actory diapositim of the peoplo• .,81
The ~eror well Ul\d.~ that Cletl:lt'.mt reared a council and

possible ramifications.

He promised that, to

~Ve

its

all approhenai<me of

i
,I

danger to papal authority, he would be present at the :meeting to take partioulAr care of Clement.

Noth1ng

not want to anger Charles.

".s more displeasing to

Nor did be th1nk the

tltlfriaient fw hie em seourity.

.

the Pope, but he did.

prcm!.8~S

or the

}l1;>eror

Clement teared that a ooum11 mtSht even

,

8O:n:nd., 260.
~1A••

I

II

bring ller'ctics back to the f'aith "mile Charles

F.~rd1nand W011ld

!I'

I

vlctory and the accord between Charles and Clement at

30,1.
1'1,

lS1
remove him fl"om the papal chatr in f,Qvor of' another cand1&ate. In
Otdeciardini', judgl'iWnt,

his

(Mtl

~ers

eid.(~r

Cl~nt

realized that he bad stinro u!i al'limosi ty in

count17 by' f\.is involvement in the miseries oX war, and th&t counoil
would not. judge th1s in his favor.

his activities L'1

his fa.uly.

F.lo~c

At least Clement's

furt.h(~l'"

'l'hey would

tnnti to con-

as aimed only to aa.t1.si7 the atlbitions of

~enta

'Would use these

argum(~l'lta

to erJit

their own purportes.
Clcm!3tlt told the cardi."lBls who vlGre to discuss a eon.mil how he

it. The Pope flmPlainoo that

Chr.1s~dom

was 'U.l'mise to 1nwlve 1.t in the

Charles, 'however,

Cl~

~lrthor

abho~

was tom by disputes in 15'30 lU'ld it

dis8et'1.non 01' a oo1Jl'JCil. To saUrdy

mentioned that he would

AgrM

to the

COl'!."!J'o(uation

ot

a concre.l COUncil, provided tb&1t it 'WOuld be held in Italy' and that Charles
WO'J.1ld be present.

r:i>~er,

the IutheNns and other heretics were to be

in:'ormed that they should abide by the group's decisions and, L"'l the
timo, show by their actions that thq intend«l to 1"0t>Jm to their
to

too

~

Ol)ediAnCG

ibly Boe.

In Ouieoiardini's judgment, the insistence that the mthm."fuw conform to
Catholic Chrlst18l'.ity obstructod any possible

pl"O~.

~

could not be

induced to forsake their doctrlnnsand rites be:fbrc a council, and it

common'l7 believed that thq opposed such. meeting for the"Jft>lt it
mc~

:reject their opinions. fJ.reactr tomer

OOlltlOUs

l'I&S

)l{ollld

Md condomnecl thma q

he%"QUcal. Still,.:m1Il1V' Iuthnmll8 cleverly called for such a meet1ne. ThEfT
f01t quite ce1"t.ain that the Pope 'trould not grent their rPCtueet and thq could
.. •

1

..

'I
"

3;,0
bOlster up their own authority o.mng the people by explaining that the Pope
rillS

afraid to face the issue of their beliefs squarel.y.82

Papal policy ...

in difficult straits, for the Chllrch's attitude toward reform lrould be con-

.At Bologna in 1>32, a cot;,nc11 again

that Clement issue a call

not

5<cEm

~atcly.

_8

disC'.;tSGoo. when Cha.!"'les insisted

The Pope 8l.'l8"IroreQ that the time did

ripe, for the French and !'nglish ld.ngs were not '\"filling to cooperate.

Al'.d, ira meeting l'tera held without them, notJ:J.ng would be ace<.mrllished.

(f"\'~en give ooooeion :for a schism. 83

Such a councU could

Guicc1ardini

oont1nu~

stressed the i'act that Clement appolled tile

council for the "old l"ehOna. Q Bh He advised the Pope alwar-s aJ.o."1g the

8Ql'lle

linE:s, 1'..a.ma33, that tho Gasiast way fer the <!:m2er1u;m to abase the ?ape

lIiIl8 by'

~1S

the

of a council..

I':
I' ,

iJa:r.r

wt~~. 8, lbt

Sft

this" hoiva'V'cr, u the only'l'll0thod of coping i.'ith

the papal poeition was Guicoiardinils pr.1.Dar..r concern.

i
'I

Hothing could overturn it like a eou:ncill

B2Ib1p..,

'I

',!

30l-3~.

83I'bid., .310-311. lfem7 '.;"'rn: 's agents had aL.""'eady ini'omed Clement that
they 'fJOU-rcrtake their 1d..ng's eaUSf3 f.rtom him to a Council. ~ thought
HJ?11X7 had gone too
ibid, 315.

far.,

Bhn,id..

308.

85uQiust1.t'1OUlone dell4 politica,· p. 206. Guicc1ard1.ni stated that
Charles could depress the Pope ftper v.!.a di conoil1 des1derati e ricercati da
molt.i. como nace.sari per 1a oresia di lut.her coo ogni ~ ~jliaw, e POl'
moltl disordird. abe eono nella Chiesa."

.'

i

,"

159
...

~

/

/

Ia f'B.cilita ebe ha di farlo e grande, pel'Che oltre aUe provine1e cbe
lui eomanda, sa1 cbe per el malo eoncetto 1n aha ~ el clero .preaso
.f lAici, 1& Germm1a non de«l.dera altro, e la ltalla vi sara prontaJ
e questo modo, lotre a ebe pu~ parere 1ustif'1cato, porche'si tara
con coloN di regiona, puo a.tlChe parere iusto aUo ~radore,
presulJl'Orlendos1 lui la ref~~one del claro la quale poi segu.iterebbe
o no, secondo cbe Dio "fOlou1.

I I

II
, I,

'I

'II I,

,!
I',
I,

Of ooureo, Gu1ec1ardini could not prediot the COl.U"t1e of divine aotiOn8,
\ ,I

bUt eoneider:1ng matters, he was quite certain.
power to depNn the Pope, be would l'IBke

USG

It it were in the

~e%"Or'.

'!

i

of t.he occasion "either out of

4mb1 tioD, which 18 natural to emperors against popes, f't»! his own secur1t7

or even tor revenge."S7 The dee1re to bring the popes to ruin vas not laclo1ng in the m.lnds of an)" Of the great princes of Cbrl.stSldom.

Elven Francis

of :!Tame Img that no pope could be ruined unlese he lost his epir1tual

tet not evan a rea:rte

power.

~t

could be made b7 ant one pr.tnee wtt.b.

out the agreement ot the other princes of Christendom. 88

86

Ii

"Proposta d1 aU..-," 5crltti pollt101, P. 156.

81~rla, dtftalia,

i'll
, ,

IV, 325.

'I,

,

,
1'11 , 1

88yn thia case, the French ruler would need the acquesemce of the Empire

and of Spain. "Ue( td puo battere, 0 a dire meglio, c'l1st'ar'e 1nt~te el
papa, non gl1 togl1t\ndo 10 apirlfualaJ e queato non s1 pad torgli S8l'lma el
ooneorso della Magna e di Spagna, a quali non 'e a Pl"Opoeito eM ~1a a1
!aceia oapo eel autom d1 una tanta
e pero sam'facile oosa. ... tt
"Disc. . d1 Franceeoo I, It P. U 1. lbreover tlwre seeed to be an inv1a1ble
hand preventing the matdall.Ucn ot these plana of ru1n~ ng the Pope in the

,I,

ill,

i

"

00.,

spiritual sphere as a step to hie political 1np)tence.

Ouiceiardini indicated

that it. al.wa,ye seemed wisor for Christian rulers to bave the Pope'. Mendship, mther than his animosity. Note his words; "}.fa questo ba emelle 01
contrapeso, pe:rcM og:n1 volta ebe non fuse! rlaoluto a non mnomettem el papa
nel doml.n1o ecoletl1ast1co, parrebbo pitt prudenzia oercare d:i banef'1oarlo e
farselo amico e cont.1.dente, in abe non 11 manchere'bbano at
ebe volerlo
per inimioo..... " ibid., pp. U7-l18.

,

I I

modo,

, I,
I

I'"
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Cl.em.mt VII died without

al'ly

d1m1nution ot Me spiritual autoorlty.

Yet,

as a CtI!Eooento pri.nce, he suffered some of the severest defeats any prince
fJ'Vcr

~er1enced.

'hue, the Medici line continued to rule in Florence, but

his familyts fortuMs should not have constituted one of the Popots

~1l'Jdamen

tal concerns. Perhaps. t:rom the Stor.ta d'Italia one can see that firm leadership on the part of Clement and. solid cooperation on the part of the aili.

ot Cognac would

have saved Italy.

In any avent, with his defeat, Italian

politics as a deciding factor came to an end, so weU EDtq)llf'led in Ms
blm111ating peace w:f~th Charles V;

Guico1a:rtRni's position in the service of the Pope and the League

associated h.1.m ld. th their tf'!'R success. as well as their ult:L'7l8te i\1ilure.
His pt)1itical account of what blppened in the ,.. against Charles
measure an apology for himself u well as Clcent.

was

in great

Gtdoc1ard1n.i. admitted that

his own m1ser1os came troll hts deliberate decision to advise war from whioh
all these mJ.s came. .t;anta ru1nal ft89 Yet" as pol1tic1&ne who taU do today" he caution«1 that none should ecmplain against the

placed himself' in this category

ot wise men,

evi. Be

who however

saw all

~

along that

the Pope's timid and irresolute poliO)" destroyed the poesibU1ty of succees. 90
Yet the opportuatty tor papal v1ct.0Jr7 s~ V'eJ'7 prom1a1ng.91 V!ea1c:neas-

"I
"

os r.ere evident within imper1al ra.n.k8. !here were 1neu.tflc1ent i'b!'Ce8J there

89uconeolator.ta." Scrltt1 a1.ltob1ograflc1, p. 166.

90:0:,14-,

I"

pp. 117, 176.

9l~, P. 117. ~ cone1demtions toree one to confess, Ou1cc1aldln1
~lte 1\1 per alcuno panc1pe presa ~resa ncJ s1
ne con maggiore sperttnu della vittorla. Q

noted. tbat ff . . .che rare
giuata TJ,f( s1 neoesaarta,

'.'
I

1,1

II

.,.s a laok of money) there was the 9n!!1i ty of the J;Jilanooe populace.

alSo had with him the French Kings the

ot the Fngl1sh tr1ng.

Un~.lm~.ly,

Ven~t1ans,

and even the

F.n1mc1s did net consult

TM Pope

VCgtlEl ~thT

~,.

of the

allies on his policies and nev~ helped the League. 92

He SPOke of Pope Clment as "that poor and
u.nhaPP~

by

~hed

pr.tnee who bad so

become a prisoner of the Spaniards. n "Tuttoe1 mendoR

Ta8

affected

the1P unfortunate uc~ in ltal7.9.3 Too late had t.he Pope come to

realise what Ouiociardin1 and other prudent paraous had

~S8ed,

mmel.;rJ

that mna:; would have conViruted eigniflcantl.y' to the 1nsa.rance at least of
papal and RmDan

sarety. 0!'1l7 a

few

dan

bef'oftt Bourbon

.n~

the citlr,

Clement oreated tbrae cardinals £ott a tee, which, beo«u.ee of the lack ot
time, could not eve be paid

therll9l. The vagaries of the princely role of

the popes t.rom Innocent and Ale:xander through Clement OIllm1nated in thi.
histor.!.o tragedy.
At h.1.s death, Pope CJ.ement left an abundance of jewels in the caete1
Santf Angelo and several offic!ala 1n the papal oourt.,

t,.. of monq. Gu1oc1ardim.

q'.lanti

'bu." a

Yel"Y small

"tfl'Ote.

Pbr wbat happiness can compare mth the unhappiness of his 1r.prisonmeat, his having wltnessed tbe sack or Rome with INch horrible ravagee, and his having been the cause of 80 gNat a ruin to his OlIm
country? ire died hated by the court, suepeotOO by the prina~'3. and
with the ch.ar8cte:r of be:l.ng rather of a moroae and di~blo than of

a pleasant and

a:.f'mble teq>~. :hr he Wl:18 reput~ 4var1ci~, ~
av~.me from doing a k1.ndness.·

to be trusted and mtuNlly

92Ibid., pp. 116-177.
93~.,

P.l66.

9hStortA d'Italla, v. 136.

~1b1d.,

317-3lB.

Ouicc1ard1rd. t s 'WOrds evidenced the pess1mLem that worked

entire stor1l; and. the pity and shame

~ng

devoted a signif10ant pa.rt of his active life.

mort ted pmee
ambition to

~d

pre$~

t,.~h

the

the ruler to whom he bad

He ackn.owledged that Clcent

tol" having taken up ame through neoessity and not

h18 person, the

HolT See, the 11ho1e of

!~

and the

world. 96 tht eepeoial'1' poignant _. the tnlged;y of Ou1cc1ardini b1mselt.

thoUgh an "aoc1dente," ~ to b1m tar deepel" than that of b1s

-

96"Sua Sanct1ta
\aara
'

_titer. 97
~

laudata se bavend.o pres. l'ame per necees1tA at
non per U1b1tione, :tare. ogni cosa per non JlOYlnare
queUa Sede, I tal1a
ta1cta Eft el mndoJ ansi, non 10 fIlccendo, ~ beetemmi.ata da opuno,"
letter to Oiammatteo Giberti, Auga.st 22, ]$26, Cart.eggi, IX, 115.

8e,

91"conaolator:1a," SCr1ttt autobtoef1c1. p. 166.

'"

,:

"I
"

CHAPTrn V

In the storie ,!lo!, -Mltine, Ouieciard1ni studied the history of Florence
.frOm the uprising of the C¥!mil in 1318 to 1509.

He thought that an accurate

tmov;lodge of' past happenings would help him better to undeo.l'Stand the con-

temporary F.l..orentine Edtuat1on.

history

ro~

These early

res~roM8

into Florentine

the faotual basis tor Ouiooiardini' s pol! tiC'Al thought.

!Ie recognized that Florance had been spl1t by factions throughout her

history and that the orten f1erce struggle among them prevented the establishment

ot a stable government there. Guicciardini held that Medici ascend-

ancy in Florence was the almost inevitable result ot the cityfs long history
or 01vil discord, but this instabil1 ty further produced t,he theocre.cy of
2
There is a recurrent theme in all
Savonarola and the republio of' Soderini.
Gnicoiardini fa Florentine wr1tlngs, the deoadence and final tall: of Florenee

lrrbe Ciompi were of the lower classes of Florence who revolted in 1318
tor SOCial, economic and political grievances. Democl"llCY in Florence reached
i tEl zenith immediately atter the uprising and then continued steadily to
wane, except, for a short-l1ved revival in the days of savonarola., until :1t
disappeared oompletely under the later :Medici rulers, Hyett, pp. 188-196.

2.ntese points tom the whole ideological current of Guieciardini 'a
Storie f1orent1~~ ~ ~ !! 1202-

163

,
and

of Italy.)

'Machiavelli too studied Florence's past and in his Istorie t!orent1ne4
plaoed its events within the larger scope of Italian affairs.
judgod them in the light. of l't.is ideal, the Roman Republic.

~~obiave11i

His Istorl.e in-

co",orates some of his f\tvorite ideas, namely, the constitutional cycle,S
the v:',talizing effects of party struggles on civic 11fe, and the amral char-

actf:ll" of success1\ll political action.
an almost tragic despair.

own city

It reflects a

lll)()d

of pessimism, even

He cont1mally rerlected upon the reason that hi.

did not come up to the standard which Rome bad set, a

~e

repl1blic

of virtuous clU.ens etrlv1ng for fame and glory in the servioe of their

goV'nrnment. In Y.l.orent1ne history lI.ach1avel11 found conUnually in operation
atrt.lggles based upon private ambition, egoism and a thirst f'or personal
power.

m. own experlMlCes as Secretary of the Repub11c bad given 111m a

first-hand opportunity' to observe these vices at woric. 6
)Passer1n d' ~es, pp. 160-161.

4xn his history U&chia:velli included events from the barbar1an invasions
in Italy and concluded it with the death of Lorenao the Magn1.f'1cerrt.

Su.,cb1avell1, like Po~U8, believed that not only does human histo17
to r~pea.t itself but aleo that in aU states action and. reaction alternate. out of prosperity comes dec.y and out of' diuolution rebirth. Monarchy',
the first tom. of government in most states, becomes tyrannical and. is 8110ceeded by an oligarc~, a demoonley and t'1Mllyanarchy, a condition which
mkee for a revertdon to monarchy. MachiavE!'lll noted that the cycle is onl¥
rart:'ly oompleted. Cf'. J.S. Al1~ A H1storz..2! Political Thounht in the
Sixteenth Cantu" (New York, 1960),-pp. J&5:4s6.
- -tp~d

6p'el1x Gilbert, Introduotion to the Torchbook TJd1 tion of ~acooiC
1.e~el.!!!iHisto!7 g! Flore~~ !:!!! g! ~ Affairs .2! I?:lZ (~lew York.. 1960),

PP.

AV.,

•

II
I
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Both political giants of the Cinqueoento tried to understand the problems of Florenoe and realized that they were but a part. of the problems that
beset Italy.

They knew that both these situations were intimately related.

Guicciardini explained in his Le cose :r.torentine7 that in 1375 the city was

--------

free and self-governing but, from that period onward, it fel1 under the perpetual unhappiness "a non essere mai caduta in uno governo bene ordinato, di
essere stata sempre piena di sedizione oivile. M8

In addition to these major

internal struggles the city faced, there was the external invasion of
for Guicciardini the beginning of Italian ruin.

1494,

Perhaps that was the reason

--

for the termination ot his Le oose with that year.
But Guicciardini and Machiavelli differed on the remedies eaoh proposed
for solution of the Italian illness.

Guicciardini saw no value in the gov-

ernment ot the Roman Republic as a model for that of Florence.

'1'0 him, it

was unwise to praise the defects of a government which were the cause of
disorder. 9 Guiociardini valued the benefits acoruing to Italy from her strong

7Le cose :f'i~rentine was begun at F.i.nocchietto at the end of 1527J abandoned in September 1529, taken to Incca in March 1530, then to Rome and
Florence until Guicciardini _s nondnated governor of Bologna in July 1531.
He oarried it to Florence in 1534 for certain corrections and then abandoned
it. Of the four books in Le cose,the last two are incomplete, Ramat, pp. 64-

65.

--

8
Cited in ibid., p. 65.

9"Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli sopra la prima deca

di Tito Livio," Book I, Chap. 6, Scrltti pplitici, pp.

13-14.
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l!Ilnicipalities while Machiavelli stressed the neeessi ty of strong monarchical
unity.

Guio.ciardini agreed papal power had been one of the chief :factors in

keeping Italy disunited and that the conservative function of the Church in
Italian history had hindered the formation of a monarchy similar to that of
Spain, France or mgland.

But Guicciardini could not understand the value of

Machiavelli t s point that I taly might well be saved by becoming a national
state.

To him, whether this would be a good or a bad thing for his country

was debatable.

The monarchy which Machiavelli so desired Guicciardini seems

to have conteJ'llplated with fear. 10
The Italian states, Guicciardini believed, had perhaps -$Uffered more than
they would have if' united.

On the other hand, the establishment of a central

government in one city would have depressed all the others, and Italy would
not have developed so many nourishing cities as she had.

Fbr this reason,

it seemed more likely that union would have been a misfortune rather than a
11
benefit.
While Guicciardini did not have what might be termed a "national conscience" and remained through his entire life a citizen of Florence, his
political acumen enabled him to see that the interests of his republic could

lONote Ouicciardini t swords' " ••• doppo tanti naufragi delle COse di
Italia e poi che questi prfncipi aranno combattuto assai, para ragionevole che
in qualcuno sia per rimanere potenzia grande, el quale cerchera di battere e'
minori e forse ridurre Italia in uno monarchia," "Del modo di ordinare il
governo popolare," Discorsi ~ regemento s!! Firenze. p. 218.
llnConsiderazioni," Book I, Chap. 12, pp. 22-23. This is a fragmentary
'WOrk, consisting in a series ot observations on various chapters of the
Livtan Books of Machiavelli. Ct. also J.W. Allen, A Histo:J of Political
Thought in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1960),
497- 00.

w.
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not be promoted unless they 'Were considered wi thin the total complex picture
of Italian interests. 12

His vista was even greate r, for his sojourn at the

Spanish court had enabled him to view the immense panortll'1JB. of international

life as it was then forming.
The forms of' government in Oinquecento Italy compelled the attention of
both Machiavelli and Guicciardini.

Maohiavelli on the one hand described the

strong rule of a prinoe13 and, on the other, popular control of government.
In the Diaporsi, he upheld government by the majority.

It seOO1ed logical

and just and afforded possibilities for Ol:ider and benefits to the state.

14

Guicciardini found neither of Maohiavelli's political plans wise or
feasible.

He was particularly opposed to the plan outlined in the Discorai.

Absolutely no stability could be looked for in the people.

In the mouth of

one Barbadoro he put these words, supposedly delivered to his fellcw-citizensl

,

You carry ftne! euore el desiderio della liberta, non per altro che per

to~

mento vestro, poiche non siate capaci n' a cognoscerla ne a usarla.. n15 The
people know as moh of the meti ves or even the acts of their government as
they do of events in India. 16 To speak of the people means to speak of a mad

12Palmaroccbi, Studt Guiociardiniani.. p. 88.
l3.rhis is the subject of his most well-known 'Work,

14Allen,
15Le

16

II princi12e.

p. 498.

~

fiorentine, ad. Roberto Ridolfi (Firenze, 1945), Book II, p. 81.

.

Ricordi, II,

14l.

l68
bellst, mthout taste,

disc~t o'Z" stab111t:r. 17

that !'6rely does anylihing happen thtlt
'.lS'1811y

tho

d~t:mtes
18 for they are
the mlUtude expects,
BrperiencA

mre pleased by specious than sture cmmaels.19 Aceordi!\..g to

m~an.6

of reaching it.

He pointoo praotically to t.1w cbaoa tU".d t'tttrane

per:t1 to whioh the Ci2!E1 bad conducted the e1ty. 20
!r~

fact Florentine oiVil life seemed so 'Warily baaed to Guieciardil1.i that

iI

it "ms easily disposed to fall into e1 tiler ~.ny or popuhr d!ssollltion. 21
Until the ott1msti, men of quality 1n whom lay the best hope .tor stability
within tho state, were brought :tnto the oity's political aff'..'dra, Florence
cO'.lld scarcely

hope tor e stabJ.e government.

His cooperation ltith "d.ly

tyran.r d.O£I.l rulers, in his later years, stemmed pr*...l1'la.:r'i~ from a desire to

take advatntage of a possible opportum t'<.r to inaugurate rt.s own gm'crnroental
plan. 22 Actually, constitutional J"f"f.'erm ".'/813 a Ene 9.':!!.!!?Jl to e!l.E.ble Florence

....
17Ib14., lbo. Ouioc1ard1n:i's words are strong and bitter. "Chi disse uno
popolo dine vera.mente uno a.n:imale paazo. piano di mille errori, di mille

confi.lsione, sanu. gusto,

18

storia d t lta;l1a,

aan.H

delatte, sanaa st&bi11ta(. tI

n, 16.

19nnd., IV, 277.

I

.

,

2<\'C089 tiorentine," Book II, pp.
DiSoorst-A pp. 215-216.

~'n

72-74.

Ct. also "La deeima soalata,"

govarno popolare," ibid., p. 219.

22Agost1no Roesi, mneeseo Gniociardtlli El U tT'S':t1:tO fiCtrentino dal1521
al. lSho, (Bologna, 18~), !, 104. EOss! tii'i'ds-t ft'OrenUne SliUatIOn"1.il
]5)0 his basic reason for attampting to L"liI.ke a pmct1cal application of his
theo:ry. At this time, Yed:Loi domination beca1l1e inevitable, therofore,
C'l1licciardini f'avorOO mald.ng th(Sil" r~g:lme stable by providing oe.~1)le and __
J>erienced oitizens to participate in the govel'lltMnt.. ib1d., 2U.

I',

!

110
!.fl tht'} notorious Pass! affair. 21

I '

It ... not an 6!lSY task to rule a city

v:ho1"e matters had to be oonduetod u.."lder republican forms.

Thi$ necessity

lW.lpod to mke Loremo eol'llOWhat dcfinnt and sllspieious and at

ti."ll'~S

lad him

to act firmly.2B Moreover, the Pani conspiracy obviously provided mtivos
tor the cruel actions with which I..orenso

i'1G.S

To Guieciardini thePazsi a.ffair was

I

,

,

oharged. 29

ind~~d fate:f'~l

for

Lora.~o·s

1\lture. It oonat1tuted a dang,:;r both to his stat.:> and to h1s life, btt ult.1JtI,a.tely it afforded him -great reputation and utility."

He was recognized

as patron of the cit)" and in a l1.II.nnwas lord of the state.
che in .futurum 1"'1mase libe~te ed interamente arbitro G quasi
signore della c1t~J e quella potf'n:zia eM insino a quallo d1 era
state. 1n lui grGnde ma scapettosa, diventO grandissima G sioura.
..

l

1

21~e han Conapi:Ncy' of' lb78 was mgineerad b;r G1rol.aloo Ria.rio, the
lord of lmola, and FNnoneco Pan1, a mronber of the well.-knmm banldng ~
in oompetition vdth the Medici, with the assistance of Archbishop F.rancesco
Salviati. They planned to mu.rder Lorenzo and Giuliano de'Medici and to overthrow their ~ Oiul1L'lO '!liaS assassinated a."1d torermo mrr'OWly escaped dr::atb.. S1xtus IV, allied. vd.th Ferrante of Naplea, and from 147b. on ill
tonne with Lorenso, exccmmmicatcd him and placed F.l.orence under intordict.
Venice and Milan, Lorenzo ts allies, aided him in the subeequent military conmct. In 1480 the WiU' of F.1.oronoe with Naples and the papacy ended. The
'l\trk:teh appearance in the sO'.lth in.f'l:n.enaed Sixtue to renove his aoclesiast.1.cal
censures. SehevUl, The Medici (New York, 1960).. pp. 123-136, and FloN>llCe,
pp. 382-386. Cf.
~4 .~, Lorenzo de1 Modic! and R.e.naisS8.nee
Ital;z: (tandon, 1955>, Chap. 8.
_ . . ...

alsocea:m

i

I

28stor.te fi.ft"MttM, p. 18. Guicc1ardini noted, bowaver, that every time
the eour'Sfl! of. Cosi:m.o and Lorenzo t~ed to reduce matters to blood ar.d further
violence, as at Pel'ug:ta and Bologna, at Florence, givm the conditions of the
e1tyand the nature of the state, they rather hP.J.poo to destroy thar!. to inQr(!4se their ~..atness. ~ ~ t!f&;!.!epto !!!. !i1renze, p. 25.
29

~., p.

I

Iii
"

I

78.
!

,

1:,,1
, i'l

,I
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Ouioe1ard1n1 intimated his view that Lorenao. bl" putting an and to the

F1orontine

CUl"$13

of factions, accompliahed a great benefit.

In the

~toZ"l;e

f,Lorentine. he displayed an enthls1um. net to be tound in the Storifl d 1Ital1a.

-.tter Me

daya of diplcmao7 and diaillue1onment" save in rare cases 11ke his

re!~renc$8 to Loronzo. 31
H1s most solid and valuable contributions to Florentine life" like thOse
of Cosil!lO, resulted from h18 prudence in consulting his council.

Their type

of tyranny, was not oNel or rapacious rut instead ft17 mild. Since they

weN

desirous of increasing the cityts power, they performed llIUl7 good deeds and
few evil ones ao!!.rt tpose

!2. whtch neo~v !!sl1nduced them.

The

ear~

Yodiei wished to control the government with aa moh civ1ll t7 as they could. 32

Lorenzo

SM"Ved

an able mediator in
Italian

pr.tnc~.

not only Florenee but the entire peninsula. He acted as
the str1fe brought about by the ubI't1.olJ.8 and scheming

Florence was ftdi

~rl

in

SOUlB

gloria e rlputuione"

through hie eldlltul manipulation Of 61tuatlons 1":raught with potential danger

tor the mtire I tal1an seene. 33

30Ct• ibid., Chap. h. esp. p. 38.

3let. storla d'Italla, I, 2-3, S-7.

~'P' 25.
33norenee,. lofty position and l'"I:vputation stet!'lllOO, according to
GuiCCiardini'8 description, "per avera un govemo eel un capo eli grandissilna
autorlta, pt'I'.J" aftre f'ra~ anpliato 10 imperio, P" oosere stata in gran
parte cause della salut~ di Ferrara 0 poi del re Ferrando, per diapon"e d1
Innocenssio interamente er e8sare 0011 ta con Nit 11 e con ~,tUano ..
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C""Uieeiardini intisted that Lorenzo t s death _s a tttming point in the

Here was his hint ot tr:lGedy, ir.ev1table

hif)tory of Floremte and of ltal,y.
siMa it seemed to he in thi..ngs.

Heferring to the succession ot the lfiS8

Lorl"ntlO b'/ his inept son Pil!l"O, Guiec1ard1ni explained

that "vanna 10 stato

pM:" eredita e $pease volte d1 UT&O saviO' 'Vime 1n uno pasllO, aha poi da

ltult1mo tuffo alla

e1t~.3b

POli vtar and the crfNltion

't"Jh11e Lol'emlo's pce1t1on strengthened a1'ter the

or the COJl81lY=o ~ .a~.35

Medici power in the 01ttadini dello

atato

~ned

the :ibu.ndation ot

at'.lbstantiaJ.ly the same and

continued after 111$ death. 36 Fiero does not seem. to bave approoiated this
!'llly.

His aawhet' treatment of the leading o\t1mati
l'
.. and his 1nereasing reo0;

llanee on ~e1 clients'7 %fIl7 bave

$p1'\lDg

iNm a m1ataken belief that the

Iii

eeS0re quasi una 'bUancia di tutta ltaJ.1a," storle fiorenti:no# p. 73. Ct.
also the reasons tor l'l'lorence' s "pote'''1I1a
•.
e riputu10ne grandeft in 1516, "Del
JlX)do d1 ase1curare 10 stato ana. ca. de t Jledioi, "DiecondJ _P. 269. Ct.
1b14a, pp, 74-75, for Guico1.ard1ni t s account or
tl."'iendship vdth the
various Italian powers, the Pope, the Ttlrks and. the French. This laudatol7
passage should be c~ with one he w1"Ote five years later in JS13, "Elogi~
pp. 223-227.

LoreiiiO'.

3b~rle f1or~~?,:;:,J p. )6.
3~f) Conrl(lio ~li!'ttantaJ

€mtherilr.:<i 'bY' to!"f!lnf;O de 1dedioi in 1480 to
ticlrl;,en his: oontrol In 'Ftorence after the Pull1 1'Va1", ~Neded all maUng
oQ'Jneils. Fbr eff.lcit;iney, how~(:'r.t its n:cst essential poW()!"!'3 wp~ d(lolegated
to 'bYO per:rmanent CODI!d ttees, the
entJ"Usted VIi tb .t'breign and mil1 ta17
affair'S, and a group of twel.ve, \"1- e handled t.tnancial a."'ld ~rt.tla.l
matters, Sohevill, ~(d'l pp. 145-146, and F1orence, PP. 396-397.

yttr

36RubiMtetn, PP. lb9-1S0.

370t• Storie t1o~tine, pp_ 84-86. Cf. also "Del modo di aaaicurare 10
ltato," p. ~'m.
.
1i1"1
"
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Medici re:ai1l1e

'm3,S

sufficie.'1tly on the way to institutional permanency to allow

him to pay less attention to the feelings of his ottimati supporters.
popular rising against Piero in November

1494

a number of these leaders had deserted him.

\'mS

The

probably successful because

38

The rall of the Medici brought into the open many political and personal
feuds among both their adherents and their enemies which made civil

ival'

possible as soon as Italy lrould be freed from Charles VIII's army.

It was

at this juncture that Savonarola. intervened wi. th a plea tor a more radical
consti tutional reform.

Ui.s authority in Florence rAd been vastly en.l-Janced by

the apparent fulfillment of his prophecies regarding the coming of the French.
He .flattered. the F.Lorentines in their hopes that the French king would restore

Pisa to ther.l while all Tuscany would come into their possession.3 9 In his
sermons he predicted that the calamities ot t1ha Republic would be turned into
prosperi ty and the increase of dominion.

By

1496 he was denouncing terrible

judgments on the Court of Rome and the rest of the Italian powers.
His intervention in the internal poll tios of Florenoe, at its acme in
December

1494, was one of the principal faotors leading to the reforms which

transformed the foundations of the F.1orentine constitution by establishing a

~

Consiglio on the Venetian model with the exception of the Doge. 40

38
Rubinstein, pp.

149-150.

39storia d'Italia;,J I, 258. Guicciardini accented the diplomatic traditio
of long-standing which linked Florence and France as well as the importanoe ot
Florentine connnercial interests in that kingdom, storie tiorentine,l p. 121.
4<JRu,binstein, pp. 154-155, 151.

"I'

II
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Qu:i.cciardin1 stressed the bbiguities in the Oren Corudclio and in the elfICt-

oral reform. 1';'as the cc1.meil aristocratic or democratic, more in favor of the

-

ottimJ:.i or the E2P2lard?

'bUt

Tht~sc

chanees aetually led to a

b:Y" the end of 1495 once again ..

~orary

waning of ot;t1mati prestige,

cons:td~ble proportion of.

the hie-hest

orr-lees ..ront to t.he, $.;me fa:ml.l1ea that bad held thea under the Medici and

earlier.

41

In spite of

2~'!Mv

/'

aoquiascence in the new regime. Ouicc1ard1ni did

not look upon it with total approval.
th~

OOll'ImOn people

r.rom breeding

were not eut'!'1c1ently

P~r

eare bad been taken to prevent

disturbances, bu.t c1t1sens of. the first rank

d1stinguish~

&om the com:raoners.

Some of the most ig-

norant poople gave advice on vital matters while the S".lpreme magistracy,
which datar.m1ned matters of the utmost importancu!t was changed.

monthlT.

Gu.:tceiartlini pointed to the confusion thus bred in the government.

Adding to this chaotic state of affairs

the advaree party.42

Han:y of the

"some out of' simplicity,

'SOJlle Oll,t

was les8

~ortant

the great author! ty of

As otten happene in

Savonarola, whose listeners formed a party.
Chlicc1aftlini noted, the common good

_8

gove~,

regarded than the dq>ression of

cit1zeJlS looked to the mnk,

of ambition and others out of tear." lever-

hlcr. storie f1orent1ne, p. 137, where OuicciardW states that in 1508
or 1509, "ginmdo 18 elcsione dmgli utlei in poeM e str.tgnendoslL a un nwnero
eli dugento cittaD1ni 0 poch1 piu. n
42Stor1a dt1tali4, I, 283. note Guiociardini's perceptions " ... i per
q:n!"'cto css~dosi maniresta~ntl"' divisa la eitti, 1 'una parte eon 1 taltra ne' )'
eonsigl1 publici s1 urtava, non Ed curando gl1 uomini, come acoade nelle c1tta
divisi, eli 1mped1t'el 11 nGl'le comtU'le pel" sbattere la r:toll.tzzione docll llvv _ _!1

11S
thelooe "nIUl7 judicious persons" despised the preacher and his pred1ctional b3
~

power,a"l the impact of Savonarola on the internal and fbre1gn

polioy of Florence be1:.ween

lh94

and

1498,

Ouiccia!din1 felt that he . . onlJ

partlal.l7 responsible tor the varloua changes there.

He did not lfllCOeed 1n

altering substant1alll' the soc1al etlucture of F.I.o:Nnt1ne poll tics or in
solving i

te probleae through the reforms of the !!!!i! ~~. '.l'ho thorn ot

Florentine polit1., the poe1t1on of the ott1aat1 in the .tate, remained..
Ultimately what _ttered most. were the polltical t:red!tiona and ditf1ou.lti.
of a c:1ty wb1oh, as Ouiociardin1 said later,
WIQ1J_ 4L.

was

~

old and set in her

HeF troubles \lVOU.ld oont1me to be oaueed "le male cond1a1oni d1 qu

cittit nella quale era tat e1tte.din1. non p1ccola d1via1one cauaat.a dalla i!:)~:).:.:

tors del govemo. flhS
Ouiccian11n1 took into account 8a'VOMrOla t..:role.

the monk believed he . .

~ed

At the

"9'017

tim. that

in bis atterlpts to transform norene.

into a 'mJl.l,.oJ'dered political state on .. eolid spiritual tou.ll!at1on, he became the instrwntmt of her oonfl1cting torces_ Some of Gu1oe1ard1n1 '. admired ottfmatl, but especiall,. the e1t1__ who I8d belonged to P1ero's

w!.she4 tor a curtailment of the

govo~·8

or1.m1nal jurisdiction for the

avoidance of wboleeale measures against Ued1ceane.

h3~., pp.

ltato,

h6

.

I

The pl'Otectton accorded

~8-2$9.

Lhma;!eE. w.

81-82.

lCStorla d tlta~.

I, 283.

h6stori,e t.lo~. pp. 107-108.
"I I~

"

-
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to ?Jedici partisans by Francesco V2J.or.t

41

andPiero caPPOniu8 _s i..'1Buffie1ent

To prevent violence and disorder and to bring

for orderUnl\1!U in Flortmee.

ahOtlt "la pace uniwmale," Savonarola tried to lrldle exeesses by·illl'.'YWing
appea.ls to

too Signor.ta49 and took measures

fnlt this .,.. }:ave been hi.

-

Gral)

ftutdlim(~ntal

to eul'b ubi t10",. Ouiccl.ardini

ftotivation for the inst:tttlt:ton of the

Consiglio.SO In an objective anal.yeis, OuicoilU"dint foom it necessary

to adnt1t that these :m.easures alone

~ught

the salvation o-r Florc'..nce a."ld

benefitted both the varq'Jiahed and the new ~e.
FbI' Ouioo1ard1n1, the pcJj.t1oal problem ot Sa:vonarola became an i."ld:i:v1dual one, .. molSl one.

l¥as 110

a great prophet- or a great

Dm1 and

-s

h$ good

or bad?S1Ueadm1tted that too r€8l question _s savonarola's own lite.
bid some pride and ubition, bttt

&

lie

scrutiny of his life ind1eated not the

least vestige of avarice, l.mm.ry'or an;y other weakness or passion. Inete&d he
r

I

47PancefJOO Valor.1, ~ted ~tlN in 1491, was an eners~c
n1 atat.eeman devoted to Savonaro , §Chev111, !1eE!!!Q!. pp. IJ49-hSO.
h8p!el"O Capponi, a l'11El!lb0l' of one of' Florence's f&mil1ea, 1s noted .for b1s
obs'f:J..Mto displq of resistance to Charlee VIII when he entered Florance in

e

21a

1494, lbi,d, PP. h37-438.

4~ a law due to Savonarolan initiative, an those who wore polit1call1'
condEl7lled acquired the right to appeal to the Sig,nol'ia. whioh could render a
def1.n1t1ve arrest onl7 after the p&8aage of .fc;eai:YlS &om the 1n1t1al
judgment. '!'his gave popular passtona time to oala them&dvee and ultimately
!'awlted. in the aafet7 of mat of the aceuaed, Oeftr07, ttUn polltiqu,e
1tall. en, ft P.

969, n. 1.

508tor1~ ftonmtuu'.t_

~t,

pp. l5-l6.

P.

359.

led a truly religious life,

~ln of

!lnva"

80

much religion Md

decrc. .ed

80

signi.tlcantly

.,.8

elVirity" pray-or a'ld

in F.lorenoe as during his lifetime.

vil:>t"110

aft.t.~

177
()b8€'J."\lUnCe.~2 Th(~:re
It

his des.th that it became evident that "the

good of hi. time bad been Cl':'?sted and Sl.letainoo onl;r by' him. "S3 He axplained

that. it was not
since

,'rort1

~.t

00

O'llt

of place to

6p~k

at length

"'as ct\mp&ftlt1valy rare in his

~e

or hie

19nondn1m.lS death"

to see a re1ig1.ollf' in

,~

there

nm:r virtues and so llIlch authorlty.Sh

In spite of the mnk's trial, excoJl'l'm.Uli.cat,ion and death,
cease to bel1ov(! that he had bean ee1'l.t by Oed.

whf:·thal" to

bol1e~

thia himael..f at the time he

but he felt certain that t1a:1 'WOUld clear

~

did not

Gtdcciardini did not know
lfl"Otc

too doubt.

b1s

~:tor.t,ft

tlorent1ne,

'r~o:«irlly

he concluded

tr.at Sa'vtmarola b£cl been ainceN, a tp'0&t p;ropik¥t and • ve.t.7 peat man.
~

Byen

i t proven t}at he had bean a "d!.~ knaV$," the Wepondenee or h1s

spi:rit and hie capabillt7

tor deoai'f'1rJc so

1Atn:y

persona tor so mIllV

~

alone would load one to adm.1.t that he bad poseessed brteUigG..11Ce, genius and
an
..

,

~rdintU'7 proi\mdiV.$
til

•

S'2Qu1cciard1n1'$ l.anauage i8 metapbor1eal.l7 clewrl •••• l1OIl nelle
cort.ecoie . . nal1a trtedolla del culto d:1'Wino,. 1b1d.. P. 151.

S)Ib14-, pp. 156-158.

~001.rd1n1 t 8 deep ~t1on for S8YOM.1"Ola can bast be gleaned :&om
• ~le of h1a deecdptive langu.a.gel .....neUA etA nost:ra, ne &nOlle • t nostr1
padr1 ed avolt non v.1ddono a i UDO "11«1" s1 bene 1zlatl'utto d1 molt. virtU
ne con tanto credito ed autorita quanto At 1n ln1,," stol'1e f1~e, p_ 156.
SSNote Guicoi6\rd1n1 '.
opinicne ri80luta in parte
oh.tariftl el. tutto. !til bene
't'edu.~ Of tempt nostJ-! uno

ane 1ette!:l

00_ ...

r>ercbe, oltre

tell1ng statement •. ·10 ne 8OnO\ dubio e non 01 be
alcuua, .., m1 r.i.8et"VO, ae vivsl'O tanto, al tempo ebe
oonohiuggo questo, ohlt 8e lui tu buono, abb1ano

tanta
euere
• "eea1 uno giud1110, uno

gnmde profeta, .e ltl aatUft, uno uomo ~aa1I'1o,
Iile aeppe &d mlare at publ.1cament.e tant1 amd. ura
acoperto in UDI. talaita, b1sopa contea$l.1'e o•

1naecno

eel

U1'»l

inver.uI1one

pro~, It

11;lsJ,.
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IRs estimate of savonarola in the storia d tltalia of some

~Ars l~ter

18

more coldly faotual and, 1n tact, al.nx>et non-eldstmt. Though he vtl"Ote that
ffnivine authority was made to appea.r in the counsels of menn in the muth of
I'

this monk, ha spoke mainly of his troubles with the Pope.

He did not consider

Mrs his tdgnifioant oontributions to the 1ntemal peace of Florenco or to

the :re:fom

or men t 8

1':'1

manner of 11ving. Though savonarola died 'With constancy,

one mst remain unable to promume on 1118 innocence or hie guilt. 56 The

affect that the

exp~.r1enoas

of Guicc1ard1n1'. active

is apparent in hie poJ"'tra1t of the monk.
be

By

the

~

"t;1!;}t!)

bad on his judgmimt

he lIl'Ote his major 'WOl'k,

vas . .re that Cf!B!OCento ltalJr called for more tbIIm the idealism ot a

Savonarola.
A realistic political th1.nkor l.ike Ouiceial'din1 found it wluahle to

compare recent perl.ods of penintlUlar b1story. In the time of the mnfaloniere
Scder!.n1, whoso republio succeeded the Savonarolan

~e,

be expla1ned that

I

I

the city of

FloNnC0

sa moh more stable than it was 1n 1527 and tbat the

affairs of :rta~ 1:00 were more settled and secure.

ot Soder1ni

To hia laudatory Qst-i.."'l&te

and hie vlrtuou.e cba:re.cw..net.1.ca, he added the note tllat under

him none fMnxi the govnrnm.ent of the republic.;7

Yet Ouico1ard1n1 _s not tNly imprassed w1 th Soderln1.

01 tisen of good
'P~ce,

~ 1tho

would probably have done very well in

but be was baaically of

mod~te

a good

t1m~

ot

Prior to his appointment, there

nas a weU-recogn1aed need tor governmental reform.

S~:r1a d'Italta, I, 298.
57HOratio annn
JD ft tm.. 227~~..
...,

was

calibre. Ouiceiardin1 expressed the

cencral judgment of the ott1mati on Soderini.

Ao.

Fie

'0 come to

grips with the

119
inDed1ate probl(tD, it scOOlOd oost palatahle to all groups to elect a
·~mo

,G2Pfillonifi!'l!!, for life,

would asaut'lO the laadorsbip in a long-l'tlnge plan

fer reorgmuling and perf'ooting the government.

As a cc.q>romis(!l bottveen the

desll'OO of the ott1mat1 and the populace, the Oran Consiglio, wru;re the elec-

tion was held, chose a

Il8n

who bad lWEIt courted their favOl".

had never refused a cODll.i.aeion

01"

an EII1lba8ay, he -s toought

Since Soder.ln1

to

be a strong

SlPporter o~ the popular state. Gu1ce1ardin1 explained that tho people,
1litnt:~ng

hie "ervie_ utilized mre than anyone 9l.so'. and not ooneideri.ng

that the reason . . that his equals avoided office, thought he wst be more
ablo than the otherrs. sa
GuieC"....ardini admi ttod that Soderl.n1's republic
Sen$('!

~

provod in one

beneficial tor norenee, it not pleasing to the ott1,s1:S;- The populace

dur1.ng this time and the Savonarol.an period preceding

or pormhr 11ving.1t The

Q¥t~ Co~p

it "tasted the

sweetn~

had become vcr.y 1n{>o:t"tA'1t to thlml as

an area all.cming their active pe.rtic1paUon in polities and public administ.m-

tion.>9 By lS'l2 the citilene of nONnCe

catilEI

to feel their equality and de-

I!
"

I

sil:"f~

ftmoro than ev'm.',n

a conti.."l'Uation of tbc".d.l* free and popular

gove~nt.

It was difficult for them to adjust to an;r stlparior, let alone the ra1nstated
VOOic1, "so greatly and enUrP.J.y of absolute will and lord of' ev~h1ng.60

F.I.orcnce otmt1nuoo. to be beset, however, by bel' usual curse. In 1511,

$SStot1~

ficrmtine, p.

~.

~9nOO govemo d1 Flrensc dope la res1:.atlta1otle de' l:ed1oi ncl. 1512, ff

~seorei. PP. 2$-266.

60:r01~., pp. 261-262.

approaching the end 01' Soderin1 's
grer:lp$

~

over the

I

r~g1loo,

the C1ea1'tleOS amng !'lorr"ntine

01.' their 01 ty deepened.

Ono group streeaod t.he

need for a powerf"ul execlltive and anotl'lor, the importance of a strong popular

council. Ouiooiardin1 maintained that not onl.y was the
acting his part" but alao there

no

~rdained

stituUon ot •

was,

Il8

the

mrJ}alo?1;t~!!N

ott~t?- bad long been

"not

suggesting,

senatorial body. This ..s . requil!d.te fOr the right in-

~lblic.

The most able c1tisens would be promoted to nm-e

hono:reble positions wi thin the conmcnweelth. and 'both

~

liOtlld be served

by this COli:Prom1se.61.

The .t&ct1on that professed cml.y' the desire tor a
tfmtely satis.t1ed.

62

The Medici weN to tmJO)" their

so."l8 living inoonformtty'ldtb the magistracy_ 63

~.edici

rotum

~

was ul-

as private per-

Holy- Leagae affairs played

into the hands of the Medici proponents, and the Congress at Mantua in August

of 1512 dec1did that such a reetoratton would be conducive to tho allied
success against the
Soder.1ni, who

Jr~.nch.

J."ofmr 'WOUld be taken out ot the bands of

was entirel1' ~ent on
lib

those ot the oonfede:retee.

the K1ng of lihmce, and placed in

'I'l1o'ueh the F.1.orentinee did not vdeh to depose

Soder1rd. they were fbreed to take the Ued1c1 back and to join the

ant1-~i'tmch

league.6S Once Soder1111 bad been deposed, this as;reement _s easily obtained.

61stol"ia d'Ita~, Ill, 125.

6'~" 224,
62lbid.

6hlbid.,
65Ct•

228.

221.

ibid... 231-23.5.
"II,

,',
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This" supposedly' in the security of all ltal.y.

In the ensu1:ng ref'orm ot' the

gt'.)Te~,

the nmr

elecW by the Grall Oo!,¥,iS!!o not 1br life 'but for a
tor foUrteen months. Jacopo Ouicei&rd1ni

1nf'~

~n1,eJ:!

t~

and to hold otfice

his son of these changes

in Florence.66 Glavan Battista Rtdoltl, :related to the ldedic1,
,opraloR1~.

Jacopo ciaracteriaed him, aceonH.ng to t.l'w

santimmt at the beg1m1ng of
civic mind."

At the

etate of flus.

~

Sept~

of Me

~rt

c.l-tosen

&8

had "a good and

Francesco, things

fho-J.gb the future of' the city

l'88

g~Uy ~1l1ng

lSl2, as a man who
to

was to be

WrG

app~ ob~.

still 1n a

it . . IInot

without some ray or hope lor the popular l"ElPublic...67
A e1gn:1n.oant mmber rallied to the Medici f07 selt-:tnteroet but then

took courage and retilm$d to at least maasured action in
the republic.

!boT observed the oontinu1ng existence of the

little change 1n the form ot the governmtmt, thottgh it
mov~ 8 "

:f'a'f'Or

'W1derwa:r to create a

e~lon1ere

tor

a

was

of pre8erving

eonei~

1"~rted

and

that a

tbr>ElG-yea1" period w1 th

66
'fe17 llmlted authorit7.
66Ouioc1&rdin1 bad conplained of' his lack of !llm1Uianty with Florentine
events since hi. Spanisb 1"osidenea. "~, poi che 10 pa~ d1 ~rmseL;:se
e imo_tosi ~ tatto el mondo, talmente c~ 10 non m1 potova ab'ba.t " .. a
esa~ 1\1or.t in t.eqpo cbe 10 avess1 a aTet" pitt wglla d1 sap~re delle coee d1
costa.... ft He pointad to the little concern or the meiatratee and hie own
Mends in commnrdcating with h1m. " ... 8e non .fUsaino gll am.ai ito avuti ... da
quoott nost:r1 morcantl, a cbi 110 a andare dr1eto per _~re delle move d1
J\~e, ne eap:Nd meno ahc d1 queUe della IndiA, ft Lctt;;;r to hie brother
luigi,

97.

JtlJlC

27..Jul7 1,

l5l3,

~,I,

188-189.

61Lctter of Jaoopo to Fi'anc0SCO 0u1cc1ard.1n1, September ~, lSl2, t~4.,

--

~d

"

"I"
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Only at the beginning of their restora.tion did the Medici allow repub-

lican vestiges of government to operate.

Nor did Ridolfi persevere in the

f'lrmneaa and rigor that had characterized his policy at the very beginning ot
69
his term.
In mid-September all popular F.l.orentine liberties were abolished.
Not only did the :Medici dissolve Florence's military organization but also
the

~

ConsiSlio.

Soderini was banished.

Ridolfi reportedly desired to

"stay no more than two mnths," but he was forced to resign.

/

The cou2 dtetat

was quick but fart-rea.ching in its etfects, for Florp.llee reverted to the strong
control of the earlier Medici rulers.

A.ffairs were ultimately managed by the

Cardinal de t Medici. 70
/

The enemies of the new regime loomed powerful.ly" for they realized that
they would now have nothing to say.

Between

1494

and

1512,

,ll
I'I

a segment had be-

come implacable opponents of the Medici who awaited the ~rtun1 ty to do all
they could against their state.

others in Florence were natural enemies who

felt their lack ot any participation in the state and teared that, not of the
Medici circle, they would miss out on the honors that would be distributed. 71
This discontent was concentrated in

!2. universale

of the City, but the roomed

classes and the merchants too feared that they 'WOUld be subject to heavy tax·1,.

:,,1

ation and dictation in their business affairs. 72
Under Giuliano de' Medici, :ftunil;y policies crystallized in practical

69Jacopo Nardi, Istaria della cit~

7Oct. Ridolfi, Machiavelli, p. 130.
71
"Del governo di Firenze," p. 263.

-

72Ibid., pp. 263-261c..

.9! Firenze

(firenze, 1858), II, 2-6.

i
I
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action.

I

At bis death in l514, he was succeeded by Lorenzo, the Duke of

Urbino, in power at the time of Guiooiardini's return from Spain.

His obSel"-

vations on the Medioi tyrant are interesting, both for the light whioh they
east on the character of Medioi rule and for that vlhich helps to illuminate
him.
1':nen Guicoiardini €'ntered the city, he was reoeived by Iorenzo, whom he
had never seen, with great honor and denr>nstrations of oonf'1denoe.

Ouiooiardini explained with satisfaction that this aotion, together with later
favors, indioated his entrance into the intimi.

Ria later imaginary critic

pointed to these favors as evidence that Lorenzo found in Guicciard1n1 "a
friend useful to the tyranny."
for his greatness.

Every tyrant looks to that whioh is desirable

Perhaps Ouiooiardini fS ontic was correct in his judgment.

He knew that bis association with Loren&o would give him. riputazione.

But

Franoesco explained. that he gravitated into the MOOici cirele so a.s "not to
'I'

lack a way of being employed. n 73

i

I'

:,1

At this point in Guicciardini' s career, he seems already to have enoountered his major personal diler.llla.
based upon devotion

Should one's political affiliation be

to fundamental political prinoiples and beJ.iefs or should

he aot opportunistically to secure riputazione?

His fmoou2t "~~g<?~~

5!!

Logrono," Which considers a plan of political reform to effect. in the city a
government bene ordinato, 'WOUld suggest the tint alternative.

74

--..
73nOrat1o aoeusatoria," pp. 216-217) in this work, Oliociardini invented
an aocuser who found fault v.'1th the aotions of his oa.reer. Cf. also
"Rioordanze, n p. 7$.

,!I'I"
:11:11 !II'I,'
I~I" ,,

I ' ,I

Ii!: II'

1,lll~ II:

74.rhis work is also anti tled "Del roodo di ordinare 11 governo popolare,"
Disoorsi, pp. 218-2$9. It _ 8 begun during Guiociardini fS residence in Spain.

r
The ?Oli tical tha.Jght
falmdation.

or Guioeiardini

rested on ;. sound

cxp'~rimt1al

\

";' grande errore parlare delle cose del r.nondo, indistint.aull.<mte
\

ad asoolut.amente, e per dire cos1, per regola," are his strong and significant

1fOr&s.1S & likEm'18e wrote that political science 18 leaml'lld not "in su. lib
da' t.llc8ofl, -

imrAlrare.

con

]a

~2er:J.anJ!:. e con l.! uiani, ehe •

U nedo Yero dello

,,76

Ouicoiardini then did not stress abstract notions regarding the natu:r-e
and origin of the state but always comddercd a concrete and actual fom of

govornment.

il
1'1'
I'

He affirmed that aU raonarchies bad a ciolent. origin,77 but

:neutralised. hie position by the statement that Re t1loscfi voellono, ct 1&
raglone natura.le 10 eonte.rma, ahe!l wro"D19
rqigl1or,g

Sl tutti.-

~

HJ'lO

~

.!
" ouonojl S!.

The "good government" of which Ouicc1ard1ni spoke was

that which operated for the welfare of the govo!ned and not for the honor or
utili t,. of the govemor. 78

'l'h$

p1"'1Doe was not ftpadt'one me esattore e d1epen-

satore a benef"lc1o d1 molt!. ft 79 No person 'WOilld havo placed h1.m8elf in a
cond1tion of seJiVitude 1dthOut reason, as would neoeasarily have been the case

7SR:t~rd1J

II,

6.

7601 ted. in Palmal"OOOhi, p. 9.
11R1cord1• I, $S, II, 48. cr. also ~ P. 1631 " ...butt!

ahe bene CO'iiildel'B 14 101"0 Orl~!, sono

oen,

gll &tau,
e &&Ua republ1che in

fuora, nella lore patri.a e non
oltre, non 01 e potesta alcuna che 8~
legitti_, e meno queUa dello 1mpi:1ratore che e in tsnta autorlta che dA
ragionc agli altriJ
da qttfl'..sta l"'egOla ecc@ttuo e pret1, la Viole-mia de'
qual1 e dopp!a, percM a tenerc1 $Otto U80nQ le anne sp1r1.tuale 0 10 temporall

ne"

7~, P. hI.

_.

79n,id

Pmpbas1s added.

I'

if the princely ofrioe had been founded silllPly for the glory of its
80
OCO(Jpant.
Quice1a:d1n! 's concept of' tho violent origin of monarohics
conpatihle with hla view on the rightful rol.o of a prince.

/

not in-

lior is his praise

for a rulf!r who p!lnJUes m6asures for the general. welfaN of' his

to his preference for a republican r9g1me and the fie!!l"nO

'1IS..S

p('~le

opposed

1!I£t9.

In spite of the violent origin of monarchies, there could be legitimate
onoe.

~en a U8Ul"P1ng monarcb was boun:i to

obsc:r'V'o the l"!11c8 of justice. 01

Ouioeiardini 'a objective criterion for k:naw1ng which
bad

stf~lIled

.f'rom

gO'l7C:rnfMnts

were good or

their orrecta. O:rd1.narlly, a violentlY e'dl eovEll"l'J.!OOnt oould

only act w.l.ckedl;y.82 Nor could a goTomment be considered good if it justi-

fioo a war ot ambition to increase ita dominion. K1ll.1nes, rapes, burnings
and other 1nt'1n1.te evils were all aspects ot war. On the other hand, it
8.3
could justJ.:r have such a war in defense of its lands.
i •

BOoutcc1ardbli "TOte that princes did not originate "per raro beneficio
a 1oro, Pm"CbG nessuno at eara'hbe f:lOSSO in semtU gmtis," !!t.OO,rdi, I, 92.
Blou1cc1al'd1n1 concluded "ehe so f't1881 po"1bi~ dare uno governo
usurpato eOO 81 tenesoi con quel11 JlJ)d1 p1aoevol1 e buord cbe ai PU6 tenere
uno govemo amoravolc, ehe quetrta sola ragione d1 eesere usurpato non 10
farebbe peggiore ehe quell' altro," ~. P. lh.
82"10 credo ebe Ii oognoseere quale spezie d1 governo 81& pin buena 0 llIIIlnco buona, non si consider!. in sustanzia altro ohe gli eff"ott:t, echo uno
govemo viol.ento soglia essere gludicato catt1vo, perche onttna.r1amonte suole
producere ~ftetti cattiv1," ibid. Ct. also "del modo di USria'.l!'Sro lo stato,"
P. 281, whm-n Qu.1cciardinl oauilons the lkdici to exeroie~ a good :rul.e, for
v;ieknd go'Vammente cannot dre&m of br.!.ng:tng forth good effects.

83n,i!l-$0, PP.

162-163.

nt11~

and la_ have but 01'10 purpose, the

TbA gems of the empirical division

betwe~Xl

gen~1'1U

praotioal life and the religio-

zaoral spbere are eYidmt in Ouiceiardini *8 thought.

organism of the state and its
asStlrfJ aU c:ttitsene the

~e

good of tho c1t1zenr:r.

'!'be end of the collective

mlson df~re was conceived of s1mpl3' as to

Vf!ry

exercise of their civ.tl r.tghts and to work for

the oommon good. 1','1se legislatom consider reward fbr good action as a

stirlllus end punisbmfmt fb1" bad action 88 a brldl..0 tor any S',loh f\Jture acta, 8h
and laws are made only ftper rlmova:re la forM" or to cu.rb individual ego1em.8S
Ou1cciardin1 fS

~bas1s on the

qualitiefJ necessary for a prince,86 on the

ideal cit1.en~7 and on l1bert;y°8 in one sense linked themselves 1!d. th the 1mmtablc doctP.ln08 of Ch:ristian lOOral1 ty and in another 14th the pelitiCG-ClOral

climate ot Renaissance lta17.

ms

rule corrt""spontiod greatly to the
o:rt~n

worda on the violent origins ot one-nan

~enturies

old situation in Italy, the

usurped s1gnol"1e, suworted in power by the ps.n;dp,tt!eJi. Uts apparE".M

justification of usurpat10n if the wmrper renders just1ce to those in his

charge would seem: to indicate that Guicciard1n1, in one respect, tlttOO into

the prevalmt

....

a~here

.
a~cord;t" I,
8S"Se

ot his period in recognising the

I:

alla buone 10ggo eon 18 forM non
PJallt1#. p. 229.

818 lee1 to oonduJ'T'O 01 populo

R1cordi, I, 92.

81C:t. 1n1"M" P.

asCf• in~,1

while,

3.

potendo tand alt~mt1," sc,rl:t~

86ct.

r.tta!i9! !po,

p.

I

I,

I
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in anotbnr, he stood above it by refu81ng to give .Y' in absoluto principles
of right action.
, I

Guice1ardini Ml.d that all ideal vimns are rell.rti'¥e in vi<M' of the

9llS. or

~allty.

sta~

i

Although he preforred a republican form of COVel'T.lmOnt, he did

not 800m one-man rule 1n the proper

sittlation.

Like Montesqu1m" he felt

that the mode of gove1"'nl!'lent met val"!! aeoo't'ding to the gmrGmoo.

n 11

/

8Q

migliore govemo ebe B1 po. . mettere in una c1tta sia el suo natuna.le." ,;

I'

For F.loretlCe, "el suo nature.lo" consisted. in the crtab111zation of th.1.-ee
pillars of F.lorent1ne

go~t,

the Gran CPl!F:aAAo. a

~n1fi£q

I,

tor a

lengthy or lite term, and an IlSS.,:q of wise cd tiaens tor grave lX1blic

deliberations, which would consider the needs of both the conservative

ertied group and the

pr0p-

popol.l.no. 90

From ita "Vf:!fl.7' orig1ne to Ouiceiardin1's own period, the 11o:rentine
stitut1on, thougb adaptocS to popular

same. There

'dIU

CM.."lgeEl,

COJ)lo

tad rEmained substantially the

an executive, whether consul, prior or Enfaloniore.... and a

senate and parl.iallmta17

bodT. 91 Guicciardini considered the 4evel.opmant

and

application of the principles both of Uberty and of state tmtborityand also
roceived some stimlating ideas :rrom the V~net1an oonstitution. 92 The sig-

89ntaloE'

P.

18.

90nIl (JOVa1"l'1O popolarc, tt P. 228.
eacb "pillar» in detail.

In the discourse, Ouiocia~.ni dis-

C'J.SSOO

9lAmedeo CriveU.uco1, Del ~rno~OOlare di F1~.me (lhjh-~) e del

duo r1ord1namM~.. secondo

!1 ~t:eCli

~ ~A:_;1.arl), p.

30.

--

92

Ib1d.,p.312.
',I"
"i

: I

1

I

i
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rdf10ant increase of senatorial

pow~r

in his new

plan~

did. not appear to have

altered his basic concept of the e~r.no m1sto. 93
Ouieciardini indicated hie balle! in the wisdom of t-he

follovmd u-p to the t1r4~ of his

lof'..rono discourse. namely,

gons1S110 of' all who had not participated in the
Savonarola's

r(~ro1'WJ.

cours(~

alNady

the removal from the

gov~t

prior to

Tbe..'1 it would not include so man,. ordiMr"J' oitizens.

Although a part of the cou.!JCil oome to include "alcun1 paaai, molti ignoranti

emit! mligni," the exteM10n
Onieoiardini.

or the

~"hony displ!~ing

to

It was in tact this very situation tInt kept Flormoe tree

from 00l.ing under the heel of a
ULe

eutf.rage was not

cons~tive

~t. 9b

bent together'lrdth 111s strong Gmpha$is on Uberty led

Oulooiard1ni to adweate a t)tpe of modm'Gte traditional

political and social atl¥>J1gth of' the VU'1ou8

~el"8

of

d~J'.

too lta.l1e

The

bod;r, for

I

! ,

all tMir separateness,

foreign pc:mer.

He

was essootial. to prevent their subjugation byarw

ws pa.rticu.14rly

concem~

over the tate of his

I!!trJ.fl.

He

linked the fate of Florence ill g'!"eQt measure to the presence of t'bre1gn
I

• t

..

,

r

p q

I

93A echolarly dispute has developed around the actual meaning of the
proposoo reform. Crivelluoe! naintains that the increase of senatorial povmr
was insufficient to change the f:!!$sential nature or the popular government and
to convArl. it into a plain oligarchy or an aristocracy. Ratlvlr, Cuiceiardird
'WaS concerned with "cheold.ng and bal.anc1ng" the autmr'i ty of f&oh rn~ of
the republic and, thereforto), w.tth ~J.arantoei.ng llbertyand strengthening the
popular regime, pp. 209" 323. In opposition to W$ T.Lew, tht.t Guieeiardini's
plan

was

s1mp~

a return to the

~

mm or antiquity is th1lt mteh ~

plains that Ouiee1ardim, by eoneentraUng so Bleh power in the sem~, was
t'.stabl1ahing only all "aristocratic tyra-wy, ff BmoS-st, pp. 1.t)S-156.

9U.. I1

govemopopohre," pp. 228-..."'29.

I

I

'I!I
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cause for desperation. tor li1orentintl! ills could 'be cured. In l5l2 the task
soMned difficult to C';uieeiard1n1 but not impoasible. 9S

The

of his project of refom which we1"& not strictly political

UMS

srn:'J!1ed rather u.topian.
n01"(fl1CC

They evidenced noetalg:1c longing tor a reblm

wltLch had existed under the ftrst Coeimo det M«tioi.

need for restoring the old

~

abandonment 'Of the prevalent

and customs.

ltl%tl!'3'

Thero

to the

was

a

l!oderation in dress and the

in Florence

llOUld ~

the ObV1ous

difference between rich and poor and the lesser c1t1lenG 'm'JUld not bUlger for
wealth.

rior would the 01ty bocoJOO impovcrtebed by the emdus of TlDnE'W in

payment tor ao ma:n.y imports. The dcwr.Y should be reduced to

~ble SUlIIlI

for the maintenance of.' equality among parente and for the bene-tit of the

virtuous

~t

POOl" men tor wh>m i t . . necessary to marry oft their daugh-

ters. 96 Lack 'Of thrlN.nea and the 6'I1statlCG of soc1a1 and eoonomlc
ages affected the vsl'7 boalth of tho Plorentine oo1l'.lllOrmealth.
~haais

on the rightful reoroer.tne of th& city's

~

FOr all their

~, t.ho

majorlty of

Ou:ieeiardini •s D1acond aro actual socio-polltical treatises.
I

In spite of the

~ct

intemal div18iona 1%'1 Florence, he explained,

she bas long stood in JJ..berty lime!' fa popular gove~ with the Y2eri'Wl} and
ft,

U

1

~Ou1ce1ard1ni wrote. "Questa l'8gione m1 famo malo sperare di noi, _
non deepe!"aJie, p.!rche 10 cred~ coo Be De pot-ssm sanare una gran parte e
ahe ee bane la eura e ttolto d1ft101le, non s1a pere U:poae1blB," l~d.., p. 219.

~d. ct. also "Del mdo di au1curare 10 stato,·t p. 281, ,~re
C'ft.lioc1a n1 E",xpla1n$ that, in the matter of men·s and women's draas, the city
ms "so weh run above i te f'oroes t..,..t thia could o.nl.y have a 'Very bad
effect in ~bl1c and in prlwte," p. 281.

I

i

-
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leadorship of tuscany.

n:i..fica.nt

~.rtat1on.

supremacy

In the affairs of Italy, she alvmys has had a sig-

In add:\. tion to favorable

g~bical

/

Yl&S

due to the virtu of the citizens thoo.lse1ves.

poei tion, this

Florentine mm

al-ys worked 1ndustnoualy and, by thrtft, achieved a good condition of life.

not all the

_

ra~ble

aspects of Florentine lite could 'be attr1.but:x\ to $1mple

97

fOn>une.

To mep the F.lorentine 01 tizenl7 content, it wae

necee8a~J

to hoed three

sProifie though lnte1"'rcl.atc-l(i aroas of civil Ufe, namely,fiscal politics,

justice in the civU order, and freedom .t':rom the
and lese powerfhl cituens by too

D}.sc9l!l1 also

$0110

g~t('>....r

and

opp~sion

IOON poWP3M.

of the weaker

Hie various

these tMmee in the inte!'f!sts of a solidly-baeed conmtOn-

Wt'?&ltb.
~;bn~

is f\mdamental .for a cOO1tUne 'a interest. In order to

rS..putA'&.d.one ~r

tu:tta ltalla," strict attention mat be paid to

/

ha'V"e

money

"piu

matters.

"''here it 18 laoldng, expenses mat be met b.Y ta:l:ation of the citizens. Men
mst be made to understand

clear~

not be atructed by t&at1on.

In

c~:nal

tlvlt they OWl do business and reap gain yet

l-Toi"1 ts met be distributed usefUlly and well.

cases there could 00

~t.er

la.rshes¥t but, in civil cas_,

justice should be firm and st.rict. with sGCUrity for Wt!l"':I POftJOn. Througb
favors and do£erence to wealth, e1vil matteftJ should not. be dra'Ml fr'om ordinary tribunals into extraord:i.nal'7 ones like the Signoria.

tho

/

pod.~

and the

COtlrt, should be

~ntant1!-", wE~re

~-ed

C~ums

pt;rt'1d1ng

ooi'bre

the prl.nc1pal judg<2tB of too city hold

to run tru"ir 00l.u:'8e.

,I

II
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state tlfeed on something," they will not be its partisans or \7arnl to its
benefioio. 98 But gra.t't oould only make enanies not only of those vmc stood
oppressed but also of those who witnessed suoh serious dishonesty. 99
Guicciardini's treatises on the su1'frage and t-aDtion give the views of
the conservative group and of the P.2P2lani.

In both, Guicciardini utilized

his cautious method 01' balance between thesis and antithesis, namely, the
moderate-conservativa thesis and the eloquent RgpOlano anti thesis.

This

peculiar treatment gave evidence of the ferment long brewing in the city.

Re-

garding the method 01' electing officials 1'or the Gran Consiglio, the thesis
advocated no enlargement of partiCipation in the council.

Each citizen was to

stand equally- under the laws with no distinction between rich and poor, beVNeen the powertul and the less powerful.

El.oh was to have the assurance

that his person and his property would be secure under the laws and ordinances
100
of the city-.
This moderate conservative notion of liberty did not satisfy the
popolani.

This group held that law8 for the defense of property would per-

petuate economic inequality-.

They also suspected the conservative argument

I,

that liberty, besides providing equality under the laws, wt>uld guarantee public goods and honors to all.

In such a syst_, each person would partiCipate

98'1'he saying is "se e t cittadini delle state non si pascono di qualche
0000, non saranno partlgiani e caldi a bene.ficio del10 S~'lto •••• ff "Del modo
di assiourare 10 stato," p. 279.

99Ibid., pp. 276-279, 281.
l00UDel. modo di eleggere gli u1':f1ci nel Consiglio grande, n Diseorsi, pp.

175-176.

!,i
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as 1.71Uoh as possible and reap as much as he could frultihlly handle.

-

~clano
t~.sion

The

spoaker fms suspiciOUS of 'hhe conservative qualifioation that e»-

of the right of partiCipation in oolll!lU'l4l attain should not bring

disorder or any harm to the public good.lOl

According to the

.P!m2~n.i., sup~r.tor1t,.

or the dominant class

'l"lnS

not

/

founded "in anlle virtu, in sn t meriti, in Bulla pJUdanzla, me. in cose eli

fOrtuna. d1 favor! e di guadagni IUdti. ,,102 '!'heae 01tis ens Rnted t.ruly'
f.'ree laws making them equal to the great.

The grouP's

~

11'1

Gllieeiardinits discourse cergatietall;r concluded with a threat to the powerful'
ltg

sa da wi

m.ad~

rlf1utate el cOl'l1llOdo

wstro,

~rete

aansa

tutti quasti beni, ~te .em, veramMte dapoch1, ad alla tino
cognoseerete cbe oostoro 'Vi banno date ad Intendere di. avel"'Vi se1"i tto
per compe.gn1 in su' llbri d1 questa bott0ga, ma che in f'atto eiate
garzord, e OM al ealda~de' conti a vol ~/la fatica, e 101'0
saranno tutti gl1 utili.1G)

Florentine history could not be undorstood -without aout.e Observutlon of

its subatl"8tum or clase struggle. The evil effects of the social division
'Would hinder any atter!pts to stab1llse the government.

In economic mttere.

a sorcpoint betw'eM the conservatives and the R2D9l.an1 consisted in the
doe:tma sc.alata. lOh

ll&re Ouicciardini made clear the popular vieT! i.n bitS the-

sis and that of the rigid conservatives in bis antithesis though thtdr posi-

10Lrnese arguments are given in dataU in !..~a., pp. 11(3.16$, and are refhtfd in "Del l1'lOdo d1

elagg~re

gli uffioil in contrarlo," ibid., pp. 186-19$.

lO2Ib1¢•• p. 191

l03Ibid., p. 19S.

1~8 1'I&S the progress!va tax levied at the time of' the l~ ":art
"La. decima scalata," P. 196.

193
ti<m

l'mS

elcakoo in a democratic guise.

'The popolani argued that the decima

council"

'WaS

soala~,

which had not yet paseod the

just and that a lim! tation of valuable property would 'be of

grf:'!l!lt monetary benef1t

to tho City. Besides, those who lived by the retum

of' their great poss.slone were usoless and pem:1cious to the general 1'1Gl.fare

of the 01ty.10!) l!erchants alone the speaker excepted,
and industrious members of F.!.orontine society.

quiot and the world to be at peace.

ror thase were

dUigent

They desired thoir city to be

They made palaces, CWrcMs, fabrics and

all things to give honor to the of ty, and they lent lDOniV' to the oonmma.
'2h11e they had ties with the -whole world," they remembered to give to the

Florentine poor. Ttl. taught the sons of the popolani, to 'WOrk in the shops

01"

other establlshments and, in ganem, demonstrated their usef\ll.ness to the
public and private good

or P1orence.106

The ooneervative spokesmn observed that the type of equallty prevalent
in Florence ftS founded on true liberty which did not mean licence.

He ....

plained that CfOd o:reated diverse eNdes ot men and things tor the na1ntenance

of universal health.l.07 No citizen oould oppress another for all were equal

lOSIbid., PP. 196-2Oh. Note Ouiccial"d1n1 's words as expressed l>J' the
~w.'eadera ..... t~rreUl abe·1& oi tta non ba e'
ed Of
pem1S1oa1 cittad1n1, ebe qt1f:1t..st1 che v1vono in aulle entrete grosse delle
posse$81one. ... Costom sono co:nuttorl diUe Citta.... " i~d., P. 201

pin

l.06;bid., w.

pin

I,

20h-206.

lO7t~te OU1cc1ardin1 'e important worde' nPa~ b1aogM ahe in uno v.tv~re
l1hero s1a amata e .favorite 14 equalita moderatamente, e non quolla aha levi
Via at gradi e 10 dist1nsione dc' c1ttadin1, percha'Die ha fatto in tutto el.
l'Ir;)ndo divend. at grad! dey,li uom1ni e delle cose, ed e state distinto, con
10 legbo eli tutto al mondo, e1 tuo dal mlo, perche con e. necessaria a ...olero
llantenere la salute umvereale,ft ibid., p. 209, of. also P. 210.
""I
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under the laws and in the council the vote of one was worth the value of
another. 10B The function of liberty was to serve as fIla ministra della iustizi~n
and not always to be an equalizing agent. 109 Were the Florentines equal in all
things, even the magistracy would be open to the capable as well as the incapable and the city would be reduced to chaos. 110 This conservative egotism
held that the very stability of the patria was at issue in considerations on
I

the class structure, for "Ie liberta non !urona introdotto per a1tro, se non
percht ognuno posss sicuramente godere e1 suo. "ill Further, it would be
impossible to persecute these pillars of stability While

simu1~neously

proteoting the merchants, for they would lose the important patronage of the
112
wealthy.
To the oonservatives, the ftoEQlani were "rash and licentious men with new
and exorbitant proposals". Any inauguration of their plan in the realm of
praoticAl action would open the way to the subversion of the old and aooustomed
way of living.11J The decima scalata would bring nothing but terror to those
nobles who hope to be able

siouro alIa ombra di questo governo e
,/ 114
conservare 1e sue rioohezze e qualita."
f~vere

10B''La deeima sealata: in oontrario," pp. 208-209. The most signifioant
words here are: "Io oonfesso ohe la ~9.ualita e buona in una republica" anzi e
necessaria, perche e il fondamento della liberta; ma 1a e~a1ita che S1 ricerca
consiste in questa} che nessuno cittadino lossa opprimerel.'aliro, ehe ognuno si
equalmente sottopostc alIa le~(l ed a' mag st:rati e che Is fava C!.t OgmllJO che
e sbile a questo ConSigliO! aDbia tanta su orits i.una guanto l'a1trs; Cosi si
intende Is equftl~ta nel1e ibertat e non g~neralmente4one ognuno sia peri in
ogni cesa •••• , ~., p. 208. C. also r.1a1ogo, p. 2.
l09aicordi, I, 143.
110''1a deoima sca1ata, IT p. 210.
11lIbid., pp. 209-210.
l12Ibid., p. 214.

-

-

ll3Ibid., pp. 207-208.

Cf. also pp. 214-216.

-

1l4Ibld., p. 216.
"I
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Guicciard1ni carefully expouncied the extremes of both eroups in his
treatise, but his own position, linked with his concept of communal good, seems
qui te clear.

Theoret! cally, he stood with the people, for their human logic

was ditficul t to oppose.

Yet, as can

til.'

gleaned from the tone of the anti then ~

on the matter of the decima soalata, the conservative in him and the borghesets

treai tional realism, led him to rear the subversion or order in steps toward
the concretization of the egalitarian ideal.
no ether p>si Uon.

An ottimati ad.herent could hold

The words which Guicc1erdini put into the mouth of the con-

servative w1thotlt doubt expressed his own eentimenta:
La prima COd a cbe ha pensare chi ordina gl.1 stat! e le republiche, e
disporrs Ie cos. in modo che ognuno abbia nel grado suo a contentarsl
rag1onevolmente, e che non ala date a nessuno cause giusta. 0 Mce.slta di
desiderare coss nuova; perehe 18 oi tta e uru.' corpo di tutti e c1 ttad:l.ni .. e
quando uno membro e male condi zionato, non puo el resto del corpo stare
bene, ne si chisma liberta, quando una parte della citta e oppressata e
male trattata dagli, altrl, ne e questo el fine a clle,turono trovata le
liherta, che iu che 0f:~nuno s10uramente potessi oonaervare il grltQo suo J
ansi e una tirannide lieemioa., 0 una liconsia t1ranniea, la quale non 801 ~
e iniqua mentre che dura, ma per le discordie e per e' mali e.ffetti ~h~ ne
nascono, dura poco, perche dove una parte e male contenta nascono le
ciivisione, e dove sono le divisione non puo e5sere 1s stal1llta. anai, c~
dice e1 Vangelo, bisogna ahe e1 regno in se Oiviso vadia in desolazlone. 1l,

Ouicciardini observed that theee lund.ental concepte
times orma! tramontanti, the
He fully realized tJlat

tll~

~riod

~re

operative in

of Lorenzo and of Italian equilibrium.

but his backward look enabled him to maintain a kernel of optimism

most pessimistic momenta.

1

£:;

grandezza dell' uno tempo all 'altro non e comparabll '"
8'a'en

in his

Be strongly' intimated his admiration for the great-

nee of the House of Medici and especially for Lorenzo, since there he
found the oivic ,tranquil! ty requisi to for a state of true excellence.
He construct!vely advanced the poasibil!ty of defending the existence

-

-

U5I bid •• p. 211.
116"Del governo d1 Firenze," p. 262.

I!I

IiiI"
II:
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and independence of his city cs he addressed himool.f to polltical probl_
and socio-econom1c problans erect..Ed on a polltical base.1l7

O"J.ieciard1n1's devotion to Iorenso was based to a great extf'.nt on the
order in Florence, fostered by hie f1rm yet indirect control of imoortant

_tters. U8 StUl there remained sufficient room for F.1ol"entine initiative

to operate. U9 A bal.ance between authoritative rule and rz.eedom for individual action constituted Ouicciardini's ideal.
I'ith the Medici restoration, OUicciardini

~1ated

stabil1sing their rule for the bene1'1t of Flcrenoe.

not what it bad been in

lb3h when their

the manner ot

The situation in 1512 _.

house f1ret came to power.

ThEm the

various factions fought until a supel"'iol' leader arose onl1' to be dieplacGd in
a short while by the

~

or another group.

Cittsens of mediocre worth found

this deplorable situation profitable. for concessions gi"m for sup-001"t enable!
the to improve their status in the city_

This situation did not al.low even the mre perceptive citizens to realise
the power ot the Medici.

The state which came into their hands in

not seem to have been taken

Albla1, a uno

JIle88eJ-

£);tom

1434 did

Ifal popela, . . a uno 1IlOf;Jsar Rinaldo dag11

Palla StrozSli ed a altr1 simUi particular1."

mora, at the beg1ming, the 'Medici

~

not abcJolute paQrnn1.

graduall.7 increased until it reached its

height in LoreMo.

P\.lrt.biel'-

but their power

120
.' '.1
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Arter the restoration of 1512, Modie1 supporters comprised t".'110 groups.
One, not "1nte:ramante pazzi,"

1l8S

forced to stake 6v'erytbing

for their mambe", would be odious and Ul'm'elcome in

e:rally content nth their' lot.

.nth t.he

an.r stato.

.Medici,

They were gen-

The second group, whose mEtnbers were moetly

noble men who bad fbmtioned importantly- in the popular state, also

neceeS4l7 to woric nth the Med'1c1. Their new status in the

~IOY

room

it

of the

Medici rnlera mad. thaa fear !\lriher change by aJ:l7 ag1 tated grou.p of ci Uzena.

All Mendl;y to the past I'Ill1ng r~ 'WOUld undoubtedly

tJUtff!Jl!'

great perll.l2l

FOr these personal reasons, thq zmstered all their tore_ tor the state's

conservation.122 Thaee ',f)artisBna would not have to tear Uec!lc1 jeelousy,
though the :rolers ware

SO

strong tb.9.t

the.r could ruin even a power1Ul cit1zen

at the f1Nt sign of danger.12)
Although the Y«J1ci state in

1512 was a tar cry

from Ouicciard1n1's state

under otUma,t1 control, he consider.red how "questa berea" might sum.VEl the
mugh _ters of 8'll8P1cion and an1mosi 1i7. The Nlara would find :tt necessa17

to deo1de prudently em whose alleg1al1Ce they desired above all others. The
support of 10 untyersale would require the distribution of honors with as moh

l2lA.rter the t11"st expulsion ot the Medici in 1491::, their M.ende, who
"el fiore della c1ttA," were all.owed to remain and to participate with others
in the gove:mment a~..r Olll¥ .. fmr l'lI)nths. Such would not be the case if the
Medici ~ to be expelled again, "Del modo d1 a881curare 10 state," P. 215.
122nDe1

go'V9Jl'flO

di Fireaae," P. 262.

123"Dal modo di assicura.re 10 stato," p. 216.
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equality as possible with attention to the security of the lesser oitizens
Guiooiardini found the alternate OOll.ree the wisest.

frOm the greater.

A. wise

ruler vrould restriot his favors to a select group of partisaDS on whom he
would confer all honors and bene.f1ts. 124 These adherents

WOllld

plaoe them-

selves in every danger to maintain the power and wealth they had received f'rom
the new re'gime and to avoid exile. 12'
/

Just as the regime t s partisans stood also to lose by the ruler f s loss of
power, the Cinquecento state had to choose its supporters and to increase

their benefits lest it:ftlll.

Already' in 1$l2 Guicci.e.rdini realized that

I

,

Nessuna. amiciJia oggidi si mi.sura se non quanto e aocoopagnata 126
dal.la util1ta, e dove non 6 questa non si puo avere nessuna fede.
So strong "ftOtlld this partisan support be that it 1'IOuld have respect for

nothing in order to maintain its power. 127 In his own period Guicciardini
found no other method of securing princely rule.

Enemies remained powerful
U8
and Mends few and unwilling to risk their safety by courageous action.
Men were led by their own particular interest, lila maastra cbe ne mena tutti

124"Del govemo di !i1ranze, tt p. 26$.
12'lbid., p. 266. Cf. "Del. modo d1 assicurare 10 stato," pp. 27>-216,
where GuicCIardini points out that these partisans DUst be "discreetly managecU

-

126lbid•
127lbid. Not only did the tear of change extend. to loss of honors but
also to 'ifl'Ertaculta' e la vita, e pero sarebbe forze cbe non aves sino riepetto
a nulla per mantenerli. tt

-

128xbid.

r
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gli uomini."
Cinquecento Florence was unlike the ancient periods of Greece
and Rome" when magnanimous sentiments could be found.

Guicciardini wondered i f

any Florentine, if he perceived gain himself" would not turn completely to a
/

'

new regime:
/

Non sono piu e tempi antichi de' romani e de' greci, ne' quegli ingeuni
generosi e tutti/" aspiranti aUa gloria I nessuno ~ a Firenze che ami
tanto la liberta, ed e1 reggimento populare che" se gli e dato in uno
altro vivere piu parte e migliore &saere che ~joPensa di avere in
quello" non Vi si vol ti con tutto 10 animo ••••
By

1516, the Mediei were not able to consolidate the Florentine state,

though in 1513 great hopes for a return to better times had been prevalent.
The election of Giovanni de t Medici as Fope Leo X seemed a '*miraculous
occurrenee" for the city under Medici domination.

Neither his power nor his

youth could compensate for the continuing presence of discontented Medici
friends and of a generally jealous and suspicious populace.

/

The Medici regime

still had no truly powerful partisans. l .31 Four years after his original
discourse on the Medici restoration, Guicciardini was still advocating a method
for strengthening their rule.
Leo X's personal greatness obscured the weak foundation of the Medici
/

regime, a dangerous thing for its seeurity.

l29t1Del moch di assicurare 10 state,," p. 274.

l30Ibid •

-

l31Ibid." pp. 267-268.

I'
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II

perch' le quaUuI de' tempi e felioita' a1 mtltono, ad ~ cabole ooaa
essere tutto rondate in aulla vita di uno UOI"lO solo, qualf.iuanao
morissi, 131 vedrebbono li etfetti di qussti dsordini ••••
Serioua problema oould ariae even during Leo 1 s lifetime.

'I
I,
I

Guiceiardin1 t a

hearers remembered well the sudden cataatroJile of the French inVnsion

ot 149l.t.

I,'
I

Selfish individuilletie action amid the contusion showed that none considered
resisting attack tor the welfare at Florence.l ))
Ci tizens

were not apt to

satisfaction waa not likely.

put time and energy into an endeavor from which

To aid in oonsolidating thenorentine state in

1516 Guicciard1ni adVised its rulers to make the state great and important.

An

extension of Florentine boundaries would give Medioi lordship a strong

.foundation. t-:ithout this any other endeavor would be ruined with the f1r8t

adversity.l3ij

1)3l!?!.2., Quicciardin1 noted Hebe a cgni furta eM tusai Yenuta, nessuno
era ohs avess! penaato a reSisters, ne al beneficio della citta 0 della state JW
solo ciaacuno a - ' proprio." To avoid such a pi titul 8i tuation, OU1cciardini
argued with an appropriate metaphor. Prudent marinera repair their Ships and
all its instruments either when they are in port or ,",,'hen things are goinr. well
so that they oan resist any .future tempest. So also should one 'Mho steers the
rudder of the etateindustriously repair its weak spots and urge its members to
have power in reserve tor every aeeident that might arise (valem di tutto e1
nerve e virtU' sua) I ibid.

~..

------

I

-

-

l340Uicciardini equated Church holdings with Medioi holdings. Under the
Medici. Florence tried to expand northward, but already' they .found it necessary
to abandon Parma and Piaoenza. Their pos.881on or Modena and Reggio was uncertain. Not only were Ulere Mrious weaknessCts in these areas but they were
in dispute with the Duke of Ferrara, ~., p. 270.

I
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III':
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Not only

W!lS

it important to have good and futhtul partisans, men of

"riputadOM,1t for }1edici strength but also they had to have a knowledge ot
current Florentine attairs. Since the major.! ty ot Medici partisans had grown

up in r.:erioda of civil troubles, they had been "nutrit1 fuora e non avezzi alle
cose nostre." It these men would learn Florentine ways and what is

"8E~+/1al

for good goverment, they would not be apt to advise action that mir)1t lead to

>

troub1,e or diSOrder.13

Ou1cciardini believed that he knew what course was beat tor Florence.
/

He could uphold a rule under "questa ombra di civilita e di liberta."

He did

not agree 111th the rather prevalent view that the Medici would be more secure
it they were to seize absolute and open control of the City by title as well

as tact. In time this course would prove Uroost pernicious tor them and for us"
and would lead to ultimate and intense cruelty.l36

vlhlle he proclaimed his loyalty to the Medici house, Gu1cciard1n1 admitted

that he found contemplation on gowrnment ('tanto bello, tanto ororevole e
magnifico pensiero. ttl37 On governments depend the well-being and health of men
'I,

l3>Ibid., pp. 271-272.

-

l)6Ibid., p. 281.
"

l37He hoped that his considerations of Florentine goverment would not leac
to his classification "come i.ngrato." He had great, even extraordinary,
obligations to the Medici. Two popel of that house, Leo and Clement, had
employed him in their servJ.,ce and had honored him exceasively, "come persona in
chi hanno avuto, eel he plt1 che ma1 Clemente, somma confidenzia." None should
i.nfer that Gu1eciardin1 had "animo aUeno dalla grande""za loro, ni che la loro
autoriti m1 disp1accia." He compared 'his own situati?'"I with that of Aristotle
and Alexander the Great. The philosopher was not Alexander's enell'l2Y because he
had written the lolitica, qialoso, pp. 3,5.
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and the success of all collective act1ons.

138 Discord in Florence was more

dreadful. than eYer du.r1ng a :period when there were foreign amies wi thin the
peninsula, "breathing slaughter and destruction...139

In hIs tialogo, Guicciardini considered the fundamental problem of who is
to rule. Its two boob were written dUring the period 1n which he served as
l1eutenant-general ot the Holy see and a8 commander of the papal troops
leacued with France.

Although he despaired

ot ever seeing

the original. freedom

of Florence regained during this troublous time, there was nothing to prevent
him from considering the ideal republ1c.

He thouf)'lt that one of the ordinary

accidents in hum.rm aff'airs might occur to return Florence to the type of'
government it had under Soder1:n1.

This would indicate that "the people were no

yet so corrupt that they should be regarded as incapable cf liberty. ff Further,
when Plato meditated and wrote on the republic, he did not believe that h1a
system woUld be adopted by the then wry undisciplined Athenians.

He noted

rather that he despaired of ever seeing them govern themeelft. well and he did

not care to become involved in their attain. Like Plato, Gu1cciardini would
consider only the ideal.1hO

The scene is the year llt94, several months after the expulSion ot Piero
de t Hedici and the early stages of Sevonarola fa preoominance in government.

-

l)8Ibid., p. .3.

139 rlal0io • p. 126.

-

l4OIbid ., pp.

)-b.

i
,

I
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The three

s~aken

are Fiero Capponi, who had been instrumental in Piero'.

expllnon, Pagolanton1o Soder1n1, the mbassador to Venice who. though a blood
relative of the Medici, had opposed the tfTanny of Plero,lU and Pietro
Quicc1ard1n1, Francesco's tather, who had tilled several. important posts under

tr..e f-ledic1 rulers. All were young, zealous, find enenoated by the events of the
recent Medici ouster.

Bernardo del Nel"O,lh2 an old but wry wise man who also

had i"u.rIctioned importantly under the Medici, did lv.)t teel that the revolution

was a triumph.

future,

He could not share the young men' s enthusiast:ic hopes for the

because he realised the often trifling nature of govel"l'mtntal changes.

He testified that he based his jUdf!l"18nts on common sense and experience,
for he had not studied the works of leamed philosophers. Of the three
possible

fOnQ

of government-that ot one, of several or of all-onl.y the t1rat

appeand geod. Be po1.nted to the desirable effects of the Jtledicean government
in contrqt to the 1 _ beneficial reaults of the two other type..

Irt their

corrupt period, Bernardo felt that theory should be abandoned and a govel'J'llMmt
was to be jUdged only by'its results.

Tm. trio or queat10ners tel t that experience alone could never be
final detezm1nant 1n poUtlcs.

the

Rather here, as in the sCience oJ.' moraU.ty,

certain basic principles daninate all actions. It these prinCiples aro based

14Lrbese

Cappelli.

ligures should not be contused with Piero Soderini and N1ccol~

lb2upon the e::couragement of the party of Piero de Medici and the instigation of Venetiana who desired to keep Pisa, Bernar::!o del Nero, the pro-French
inf'alOniere, plotted a Medici return. when the plot was di $Covered, Bernardo
1 Nero was lentenced to be executed for pretem.ng fr1endahip to senice,
gtoria d t ltal1a, I, 2th, 297.

on reason and truth, experience must verify them.
The thJ:ree applied the

cn ten a

of virtue and vice tc the actions of the

Medici rulers and found them wanting on the very baSia of experience that

Bernardo was so wa:mly advocating. They lamented "che VitUperiol che
vergognal It aa they considered that the noble and respected c:1 ty of Florence had
become a slave against her will as ahe tell under the heel ot toreign forcea.

This they blamed pr1marily on the Medici. The conclusion, expreeaed by
Capponi, was that, under the Medic! rule of one, fam11y interests affected

even such weighty matters as foreign affairs. Upon the shoulders of one man,

talented {lr otherwise, rested all grave concerns. Honora went to favorites
instead of to deaeniJ:1€ 01t una. Under such an admin1stratioD, justice i8
alwaya corrupted, not always because the ruler desires this but often because

ot clever

sycor~ts.

Bernardo pointed out that their ideal goverrment would have theae and othe t'

faults as t...,U. He admitted his suspicion ot civ:U discords stirred up in the
name ot liberty, s1nce most otten pfi"rsonal 8mbi tion is at their bUis, and •
deliverer trom

~

usually becomes a tyrant h1meeU'. He argued that, since

the !-'I8Ople have no discers:ll8nt, a popular gover.nment cannot be good.

Under

such a system, there is no control over the adminiatraUon ot juatioe,
lIIaf).strates tear to antagonize the people who support them, abuns are
mul tip1ied, and the elWious poor strike at riche8 beyond measure to tha gl"eat

detriment of tl".EI city

eo ultimately to

th~ ~or

themselvea.

Be!"1"..ardo del Nero was not a Medici partisan Ear

.!!. but looked upon

the

stability they brought to Florence. Yet it seemed better that they ahould not
be restored tc; power, be remarked, for this could be accompl1shG.;.. only by

I ' I
I

20$
foreign military strength.

resiX'es for revenge would be rampant and force used
,

I

'I

to assure their power. He sincerely admonished the
in the republic by aiding the principal ci tiZellS

~

men to maintain union

I

!I

'

,I

to lay aside their 8Mb1 tiona

to avoid internal dissension which could only prepare the way for a new tyrant

I

or for serious dissolution and anarcl:\1. His last caution was that Florent1ne
goverment must not seek to 1m1 tate the Venetian, for each country calls for
its own kind of rule.143
\-;i th

,
I

I I

his mouthpieces of both penmasion8, Francesco OUiceiardin1 was

partially in agreement.

Like the trio, he upheld wamly the idea of Uberty,

but, like Bernardo, he looked back at sad experience.

The sentiments he

attributed here to the old man actual.ly seem to have been those he held with

conviction as the tinal product of his long and serious thought on matters of
govornment. Practical neceai ty, success, stabil!t,...these were to be the
, I:

nonna of sixteenth-century thought for minds like those of Oulcciard1n1. The
whole tenor of the Dial0ti!? seems to bear out the truth of the observation that
1t was written only at the end of a "philosophical contemplation of J."lOUtical

truth,nllW speCifically p1psueeent,? political truth.
strong and intelligent rule was impOrtant for Florentine health, for "la

lhlrhese arguments, very briefly summarized here, are discussed in detail84
dialogue fom in Book I of the ~alOgo. pp. 7-84.
1h4.rhis 1s the view of CrlveUuc1, p. 19, and also of Barkhausen, pp. tQ-6j •

I
I

!
,

,

,

I

I,

I"i

, I'
'i

I

"I
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ignorznzia ~ ciaca, confUsa e sanaa term1ne e regola, e perd dice 01 pl"Overbio
-ehe
speaso e meglio avere a tU'9 col maligne ehe co
Love of
\

/

the ;patria wae not

Syno~U6

~

lt~;norante."

with love of liberty. One could love his £Stria

while living under a tyranny. Further, equality for all citizens under the

laws would perhaps be even better served under a well-ordered goverment than

146 LieenUa, an enemy and destroyer of the Eatria, was

under a popular one.

not the foundation of liberty but of the worst type of tyrmm;y.147
A

suitable and stable government for Florence

1fU

OUicc1.ardin1's major

concern. The two th1llgs in the world that he desired more than any others were
his ciV's "perpetual exaltation l ' and U. glory c.! "caaa noetra" .forever. He
begp'ed Clod to increase both.

lh8 Hia first wish was to see the establishment of

a well-ordered republic in Florence during his l1tetime.149 Bernardo had outlined Gu1cciardini's own plan of government by the ott:1matt, and had shown its

relatiOnship to the government of Venice, "per una citta disarmata e1a cos1
/

citta disarmata 51a coai bella come forse ma1 ave88i alcuna republica libera. ttl 0

14St'1alosg, p. 46.

-

lhltbid.,

pp. 38-39, 42.

l47}:bid., p. 100.

lh8 "M81'IlOrie d1 famiella, If Sari tti autobio&rafict. p. J.

149The second wiah was for the tnaedan of Italy fran all foreign invaders
and the third, the ".freedom of the entire world trom the tyranny- of wicked
pri.esta, fI ~cord1. I, 14.
lSOoi!+ogo, p. 106.

2(ff

BOth would have a .Q.!:!E. Consiglio I and Florence r s S0nfaloniere would correspond
151
to Venice's LOge as would all lesser parts of the governments.
Yet Guicciardini felt pessimistic regarding the Florentine future.

To

him, there were many more reasons for believing that its republic must soon
fall into decay than there were for holding that it would long endure .152
Bernardo could only advocate, like Guicciardini, that the Florentines be
contented with the times

.2h! ...c....orr;;.;;;..,o0....no... and

accomodate themselves as best they

could to the government under which they lived whUe they lookedto the future
reforms. 153 Virt~ was nothing else than knowing when the time was ripe to
inaugurate reforms, patience in waiting for an occasion which could make an
undertaking easy which would otherwise be difficult:

,

"e questa e una delle

ragione ehe e pazienti sono tanuti aavi."l54 Guicciardinits agreement with
Bernardo showed that he was a conservative but an opportunist as "Jell.
Guicciardini thought that honor and amibition were more important than anything else.

He admitted that the management of public affairs and the

grandeur accompanying them attracted the "supreme homage" of men and perhaps
excusably so, for ambition seems to :many to make them equal to the gods. l5S
151
For a detailed treatment of these points, cf. ibid., pp. 100-185.

-

152Ricordi" I, 9.

-

l53 Dialo!2, pp. 82.8r.~

-

l54Ibid ., p. 162.
l55"consolatoria," cited in Geffroy, flUne autobiographiEl," p. 673.
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If one who desires to become supre.me in Florence 1s of the Medici line and is
backed by pSj:1il power, Gu1cciarf:tl.ni advised, he can hope to at:tain this height.
If not of the house of Medici, his only method of achieving success lay in
affecting the popular cause with the hope of b31nc' e13o'teu by the free voice ot
156
the p~ople as their constitutional chief, as 1n 1:lw case of Piero SOderini.

self-interest and sheer utilitarianism are l1nksd here.

The same holds true

ot

OUicciarditdts ea,ltiCIUs advice to a goo citizen, not to connect himself with
the Medici government lest the people come to disl1ke him, though he should not

for this reason withdraw altoather trom. such a connection or forego the
benefits to be derived trom it.15?
Guicciardini's major d1llemma was evident in his devotion to Florentine

liberty as exemplified in the republic and his ideal of COOp'?ration with the
status quo for reasons of honor and

selr-1nte~st.

This accounts in larse

measure for his conO.1ct1ng attitudes on th4 Ueoici rule.ts.
political affiliations followed such a course.

OU1f!ciardird t s own

After the Medici expulSion of

152?, Nicco1~ cappon1,158 "cittadino d1 grande autori ~ ed amatore della

i
I

15~~rdi"

-

I.

I

~

I, 155.

157Ibid. , 136. Flnphasis added.
l.;.8 C!.. Roth, pp.

59-t4,

for Cappon1 t 8 early career and his pollcy as

ion£al,?niere.

,!jlll
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libe~, 11 was elected gontalomare in the new republic, reminiscent of that ot

-

plare Soderini. Though heaeJing a mo(srate eoverrnent, Capponi was a
.
representative of the ottimati, and, 11ke declared members

ot

the 2!llesch1

faction, had a rather pronounced sympathy for another Medici return to power.
~d th

Capponi, Guicciard1ni consecrated his efforts to re.foxm in the face of

stout opposition and to the reconciliation ot the Florentine :republic with the
Pope and the Emperor.

159

While theoretically upholding the principles of the

revolution ot 1521 J Gu1cc1ardini continued his correspondence with Clement
though in his capacity as pope and not as lord ot Florence.

vn,

160

In 1529 a minor riot oecu.r.red in which Capponi was overthrown by thosevj,o

realized that rd.d defense of Medici partisans would mean the lessening of their

own power.161 The arrabbiati gontaloniere, Francesco Carducc1,162 succeeded
him
41,"1

in office.

He was corrupt, Ouicc1ard1n1 judged, and umrorthy of so great

honor. 163 Under his administration there was pereecution ot the Medici

partisans, contiscation ot their goods, and, as had taken place in some measure
/

under the Oapponi regime, overturning ot the statues of' the Medici popes and

159ttp..ag10ni che cona1gUano 1a signoria di Firenze ad accord.e.nd con
Clemente VII," ~cr1ttt W1tt1ci, p. 214.
16Oaos8i, I, 67-68.

__

t ltal1a ' V, 2$2-253 •
161storia
................... d....................

16201'. Bernardino Barbadoro, "Francesco Carducci," Enciclop!dia 1taliana
(Rama, 1930), VIII, 995.

163storia dt ltal1a, V, 252-253.
L

_

I

1
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the effacing of their arms on the 14edici palace.

164

Such offences naturally

rendered any republlcan accord with Clement VII impossible to achieve. The

EmPeror, attempting to ally himself with Clement VII, offered his troops for
16S Otdcciardi.ni lett
the rrestabl1shment of tiedici government in Florence.
Florence to meet Clement VII at Rimi.ni, following him to Bologna, where the
"

rope was to have an interview wi. th Charles V. '¥ihen he d1sobeyed the orders of
the "otto di Guardia e

BIll.ian166 to appear before it

he was condemned as a rebel and his goods

I

II
I.

to justify his conduct,

were confi.scated.

The Florentines heroically defended their c1ty betore the papal and
imperial troops which besieged it, but in AUf:1,UJt 1530 they were forced to

eurrender.167 In Clement's 6efenae, Guicciardini explained that he had
capitulated with Charles at Barcelona with the proviSO that there be nothing
more than a change in the c1tur' s pro-French eovernment.l68

I

ii'

Ii'I·'

••

l64pastor, IX, 426, cf. also Francoi.s '1. Perrens, Histo1re de Florence
r:;ts la darJ1nat1on des Medicis ~us9'!! la chute de la ,£!publiqU8 (l;tt81;-15,g)
Va

8,""Iasa:rS!m', m; ijO.

-

- -

16Ser• Pastor, 56-57, for a discussion of this and the other terms or the
Treaty of Barcelona, concluded between Charlee V and the papal nuncio, Girola.'110
de Sohio, on June 29, 1529.
166rhis body, usually referred to simply as the otto, functioned as the
supreme criminal court of Florence.

m,

l67The norentinae put up a brave resistance against the wishes of Clement
who 1s reported to have excla1med distractedly, "Would that Florence had

never existed!"

Pastor, X, 100-103.

168"Ragioni ehe consigUano la signoria d1 Firenle," SOritti 22litic1, pp.

2lL-251.

I. "
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The charter at the restoration at 15.30 specified that liberty was to be
preeeJ"'nd, but this proved to be merely a fom.

terms of the capitulation by July

lS.:n

Clement

m

disregarded the

and had CarduCCi, as well as the last

gonfaloniere, O1r01ami, hanged. He intended to found an absolutism in Florence
by appointing his nephew, Alexanier, the natural son of Lorenzo.. the Duke of

Urbino, as head of the muqueracling republic.

constitution was made public, whe:eb:,"
and hereditary Duke ot Florence.

On

l::~er

AprU 21, 1532, the new

became

~!10nie~

for ll.t'e

But theactuaJ. reins of government remained

in the hands of Clement VIl.172
Guicciardini lett Florence when Clement VII obtained for him the poet of
vice-legat.. of Bologna in June lSll.. His semces here and against Ferrara WW1
especially valued by the Houee at Nedic1.173 Paul m, a. F8.1'Tl&8e and an

Cimem)T

of the MediCi, did. not wish to retain OUicciard1n1 in the important Bolognese

legation after Clement'. death. Guicc1ardini returned to Florence in January

1

I,.i

,I'

172pastor, X, 104-105. At this time, Clement VII shewed himself' eager to
effect a. reconciliation between Fra:')cis I and Charles V. The Fmperor,
c Ol1S1der1ngtbis a hopelese aim, proposed an Italian def'en.ive league to secure
Milan and Genoa afainet French attacks. Venice resolutely' opposed tUs idea.
It was little in keepillfl' With the policy of a pope considered neutral. :Further
Clement continuedto inaist upon the restoration of Modena and Reggio. other
complicating tactors came to affect Clement, especially the threatening atti tudl
assumed at the beginning ot 153.3 by Francis I, an ally ot Henry VIII, ibid.,
21 l.

I"

I'

"

:111

'I'
illlill
, '

r

1,1.,1

,,',,·1

'!
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1535 to become a courwellor to

,~.'Uke

Alexander, surrounded by assassins and

firmly opposed to those struggling for Florentine independence.

Under this

rule, Florence would remain the capital. of the Grand IUchy of Tuscany.17L
I,

The specific motives tor Guicciardini fS service to the youD.£er
are not easy to fathom.

~iedici

line

,

,I

Adherence to the rule of the odious Alexander because

of affection can be ruled out.

Perhaps he considered the l-1edici aa the most

probable guarantee ot at least one gem-e

()t

Florentine independence, namely,

independence from the Emperor, who could easily have eubjeeated the city more
completely.

Only in this light or, more probably, in the light of sel1'-

interest, are we able to understand his sucoesstul defense of Alexander at
Naples, where a great number of exiles presented their grievances to Charles V
in

]$35

and demanded the Duke t t:; depoei tion.

To Gu1cciard1n1, these were '\:mjus

accusations."l75
The piar,noni and the popular party stUl dreamed of the reestablishment of

a popular goverment, led by the monks of San Marco , who proclaimed that
Savonarola t IS prophecies waul::! now be real1Hd and Florentine liberty recOTeZlecH- 6

i
l
"

17LAtter the death ot Clement 'VII, Florentine exiles included important
personages like Filippo S1.irozzi, Ippoll to de' Medici, the historians Jacopo
Nardi, Benedetto Varchi, and Donato Oiannott1. They entered intc a bitter
Struf,gle with Alexander, cal.l.1ng him a tyrant and usurper, Antonaide, 1£;6.
17SCharlea V, of course, did not desire to r~;atore any ,popular re"gime or
repJ.blican liberties in Florence. To the ex:l.les he replied that their request,
if granted, could lead only to uave danger, 1nter£erence in the internal
affaire ot FlorenceJ Alexander retained the duchy and married Marguerite of
Austria, a natural daughter oi Charles V, after paying the Em}:e %'Or a hundred
twenty thousand ducats, ibid., pp. 186-187.

, 'I

. I,i,
I

,I

I."

"' ,. 1

-

l76aeffroy, nUne autobiographie.. fI p. 677.

I
"

I

!

\oJithout arms, however, this was r..ardly possible.
instrumental i., preventing any such result.

!

Further, Gu1cciardini was

Leading the major palleschi, he

hastened to proclaim Cos:l..mo de' !<1edici, a member of the

youn~r

branch of

Ciovanni by a relativa J Lcrenzino, in Jan u,u'y 1537_
Dut Gui:.::ciardini' s plan of setting in operat.ion his government of
otti.~ati

under tho apparently

He thought to

s~cure

unaaaumin~,

inexperienced

j~ung }~dici

tr..e

failed.

l'.is plan by havirlf: Cosimo engaged to one of his d;mghters,

177

but tho girl ".8 sent back.

He tried to :impose several conditions to limit

the rulerta power, like the institution of a Senate without which he could

decide nothin.,!, but Co81mo triumphed because of continUed imperial support.
Haking h:1:nself abscllute, he annulled all the conditions under which he had been

I

I

chosen"
I

For his I'IUpport of Alexander and Cosimo .. Gu1cciardini's l.'I'!laginary sccurs..

I

I

charged him with having acted as 1110 inst:-umento di offenders ed oscurare e1
nom della patria ••• " ft "!hen he had had the very rare opportun1ty of riving
speical service to his F'lorence,178 he bowed before the tyranny of the later

177Both Coe1mo de f Medici' s mother and Guiceiardini' s first wite weJ.'e
members of the important Salviati family, Benc.ist, 82.
178 ItAccu.aatoria" J p_ 212.
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CRAPl'ER VI

I

THE RELIGION OF GUICCIARDINI
i

The study of religion in Guicciardini in its varied aspects must serve to

':,:1
I

reconstruct his character if it is true that ttin tutti gli scrittor1 politici

,

1a parte del loro pensiero che r1fiette la religions e U punta di contrello
del lora intero sistema, dove si vede meglio i1 fondo dell 'autore ...l
Like that of various other personages of the Renaissance. Guicciardinits
religious views have suffered from contrary descriptions.

He is associated

sometimes, and without sufficient basis, with the conception so orten
prevalent of the irreligiosity of the period.
The classiC and indelible portrait, somewhat exaggerated, is that ot
Guicciardini as "1 'uomo savic, If the typical exponent of the Italian society of
his age and a type possible only in a corrupt civUization. He is sketched as
a cold intellect combining the famous discrezione with knowledge and experienc
holding to neither ideas nor illusions, and relying necessarily upon his own
judgment, speculare and misura.

Ipaolo Treves,
1931), p. 5e.

n

2

'While patriotism, liberty and justice did

realism.o ;eolitico d1 France.co Guicciardini (Firenze,

-

2For a descriptive explanation of discrezione .. cf. intra, pp.
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exist for him, they were

o~

1n the guise of abstract ideas, never living

sentiments which spurred him to action as they did Machiavelli.

Guicciardin1 t s

only god was his own self1sh interest and his desire tor riputazione.

He would

not, these wr1tel'S argue.. sacrif1ce his ambi tiona to the 1deals of liberty and
s&lt-den1al, since these befitted onlY' the ;eazzl and the ignorant, certainly

-

not the savi • .3 'lhese views perpetuate the n1neteenth-eentu17 patriotic
criticism of Guicciard1ni, formu.la.ted on the baSis of his Jtlcordi.
Even if not this type of Cing,uecento Italian, they write, Ouicciardini was
at least an opPOrtunist R!!

~ellence.4

In the interest of self, he forgot

that moral greatness means a. genuine manly triumph." still more than
Machiavelli, he exemplified the worthlessness of politics as a science independent of morality.6

I"

,"

Sometimes Guicciardini is described as a men indifferent to religion, a
skeptiC, a pagan .. or an adherent of a formalistic faith with no intellectual or
moral content, as one who remained simplY' in outward fashion in the Church
since he never got around to breaking with it. 7
Since such desoriptions of the man are obviously quite onesided, they oan
not be wholly accurate.

Fra Remigio Fiorentino, a Dominican, and a oontem:porar

of Gu1cciardini, judged him to be a

"De Sanctis,
40arlo Se'gre,

JU.n

''mclto religioso e dotato d'ottimi e

ItL 'uome del Guieciardin1,"

"Qu1coiardin1,"

~a

pp. 1 ...2.3.

antolog;ta, LXVII, ser. 4 (1897), 472.

"Geffrey, "Un polltique ital1en, tt pp. 962, 991, 99.3.
6aenoist, P. 1.30.
7otetea, pp. 318-320.
~

'I
II'!I

r
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I

santissimi costumi.H8 A student of Guicciardini expressed astonishment over

II,
'I

'!

the spirit of religious fervor evident in him that one would not expect to find
in nun politico cosl realista. n9 Another sees in his belief not formalisol but
the sentiments of a true and living faith to the extent that in his writings
"la soggezione a

~o

ricorre come atteggiamento che informa la psicologia

0

14

mentali t~ dell tuomo. nlO Guicciardini himself admitted that he renected on the
tribulations of life first "come f11osofo ed uome del mondo" but also "coIDe
cristiano. nIl But the bro are not incompatible.
Guicciardini referred to his upbringing by a good father, "tanto
catolico.H12 A1reaqy in 1503 his personal ambition was the basis of his
temptation to become a priest finally, and to succeed to the numerous benefices
of his uncle Rinieri.. archdeacon of Florence and bishop of Cortone..

dissuaded him tronl entering religion for such a base motive.

His father

h'hile Fiero had

hopes of his son becoming rather a great teacher, Francesco was content with
his fatherts other reason, namely, that he would soil his conscience by making
his son a priest by greed for possessions or for renown. l )
i"
1.1

8Carlo Angeleri, "n Guicciardini :nella Vita di Frs Remigio Fiorentino,.t
Francesco Guicciardini nel IV oentonario, p. 229. Cf. also Francesco Sarri.
nGUicciarcfinI e fa reii'gJ.one,· ibId.; p. 144.

9Nulli , p. 30.

-

lC1.talIlgOli. p. 91.
11 trConsolatoria., If p. 189.
12"Orat1C' accusatoria, It p. 198.

,,-56.

13"Ricordanze," $cr1tti autobiografioi, pp.
Of his father's view,
Francesco wrote "parendogfi oEe Ie cose della Chiesa fussino molto transcorse."
Further, fIche maculare 18 ccnscienza sua di fare un figliuolo prete per
cupidita eli roba 0 di grandessa."
'II,

,,1.11'11

I
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At the age of thirty, Francesco already seemed to realize the vanity of
this life and the reasons that wicked men fear the future while good men have
hope.

He knew that he had received many blessings and praised Ood for his

goodness and beneficience.14 He lamented the spiritual poverty of his uncle,
the bishop.

The latter remained a man of eTU habite.

15

He described his

father's peaceful. death in 1513, fortified by all the sa.crmnents of the Church
\

and deep devotion", Ite talmente che si puo sperare che Dio al certo 10 abbi

ricevuto in luogo di salute." He equated the good lii'e with consolation, for
16
he felt much less the death of his father when he considered his goodness.
He wrote of his intense desire to see Plero again in hellven.

He saw that even

in adversity there were eonsolations that faith alone could give.

He wrote

that God had His reasons tor sending trials and tribulationa to man and, i f

accepted as diVine Visitations, they could redound to his ultimate credit. 17

14~A

-

sa stes.o,R ibid., p. 99.

15''Memori& di tamiglia, If ~., p. 48.
l6t1Ricordanze," pp. 71-73.
l7Guicciardini wrote that "le tribulazione del mondo seno speaso
desiderabile perche sono Viaitazione di Dio a chi 1e riceve con forte animo, e
mezzo a conseguire quella sterna felici t~, It IfConso1atoria, If p. 189. Again:
"Perch~ come tu proponessi 1a m~ria dell t altra vita, a comparazione della
qua1e questa e uno punto I e che Dio manda spesso la trtbulazione agli uomini
non per gastigarli, ma per wrgarli, e chs ehi amor suo le tollera pazientemente ha da reputare fellcitA 10 essers Visitato da Lui di qua con questi modi,
perch. mirabilmente approfittano d:1 1al chi dico si riducessi a memoria quests
cose, sarebbe ne t tuoi dispiaceri· con maggiore piacere che non avasti ma1 neUe
tue falleita,l/ ibid., p. 169.

-

,

i

,
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Nor were the statements of Guicciardini's youth dimmed by the bitterness of his
, ,

poll tical experiences as an old man.

I,

,

Guicciardini's religion seems to have been founded on the basic contrariet
of human nature.

Since man is naturally inclined to good (his was an

optimistic position), Guicciardini saw that there was no advantage in evil.

18

A person who wo'!lld prefer evil to good must be considered a beast rather than a

man for he lacks an instinct common to men by nature.19 But Guicciardini saw

I

II

I
!

i

I: I

too the selt-interest could readUy incline a man to evil, since he is frail
and is continually tempted by what is wrong. 20 Since, for the most part, man's
afflietions stem from his excessive desires, he is his own worst enemy.2l

~I

I

At time, too, Guicciardini seemed very much aware of the presence ot the
divinity and the power of His unseen actions.

He admonished men to beware of

contending against religion or anything which had close dependence upon God. 22
He upheld the dignity and authority of the Church as an institution and its
divine power to rebuild itself spir1tually.23 During the sack of Rome, he was
\

deeply concerned lest profanations occur "aensa rispetto aleuno ne di onore di

18

R1cordi, I, 3.

19Ibide ,

4.
20n,id.,

-

3.

21Ibid ., 139.
22Ibid ., .31.

-

23"1a reverenzia ed autorit'i /.della Chieail non llUore mai, e Be talvolta
qualcuna dello sue ragloni e s1 inveechiata che e quasi in oblivione, tornano
poi e tempi, e risurge pin fresco el suo diri tto e piu potente che mai, tt
~aloS2, p. 160.

",I"
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donne, n~ di reliquie sacra, n~ di sacramenti, n'e di nio. ,,24 In spite of his
25
symrathy for every reform in the Church,
he attacked the Council of Pi sa as
26
false and productive of diVision in the Church.
Yet the gulf Guicciardini sometimes drew between morality and the rule of

'"

I

the state carried over into some vague but suspicious utterances on the
essential qualities of religion.

He argued that "excessi va religion" was harm-

ful to the world, insofar as it made men's minds effeminate and prone to error
and hindered them from acting honorably.

He stressed that his advice was not t

be understood as derogating from the Christian faith or the veneration due it.
He intended rather, to confim the faith by pointing out its fundamentals from.

its excesses so that men would know what is to be taken seriously and what is
to be disregarded. 27
Guicciardin1 thought that the Churt:r.. },>J.8.ced too much emphasis on external
works.

While prayer, fasting and other devout observances prescribed by the

Church or recommended by friars are not wrong, nthe beat of all good
observances, and in comparison wherewith all others are tnsii2tficant, is to
wrong no man and do what good you can to an.,,28 This i8 the familiar laicized
and secular humanitarian concept, diametrically opposed, however, to the

24ffL8 prigionia d1 Clemente VII," 9Eere

~nedite, IX, 35.

25cf. Storia d'Italia, III, 102.

26,'1. t ltalla dopo 1& g10rnata di Ravenna," Scrttti eli tici, p. 87.

27Rieordi, I, 32.

-

28Ibid ., II, 159. Emphasis added.
;""'1 ',',
"

'
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classical view of the ruthless self-interest of the Renaissance period.
w1dle he seems to have accepted immutable Christian doctrine as defined
and preserved by the Church, he thought that men should not dabble in religious
studies.

Even theologians and philosophers who write of supernatural things

utter "a thousand follies."

Their probing seems to be more an exercise of the

intellect than a means of discovering the truth.

29

It demonstrates a lack of

wisdom to preach on certain "thorny articles of our faith" Uke predestination.
Quicciardini argued that he was not objecting to the doctrines of the Church
though he felt that they should not be tampered with lest they give men the
occasion to think of things which the ordinary man can never understand. Such
ideas create doubts which can be settled onlY by the ready acceptance of Church
doctrine.3° Here Guicciardini seems to evidence his belief in a blind faith

with no questioning.

Reasoning in the religious sphere brought about doubt.

and he had no sympa.thy with them.
On

the other hand, he ttought that miracleo give no more proof for the

existence of the Christian God than any other gods.

They should be considered

simply as "secrets of nature to the depths of which the mind of man cannot
penetrate. lt31 Strong faith can lead man to believe things that are not true,
just as certain effects are credited to the intercession of the saints at their

29Ibid., 125.

-

3OIbld., I, 135.

-

3lTbid., II, 123.
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various shrines • .32 He manifested the same fear of becoming too involved with
non-human spheres like signs and portents in which he very definitely believed.
Guicciardini's evaluations of prodigies, prognostications, fortuna, and
the operations of divine providence are rather closely allied.

The Middle Ages

believed that free will determined men's actions while prOVidence guided them,
but, for this

virhl ..3.3

viG~"

.

the Renaissance substituted the prime role of fortuna and

Though one of the dominant motives of Ouicciardin1's work is

"l'imperio della fortuna," which no man can fully escape, he, unlike Machiavell

i1

did not concede to virt'n a Significant amount of autonomy. 34
Some hold that Ouicciardini's historical concept superseded that of the
Middle Ages, which considered history as a direct judgment of God.3S They
point to the difference between Gu1cciardini and Philip de Commines 36 and deny
that a sense of the transcendent is the COll8tant though silent thread of the
storia d'Ital1a. 37
Actually, it would seem that Gu1cciardini t s esoteric spheres of action and
influence took the form of the joint concepts of fortuna and of God or
providence.

For example, both were speCifically mentioned when he referred to

the politics of Clement VII.

Their eftects showed that "la prudenzia ad e t

33PalmarocChi, p. 33.
32Ibid ., 124.

-

34Ibid., p. 43.
3SNulli, p. 33 •
.36Capariis, p. 126.
37Malagoli, p. 2.31.

I.

r
statement indicates that human beings are responsible for their actions and
that they are not complete masters of their own si tuation.

The use of the term

"fortune" here connotes the normal changes that occur in human life, for
example, the Slccession of misfortune after days of prosperity. h.3
Guicciardini explained that the Venetians, who had heavy military losses
in 151h, suffered "under the wrath of heaTen or the casual events that depend
on fortune. nhh Again he wrote that men always attribute to advice :nd planning
what has often proceeded from fortune. 1l45 Fortune is unstable and uncertain so
that even one long protected by it must fear its change. 46
Portents of futUre horrors, indicating a change in "buona fortuna, It
fascinated him.

He wrote that together "U consentimento de. Cieli e degli

uomini pronunziavano alIt Italia Ie future calamit'a. n47

Predictions of future

events can be made not only by men who "per scien£a" make a profession of this
but also by men who do so "per arna to divino. 1148
Portents which excite general wonderment also giTe a knowledge of future

h.3"Fortune tl has, in fact, seTeral connotations in Renaissance writing, Cf
for example, its use in OUicciardini's description of the Florentine plight in
1529, ibid., V, 289: the citi£ens had fino inclination to try fortune," for the.
though'i""they had sufficient means to defend themselves for many months. In
other words, they Simply did not wish to take a chance and lose every crumce.

4hIbid.,

In, 316-.317.
45Ibid ., IV, 126.
6
4

"Giustiticazione della politica,tt p. 208.

47Storia d'Italia, III, 63.

-

h8Ibid.
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happenings.

Ou.icciardini described at length those which occurred before the

Italian invasion of Charles VIII. 49 He dwelt excessively on those preceding
the death of Lorenzo de t Medici, and, he felt they foretold the calami ties that
would befall Italy.

In Florence, a few days befol'S, flames had been seen in

the heavens and there was a comet.
other.

The wolves howled and lions fought each

In the church of Santa Maria Novella, a woman had a fit when in a

vision she saw an ox with horns ot tire spreading destruction over the entire
city. 50 Guicciardini noted similar signs which he believed, foretold the
51
A.fter the French deteat at
Florentine revolt in 1512 and the Medici return.
Ravenna, the cardinals begged the pope to make peace, for God did not wish the
struggles in behalf of Italian liberty to cost so much.
of His will.

52

And he held that the caprice

in war as in every other human happening.

There were many signa

ot "fortuna" played a major role

In one passage, Guicciardini seemed

to deny that some men can foretell .future eTents, sqing it i8 useless to try
to foresee them, for human existence does not follow immutable laws. 53
Considering the relative forcea and strength ar Marignano in
his stateJrlents, Guicciardini explainedl

d:3lTlonstration of

"pure li event! delle battaglie sono

49Ibid., I,

64.
50Storia fiorentine, pp. 73-74J af. also ItElog1o,
51stOria dtltalia,

--

nI,

h

pp. 227-228.

236.

52Tbid., 193-194.
53ffSulle mutazioni seguite dopo la battaglia d1 RaTenna," Scritti P2l1tiai
p. 89.
.
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dubii, e vi puo molte volte la fortuna. piu ehe la ragione. 1J
depend completely on the ability of the captain, the
accidents of time and place, for there are always
interamente alIa fortuna.«SS

54

Victory does not

virt\ of the troops or the

~lle

accidenti sottoposti

Even more important, not necessarily do those

whose cause is just have victory~ tor daily those who tight unjustly are
S6
succesaful.
Guicciardini seems to imply here that justice is not possible

Ili~

in a world where reason is not supreme.
The twists of fortune often were dramatiC.

The sudden death of Archduke

Filippo, the young and healthy' son-in-law of Ferdinand of Aragon, puzzled
Quicciardini.

OnlY the variability of fortune could explain it. S7 Guiccis.rdin

also thought the immediate reversal of Florentine success in battle in lh79
after the sack of Casole could be explained by nothing else than a change of
fortune. S8
In some ease, evil men enjoyed good fortune but in others they paid for
theirwickedne8s. He wrote, in connection with the scheme of Morone,S9 as he

S4nDiscesa di Francesco I," p. 114.

SS"Se tl Gran Capitano debbe accettare la impress. di ltalia," Scritti
E91itici, p. 107.
56 11N, 51 pUd promettere la vittoria chi ha la giustizia della causa,
vedendosi ogni d~vincere chi combatte per 18. ingiustizia," ibid.

57~~ria dlItalia, II; 183.
58Storie fiorenti~1 p.

-

4S.

59Girol~o Morone plotted

I:

to oust Charles from Milan.

I~:

'IIII
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,I

sought for some pattern of explanation, the he could be certain only that
"There is nothing more difficult to avoid than fate, and there is no remedy
against predestined misfortune. ,,60 He considered Lodovico Sforza I a imprisonmen ~
A prince of auch magnificence, envied by so many, now in such miser"J,6l Still
his sons were permitted to enjoy the state of Milan which Lodovico had seized
wrongfully and Itto the ruin of the whole world. ,,62 AI though Alexander VI was
more wicked than any pope for centuries, he was also "pi~ felice. ,,63 Antonio
da Leva he described as "the author of so ma.ny bitter calamities and severe

punishments, who was, however, very fortunate in all his undertakingsl ft64
More often, however, Ouicciardinits examples of the close relationship
between wrongdoing and retribution are very evident.

Cardinal Ascanio Sforza,

who practiced simony more than any other at the time of Roderigo Borgia's
election to the pontificate, was overtaken by divine justice when his excessive
ambition finally made him "an object of scorn and hatred to all mankind. ,,6S

'i

The Marquis ot Pesoarats death occurred, Guicciardini thought, "perhaps by the
just judgment of God, \-!ho would not allow him to enjoy his evll-gotten
"

gains. ,,66 Liveretto de Fermo had a just end for his own wickedness, for it was

6oStoria d'Italia, IV, 319.

61 Ibid., I, 393.
62Ricordi, II, 91.
63Storie !!2rentine, p. 265.
64Storia dtltalia, V, 197.
-11-"

" _ _ _ _ _ _,

6SIbid., I, 6.
66Ibid... IV, 321.h Although Pascara had plotted unsuccessfully against the
F,mperor,..-ne conquered areas for himself in north and south and built up a small
fortune bASi dAA ..

'I
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right that one guilty of having killed his uncle by treachery should also die
67 Nor was the Florentine Vitellozzo Vitelli able to escape the tragic
by it.
fate of his own brothers, who all had died a violent death at his hand. 68
Two of his major examples stem from the period of the greatest jeopardy to
the Ci::suescento papacy and to Italy as a whole.

In 1527 tomenico di Massimo,

the richest of all the Romans, offered to lend only a hundred ducats for the
defense of the City.

He suffered the due punishment for his avarice.

His

daughters were raped by the soldiers, while he and his sons were slaves until
they freed thems.lves from prison by an exorbitant ransom. 69 Again, one
Migllau, who opposed freedom for Clement VII in 1527 on the grounds that it
would be dangerous to the Emperor's interest, was punished for his impiety when
he was later killed a t the beginning of the siege of Naples. 70 And in referenc

.f!!! 2! 2.22. or was so much taken up with a regard only to his own interest, the
to the maneuverings of Francis I, he wrote that "the King either had so little

recovery of his children." 71 :;"lhat is very interesting is that these observations of Ouicciardini on evil and its consequent punishment were never mentione
by Machiavelli.

Guicciardini also discussed whether fortuna favored some individuals more
than others. While one who is a favorite of fortune can afford to be more

-

67Ibid., II, :;;;9.
r=

-

6B Ibid •
69Ibid., V, 137.

-

70Ibid., 172, 199.

-

71Ibid., 262.

'I'

'II
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Emphasis added.
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bOld than another" still he should not forget that tlnot only may fortune vary as
to different times, but also at the same time may vary as to different things ... 12
The wise man has to act, but he should also make a prudent calculation of
probable effects. 73 Although Rla buona fortuna ll is always needed, men should
74
8i ze up their chances and move wi th care.
Basically men lUUst guide themselves by the use of "la ragione. tl75 The
intelligent man should realize that experience and natural prudence are always
76
helPf'ul.
Both experience and reason had to operate together. 77 In the
Dialogo

.2!!

reggimento

!!!. Firenze,

Ouicciardini had Bernardo del Nero state:

"10 sono di quelli che in queste cose non allegherei mai la esperienze" se io

non la vedessi accompagnata dalla ragione. ,,78 Reason also played a major role
together with faith.

Guiceiardini counselled men to put their hope in God, to

pray and to do good works but then to make solid use of reason. 79 Here he
meant that, while accepting religious doctrine as defined by the Church,80 men
should not be afraid to strike out for themselves in other areas.
72Ricordi, I, 1.38.
73uGran Capitano, If p. 106.
74Ricordi, II, 30.
75Ibid., I, 160.

-

-

76Ibid ., II, 10.
77Treves notes that Guicciardini "non si presenta senza un antecedente
speculativo illa prova della realt'll" fI p. 42.
78
p. 23.
79nper L'accordo tra Firenze e Clemente VII," Scritti Wlitici, pp. 278279. In other passages, however, Guicciardini implIed that the majority of men
were not intellQc1<uhallYce<l.uipped to consider theological matters and advocated
almost. a blind nU. t .
r; supra pp.
80Cf .. sunra. D.
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AI though the future is uncertain, Guicciardini cautioned against the prey
of fortuna.

Good fortune and divine providence help the courageous man who

first helps himself.

One must not paralyze himself by fear of the whims of

fortune,81 for none can obtain great things without some danger.

In every

action man should have more hope than fear. 82
F~erience,

reason, resolution and action were the ingredients which

constituted success.

While Guicciardini was Ua matchless observer of the

concrete human fact" and far less likely tha.n Machiavelli to allow his
observations Uto be deflected to the constructive uses of his thought," he was
quick to observe the flaws in some of his older friend's arguments. 83 In the
final analysis, the vital role he gave reason warns of the need for caution in
speaking of him as a relativist or a skeptic.
importance of free will, he was no fatalist.

And since he never neglected the
In the 1490's, an alteration of

affairs in the Italian peninsula began with the pursuit of new policies by

8l."Ricordisi Vostra Santita ffi1ement ng che chi si abbandona da s~
medes1mo, e abbandonato non solo dal1a fortuna, ma etiam. da Dio, e1 quale, come
~ in proverbio, non aiuta chi non s 'aiuts da se stessoJ e1 pel contrario la
fortuna favorisce vo1entieri chi s f arrischia," "Ragion! che consigliano a
Clemente vn d:l. accordarsi con Carlo VI in contrariC' .. ff p. 197. Cf. also
tlOratio accusatoria, fl p. 239.
82
"Gran Capitano" fI p. 106.
8%enry Osborn Taylor, ThOifht and ~resSion in the Sixteenth centuft, I
(New York, 1920), 83, 93. c1'.so Hrram aydii, TheCounter:m;naissanceew
York, 1960).t p. 197.t for a discussion of GulcciardIiii WitE: otlier 1'igures who
were for the most part ·'pure" empiriCists, products of the Counter-Renaissance.
Haydn's group includes Vives and Telesio in natural science, Vesa1ius in
anatomy, Machiavelli and Guicciardini in history and political theory, Bodin
(With reservations) and Le Roy in historical met~od and SOCial, political and
econemic theory, and, above all, Montaigne. He explains that, if they 'Were
tainted by any ~"Stical or occult influences, they nevertheless followed with
considerable fidelity the pragmatic path of naturalistic empiricism.

f
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France, Milan, Florence, Naples and the papacy,84 and these were the work of
free men.
Yet fortuna, while not hampering the individual exercise of free will,
nonetheless seemed to Ouicciardini to set up a certain pattern a person had to
follow.

He knew this well.

He was of himself inclined always to desire the

overthrow of the Church's civil government so he attributed to chance his
service under two popes and his incessant striving for their success. 85
In Guicciardini's thinking, there is often a contrariety between desire
and action, between human acts and fortune.
in his view on scared abuses.

This contrariety is also evident

Papal misdemeanors scandalized him because of

his belief in the sacredness of the office.

The pope was, for all the

8
difficulties of his poSition as a Cinguecento prince, Christ's vicar on earth. D
\

He lamented the evils of the Roman court I

"non si puo dire tanto male della

corte romans. che non meriti chs se ne dica

pi'.ri.,

perche e una in:faInia, uno

esempio di tutti e l vituperi ed obbrobri del mondo. 1f87 He confessed that no
man could feel greater disgust than he at the ambition, avarice and pronigacy
of the priesthood, not only because these vices were odious in themselves but

.

84Storia
d'Italia, I, 29.
,
85Ricordi, I, 124; II, 28.
86storia d'Italia, V, 156-157.
87"Considerazioni,lt Scritti politici, p. 22.

~I
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especially because they were utterly abhorrent in men supposedly dedicated to
88
God.
Yet in sections of his works and in his dedication to the popes,
Guicciardini manifested a higher regard for them than he
realized.

hL~se1f

may have

He told the Cardinal of Cortona that he woUld rather be dead than

experience in Rome the cruelty suffered by Pope C1ement. 89 Whenever he
considered, in later years, Clement's imprisonment and his anguish" he was over
come by me1ancholy.90 What disturbed Guicciardini most, he confessed, was the
fact that not even a single lance was broken to deliver Clement atter he had
"stirred up war in almost all the world" for the benefit of othersl 91
Many of the statements in the
Guicciardini's later cynicism.
them is open to doubt.

~icordi

collection gave evidence of

Whether he meant things as strongly as he wrote

In his reconstr.lction of the speech of Lannoy, the

Viceroy of Naples" in 1526 in favor of an agreement with the French King,
Guicciardini .noted that it was more to the imperial advantage "to trust the
word of so great a king than the immoderate covetousness of priests. ,,92

8Baicordi, II, 28.
89f1Prigionia di Clemente" fI p. 11.
900uicciardin1 confessed that "non ti truovi mai in ai allegro ragionament<
e penaiero, che rappresentandotisi la memoria della sua prigione, non ai
interrompa e si converta in somma mestizia~ non per Is conslderazjone de' danni.
~, rna per 1a sua sl lacrimosa infellc1ta,1tii'ConsoIitoria" If p'. 170. Ii3ttphasls
added.
91Storia d l lta1ia, V,

-

92Ibid., IV,

.346.

146.
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With laymen apparently the situation was not quite the same, nfor the world and
its rulers are what they are and not what they should be. n9 .3 Since he never
thought they could be anything but selfish, he did not have a similar reaction
to lay vices.

He

found it hard to understand how

service could act as they did.

ma!\y

consecrated to God's

If not for his own ambition, he confessed.

I should have loved !4artin Luther as myself 1 not that I would be loosed
from the laws prescribed by the Christian religion as commonly interpreted
and understood" but because I long to see this pack of scoundrels brought
within due bound~~ that is to say, purged of their vices or stripped ot
their authority.

I'

These sentences of Ouicciardini afford the proper opportunity to consider
the more typical Renaissance qualities he manifested. Throughout the Ricordi
exists the basic though often unexpressed dilemma, that one should be noble
and, on the other hand, one has to act in an ignoble manner. To seek wealth
and fame for the sole purpose of enjoyment, carries the stamp of a base and
ignoble mind.

Yet, since human life is as corrupt as it is, one has to seek

riputazione lest his virtues go unnoticed and they be unesteemed as they are in
a poor man. 95 Ripu tazion~ was one of Guicciardini'l!J basic cnteria. He
advised that a man never retrains fram doing what will gain him this benefit,
for actually one who lacks it will also lack friends and position?6 A good
II

I,I'I

~~icordi,

n,

179.

94 Ibid ., 28.

-

95r bid., I, l41.
96Ibid., 174 •.

-

reputation is a sufficient reason for doing what is good, for it can often and
in a variety of ways be of "utilita incredibile. n97
He wrote of thE- reputation he enjoyed at stated periods of his life.
Spanish experience had turned out very successful.

His

lIe got alone well with the

:{iI"l£ and gain.ed for himself a good reputation. 98 A fruit£ul life must have
honor and reputation, and one must accommodate himself tel the attainment of

!

!

these qualities so that he does not look as thou[h he were born yesterday or
inexperienced in the' ways of the world.

All should know him af'! a person of

"

letters, of virtu, of magnanimous sould and of experienceJ

As a Christian, a

,
1

philosopher and a man of the

world~

Guicciardini realized that life afforded

many opportun1t,ies for self-adVancement and the recognition of a personfs good
quall ties. 99
The Ricordi, which is very confusing when one seeks to understand
Guicciardini 's mentality, abounds in unclear statements and even contradictions
Yet even this ai tuation can be explained.

Guicciardini knew what was right but

sometimes he saw that he could gain immediat.e advantages by pursuing a course
of ambition and self-interest.

He admitted that "true merit lies in doing what

we have to do well ••• as in a play, he is no less applauded who acts well the

Cf. also ibid., 167~ where Guicciardini explains one can
to a group although one gains even
more notice by serving important inCI.1vidual.'
" '
97 Ibid., 168.

gain a good reputation by rende'ring service

98uRicordanze,tt pp. 70, 73.
99uConsolatoria, tt Scritti ~utobiograriei, pp. 189-190.

,I

I

235
part of a servant than. he who wears the robes ot a king.

In short, each in his

own station may do himsel! honor and deserve praise. tt100 One who has high
esteem for honor, the finest c,uali ty in a man, will never be guilty of any un101
worthy deed.
Guicciardini' s view ot honor seems essentially connected with riputazione
and selt-interest.

By the ruin

ot the Pope, he told himself, "you have lost

the presidency of the Romagna, a place whioh would have been most useful to you"
policy and your personal reputation. nl02 He was proud to mention that be
sought to serve the l?atria but be was basically motivated by ambition, honor
and the esteem of men to keep up his good reputation.
were less laudable

tr~n

Perhaps those sentiments

an unselfish desire to work for the Eatria but they

were not to be condemned.

But Ouiociardini was willing to admit that one who

lacked ambition actu~ had greater peace of soul.103

In otber selections oan be seen the amorality and indeed the immorality so
often charged to both Guicciardini and Machiavelli.

If one is placed in a

situation in whioh he must either sutter injury or infliot it, he should choose
that course whioh is

!2.!! !e E!! .2!!!!

with the admonition that

~

advantae.

!l!!! !.!2! alleSie

l~cordi, I, 1,1. Emphasis added.

-

101Ibid ., 10,.
l021~onsolatoria,n p. 165.
103Ibid., pp. 183-18,.

-

Guicciardini qualified his vier

dangers

!£ Justi£l violence

~

!:.! wants .:!:2. commit

through Eeed

~

ma.lice. 104

I.!

i!

Like Machiavelli, Guicciardini realized the merits of dissimulazione.

He

rel t that, though sincerity is a noble c;uali ty, it can sometimes hurt the one
who practices it.

Because of the perverse nature of man, deception is useful

and necessary even though odious and unbecoming.

While one should exercise

candor in daily affairs so that he will be more readily trusted, on certain
important occasions he might well resort to dissimulation. lO'

Guicciardini

would not commend one who spent his entire life in deceit but now and then he
would approve i t. 106 If a man cannot restore the balance with a :man of high
station, the only renedy is to endure the situation outwardly, while taking
secret measures against h1m. 107
Guicciardini expounded views on sever!ty in government as Machiavelli had
done in 11 Principe.

Severity is essential for good government because ot "la

\

malignit4 degli uomini, It and a ruler should make it appear that he has to act
cruelly for the public good.108 Guicciardini commended governors who inflict
tew sever! ties or punishments but know how to get and keep a name tor ruthlessness. 109 Actually, a ruler should resort to murder only when there is a

lOURiCOrdi, I, 1$3. Emphasis added.

105Ibid., 4J.
r!

-

-

l06Ibid ., 46.

-

l07 Ibid ., 27.
l08Ibid., 85. Guicciardini admired Ferdinand ot Aragon, who made all his
actions appear good. Cf. supra, pp
l09Ibid.,

U,.
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genuine need.

But Guicciardini' s rea.son for advising few murders is not that

I

'

1

,I' '

such action is immpral but rather that in such actions one frequently loses
more than he gains. 110
He was convinced that both religion and the force of arms are fu.ndBmental
to the life of republics and kingdoms. 11l When he could not solve the
difficult problem of the relations between religion and morals and politics,
however, he tended to expedience.

To rule states there is a need for men "che

amassino piu la patria che l'an1ma, perche" e\ impossibile regolare e 1 govern! e

gli stati volenda tenerli nel modo s1 tengono oggi, secondo e' precetti della.

jl
I

i

1egge cristians.. u1l2 A case in point was his recommendation that all the Pisan
prisoners who had revolted against Florence should be killed in order to weaken
that city.

Though this might not be Christian, "ragione e uso degli stati II
required i t. ll)
There were other areas too where Gu1cciardini could not take a firm stand.

He felt that there was no greater good fortune in the world than to see one's
enemy prostrate at his feet, a situation which a ruler should do everything to
secure.

Yet still greater is the glory which comes tram extending mercy and

-

110Ibid ., 120.
111"Considerazioni intomo ai Discorsi del Machiavelli, ff p. 21.
112
D1al0lo, p. 162.

ll~ere inedite, II, 212.
Meinecke, MachlavellIsm, trans.

Cf. also Barkhausen, p. 89, and Friedrich
:touglas Scott (New Haven, 1957), p. 46 and n.2

1111',1'

II.
: "III
! '.
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pardon to onets enemy.1l4
For Ouicciardini, then, the fundamental criterion for all action is not a
moral one at all.

His Ricordi conta.ined rules for ordinary cases; exceptional

ones had to be considered separately and one had to use his discretion. 115
Discrezione is the basic directive torce tor human action.

SUch a view meant

the separa.tion of political action from that of morality.
So much for Guicciardini' s view of the action required in a period of
ruthless individualism and ferment.

How did he accept a situation which was

central religious occurrence ot his age?

th~

I,

This was the Lutheran break with

Rome.
The peace of Christendom was, in Guicciardini's era, something which good
men sincerely desired but politics did not allow.

Guicciardini laid accent on

116

the danger of the Lutheran heresy and its hatefulness to God.
His own view
117
on this "impious and poisonous heresy"
shows his religious position. His
account followed the usual humanist pattern, stress on the
the break itself, and the errors of Luther.

"sal~'of

indulgences

Aside from repeating the spiritual

abuses in the Catholic Church, Ouicciardini paid very 11ttle attention to
Lutheran ideas of refom.

He fOC"llsed his attention prlmar1ly on how political

I

l14 R1cordi , I, 34.
l15The phrase is IIsi possono male scrivere altrove che nel libra della
discrezione," ibid., 35.

-

116storia d'It,alia, IV.. 285, 288.

-

117Ibid., V, 184.

'I
"

,
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and economic motives contributed to the break and how the princes took over the
movement.
He explained t.hat the Holy See granted indulgences only to extort money
from simple men and that the commissioners practiced simony.

There was in-

dignation and scandal in many regions" especia.11y in Germany, where many of
these commissioners sold :plenary indulgences while they enjoyed themselves in
the taverns.

Luther found in this a great opportunity to crusade against the

"indulgence traffic, If and to negate papal authority as 'lrJell and thus become mos ~
popular.

118

In a passage describing Luther's relations with the Curia, OUicciardini
suggested that the apostolic delegate had goaded Luther into a last despera.te
stand.

By offering Luther some ecclesiastical dignity or some rich prebend, 119

he might have persuaded him to reject his errors.

Perhaps the revolt could

have been avoided if such a course had been pursued at the right moment. 120
With more

~isdam,

Ouicciardini saw the practical reasons for Lutheranism's

appeal to many of the German princes.

Some who embraced the sect were sincere

or at least partly excu!lable :;y the just occasion given them, but most wanted
money and popularity and the favor of the Duke of Saxony.

These did not want tc

be deprived of the church property they had confiscated, but others were

118storia d'Italla, IV, 285, 288.
1191l ... se le parole ingiuriose e piene di minacce che gli disse i1
cardinale di San Sisto legato apostollco non 10 avessino condotto a ultima
disperazione, 8i crede aarebbe stato facile dandogll qualche degnit~ 0 quaJ.che
modo oneate di vivere, farlo partlre dagli erron suoi, II ibid., 83.
120Ibid •

-

-

2L.o
careful and tried to keep this contagion from spreading into their realms. l2l
Guicciardini wrote of the diversity and the lack of restraint in Lutheran
opinions.

Scripture, the v1%'1 tinge of the Fathers and Doctors, canon law and

papal decrees were daily given new and suspect meanings and unheard-of
interpretations.

And some of Lutherts followers, already despising

h!!

authority, set out to make the Eucharist something evil and diabolicaL

Even

outside of Germany, these notions spread and further gave way to lIogni nuova e
perversa invenzione

0

interpretazione," for they freed men from

I~olti

precetti ••• gl1 riducono a modo di vita quasi libero e arbitrio."

This

situation bred contrary opinions among the heretics themselves so that their
thought was in complete contusion.

Guicciardini rel t the Lutheran errors were

sustained by the licence given people on the level of morallty.122
By 1530, the schisms that arose in Lutheran doctrine were so many and

80

contrary to one another that very rew gave any consideration to the life and
authority of Martin Luther.

Hence even the German princes began to solicit a

general council for they could think of no better remedy for their troubles.
Guicciardini wrote:
For even the Lutherans, trying to justify their cause with the authority
of religion, insisted on holding it IJ. council.!l and it was believed that
the authority of the decrees to be issued by the council, wou1d be
suffiCient, i f not to turn the minds of the chiefs of the heretics from
their errors, at least to reduce some of the people to more satisfactory
views. 123

l22Ibid.

69-71.

l23Ibid.,

v,

121Ibid., 68, 70-71.

-'
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But the Lutheran break from the fold had for some time been consummated.
Tris fact, war, the widespread fear of a council--all pushed such a convocation
into the next papal reign.
Guicciardini showed he was a man of the Renaissance, denouncing the
corruption of the Curia as a cause for the spread of the Huseite errors and the
rupture of Christendom.

On the other hand, he was also a man of religion vlho

was not a ble to understand how Lutheranism actually happened.

He seems to have

looked upon the phenomenon l.1. th dismay as a split in at least the formal
religious unity of Europe.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION
THE PESSIMIs-i OF GUICCIARDINI
Guicciardinits personal tragedy was a part of the tragedy of all Italy.
Like Machiavelli, he had actively participated in the central events of his
age, all connected in some way with Italy's role in the power struggle of the
sixteenth-eentury. When Guiceiardini saw no hope for Italian freedom after the
successive imperial viotories of 1527, 1529 and 1530, he abandoned his aotive

I I

role of papal service, went into retirement, and began the writing of his
Storis d'Italia.

The tone of this work and of his apologetio writings is

pessimistic.
The hard pessimism of Guicoiardini, so evident in his latter years, had a

I

I

I

I

double foundation, one somewhat natural to his personality J the other based
upon the events of his career and of his service in behalf of the libert~
d'Italia.

,,!ben these events did not follow the only pattern whioh he thought

,

oould achieve this liberta, Guicciardini realized that all hope was gone.
In any case, Guicoiardini's pessimism was not blind.

Camillo Cavour

I

recognized that he was a man who truly knew affairs and events and who, as a
matter of fact, knew them better than Machiavelli. l
1

,

!

Adolph Thiers too

P. Villari, Niccolo Machiavelli! ! suoi t,pi, II, Milano, 1927, 119, n.
cited in Palmarocohi, stud! Guicoiardin1~. 2 3.

I

understood that Guicciardini was an able diplomat, an able administrator, an
able military man and an able historian only because he was a penetrating
observer of the idiosyncracies of individuals and of political groups.

All his

life, Thiers recalled, Guicciardini was Itl'un des esprits les plus clairvoyants
qui aient jamais exist', surtout en affaires poll tiques. It His entire

I,
!

characterization of Guicciardini is worthy of notice:
Il avait l'ame un peu triste par nature et par sati~t~ de la vie •••• ll
connaissait profondement ls nature bumaige, et il trace de tous les
personnages de son siecle des portraits eternels; parce qutil sont vrais
simples et vigoreux. A tous ces me'ri tes 11 ajoute 141 ton chagrin et
morose ,d'une homme fatigue des innombrables mis~res auxquelles il a
assiste, trop morose, selon moi, car l t histoire doit rester calme et
/
sereine, mais point choquant, parce quton y sent, comme dans la saverite
sombre de TaCite, la triste~se de Ifhonn~te homme. 2
Guicciardini's few

hop~e

I'

of success centered on papal leadership of the

League of Cognac and allied cooperation within it.
could dent impe rial power in the peninsula.

Only concentrated endeavors

Guicciardini could never himself

settle all affairs of importance to Italy though a chain linked him with the
larger affairs of the

Cinquecen~.

By his personal, family and Florentine back

ground and training, his career of service to the Medici family and the Medici
popes and in the League of Cognac, he was quite naturally involved in the
course of their fortunes.

Actually, the story of the 1 talian tragedy is the

story of the fall of '\Ihe Florentine Medici, of Pope Clement, of the League of

2Hiatoire du Consolat et de l'Empire, XII, PariS,
ibid., pp. 275-2'f6.
- -

-

1855,

I,

x-xii, cited in

,'I
'I

Cognac which he headed, and of Guicciardini himself.

It is no coincidence that

Ouicciardini began his Storia d'Italia with a Medici marked by good fortune and
ended with another whose reign was marked with ill success.

The papal fulcrum

of Italian politics broke under the headship of Clement VII when he made peace
wi th Charles V in 1527 and again in 1529.

In Guicciardini.' s judgment, this

settlement, which seemed necessary to the Pope, made the Emperor triumphant in
Italy and nullified the effects of all the efforts of the allies of Cognac.
All of Guicciardini's own activities as papal lieutenant in behalf of the
League's affairs also came to nought.
Like Machiavelli, Guicciardini understood the new political complexion of
his period, the national states caught in the maelstrom of intense power
politics. Were this not so, he could never have written the magnificent
Storia, which details the lengthy struggles among these states for the hegemony
of all Italy.

Yet, unlike Machiavelli, Guicciardini was essentially a

~rshes~

at heart.
Though the "barbarian tt entry was indeed a reason for the decline, misery
and decadence in the peninsula, Guicciardini considered it only a contributing
factor.

It was not the basic cause.

Nor was the Italian military weakness,

which Guicciardini always decried, or the lack of allied cooperation against thE
Emperor.

In the borghese governments lay the best hope for Italian salvation.

They alone could maintain peninsular stability in the face of the foreigner.
states like Venice and Florence, for all the latter's civil disorder in the
past, had already demonstrated their value for Italy.
longer afforded

~

But somehow

the~

il

no

hope.

I

,I
I!,i
,',

'1 1,,11'

,"

In his account of the alliances and counter-alliances among the Italian

'I i~ III
'I'
'1:

1

I'!"I
I' ,
:

:11,'i
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states and foreign powers from the latter fifteenth century through the sixteenth, Guicciardini strongly criticized Venice for her selfish attempts to
dominate Italy.

Thus she ruptured th'3 Italian equilibrium.

Nevertheless, he

admired the Venetian constitution as a model for firm and solid government.
Florence, despite her civic problems, had also contributed to the Italian
commonweal. Lorenzo de' Medici had worked to maintain a healthy balance of
power within the peninsula and, as long as he was able to act as the
equilibratore of Italy, peninsular unity was guaranteed.

The separateness

of
'I'

the Italian states, large and small, princelY or republican, actually con"

tributed to the well-being of Italy so long as this equilibrium was maintained.

!1
I

1,1

Foreign intervention could bring misfortune to Italy only if the balance were
d:i srupted.

This happened with Lorenzo's deatt when Fiero, ttuno pazzo, tt reversed his
father's domestic and foreign policies and contributed to "l.ultimo tuffo alla

citt~.,,3 Though the Venetian government remained strong internally, the
decline of its fortunes and those cf Florence, Milan, Naples and Rome was a
striking evidence

Cif

the gradual ruin of Italy.

Not one of the "Big Five 'l

powers of Italy could escape the consequences of foreign invasion and occupatio
and the internal disorder which resulted.

Habsburg and Valois fought for Milan

and Naples and neither Emperor nor King underestimated the importance of Rome

3Storia d'Italia, I, 38.

I

,I'i1 1

'I

!,'

,

'
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and its pope. After Venice, Florence succumbed to the victorious Empire when
no other course lay open to her.

For Guicciardini, the sack of Rome in 1527 an

the Barcelona capitulation of that year, renewed in 1529, symbolized the tragic

I'
ii'"
, ,

I' ,:
,

fall of Italian civilization.

But even more gravely significant for him and

,

II

for the Italian political spirit was the collapse of independent Florentine
government at a time when there were no odds in favor of its resurrection and
reaesertion.

This was the crisis of the Italian borshesia and of the civil~

known to Guicciardini.

The supremacy of the Impire state over the individual

states, which Machiavelli saw as inevitable, was proof that the cycle of their

!!

,I

usefulness to Italian political life had been f u J . . f i l l e d . I I ' ,
11:

The question arises in a consideration of the bases of Guicciardini's
pessimism, was his pessimism truly based on an accurate. int4rpretation of the
course of events? Did his closeness to them in any

w~

mar his reading? He

observed the situations carefully and reported them clearly, hence Ouicciardini
is always associated wi th realism.

As a poll tical figure and

an

historian, he

had the will to comprehend the reality of things, at whatever price, and to
destroy any illusions which might be formed.

He derided the flights ot far.taay

of Machiavelli, who wished to imita,te the ancients in many respects, following
the ideal which had inspired the Renaissance.

Ouicciardini found his strength

in strict attention to -the realities of the times che corrono. 4 His realism

----

precluded the spacious flights of the poetic mentality and permitted his
thought, vague in the camp of pure theory, to acquire a unity and coherence
which could motivate practical activity. His own career always demonstrated

4passerin dtEntreves, p. 110.

1

: I
I

that, for every possible contingency, he could find a few clear and simple
ideas to act as the substance and nerve ot action. S
But this empirici8lll. and the intellectualism which worked upon its results
constituted at once the strength and the weakneaa of Guicciardin1.

Passerin

\

d 'Entreves wrote.
\

Ma Ie sola ragione e una guida pericolosa e un t esigente compagna, e U
lumen siccum dell'1ntelletto che rende moo, jeserto e nuda 11 mando del
Guicc1ardini-una lands. sterile e sconsolata. In nessun t altra opere, i
limiti di una stong strettamente politica sono piu apparenti che nella

stona d.ltalia ••••

These obael""t'ations on cold reality and not simple opportunism serve to
explain some of Ouicciard1n1's rather puzzl.ing actions.

In 1530, he knew that

Florence could save itself from aubordination to Spain only by a tempest-like
accord wi th the Pope.

No longer was Guicc1ard1n1 interested in the queation

ot

a republican gcvemment for Florence or Medici rule. His dilemma concerned
f4edici cooperation with C, arlee V or complete foreign predominance. only by a
nece85al"1' surrender to the Empire could Florence save itself, yet, he always
insiated that her internal. Uberty be preserved.

For the same reasons, he

I
!

defended

~e

.Alessandro before the Emperor and also tavored the accession of

Col1mo of the younger J-iedic1 line.

working toward

8

This seemed to Gu1cciard1n1 one method ot

stable government in Florence. 'When Ou1eciardin1 viewed the

consolidation ot Cos1.mots state, however, he refund to cooperate wholly with

SpalmarocChi J studt Ou1ec.1ardiniani, pp. 108-109.
6Passerin d'Enueves, Pl'. 170-171.

~
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it.

It did not suit his expectations.
Jl::achiavelll., l11ce Guicciardin1, devotedly

8erYed

norence. Machiavelli,

as Florentine secretary, must have read Guicc1ardini t s many reports to the
Chancery and,

8S

a roving ambassador tor norenee :in matters pertaining to the

l.eague of COrMc, he came into personal contact with him.

But their

association in the realm of thought is far more interesting.

If the

~tor1a

d'Italla was Guiociardinits major historical work, it was also his :political
manifeato. Machiavelli t s major contributions to

~iOl1 tical

thought were found

in 1! frinciE! and his Discorn.
These works indicate clearly that, in a comparison of the two thinkers,

,

i

I

.:

·),,1ill
I

I

i'i'

Machiavelli must come out the poet and Guicciardini the 122l1t1co.

Guicciardini

saw in the unity of all the Italian states under one man a noble ideal but also
the practical. a.nnullment of all municipal liberties.

A strong Italy to buck

the barbarians could be only a beautitul thought because history, Guiooiardini

saw, did not allow jumps.

Rather one had to consider the facts of the

situation, the facts of dally reality, the facts of history.

In a modest way,

in his own action and in his stately bistorical analysis, Gu.icclardini coped

with

reallty~

tor this alone was the camp of action of a political man.

His

path could Mver be continuous, for he had to follow the complicated and otten
capricious develo}Dent of facte.
reall ty by evading 1 t.

He could not, liko Ji!t8chiavelll, conquer

If Machiavelli experienced delusion and melancholy, his

method allowed him to prophesy and to hope. Machiavel111llade the groat leap
from history and called upon Italy to free heraelf tl"Omthe barbarians.
G:}icciardin1, as a
in success.

~l1t1co,

could find his froedom from disillusionment only

If success were wanting in the end, his facts and the ideas he

ii, '

'I'
, ..

,
based them upon could only become the weights which would draw him down and
crush h:1m.

Ouicc1ardini wished Italy to be free but, given the trend ot

events, it was useless to consider such an eventuality.

Therein lay the basis

tor Gu1ccie.rdini f s pessimism. It is paradoxical that r-tachiavelli,

who was not

hemmed in by the reaU ty of the immediate, was 1n one sense more truly the
realist.

He saw the historic necessity of a revolution which would unify the

Italian states.

Italy could not separate herself forever from the modem

phenomenon of the national state. Machiavelli could look from the real to the
ultimate.
Guicciard1n1, on the other hand, could not triumph over his realism..

F'rom

the beginning, he .realized the Emperor's aims to control Italy and he knew that
these objectives were last being accomplished.

Charles' greatness was such,

Guicciard1ni wrote, that one could "desire but not hope."7 As he watched the
imperial successes and the Italian declJ.ne, Guicciardin1 wrote, he who has seen

acutely "e co' calcoli e aisura delle cose pauate sa calcuJ.sre e miaurare
assai del futuro. ,,8
"lile'! Guicci&rdin1 retired to hie country villa to undertake his manmoth
Storia d'Italla, hie world was at an end.

This fact is clear in the

Consolatoria, Guicciardini' s answer· to t he Florentine republicane who, after
the Medici restoration of 1527, accused him of complicity in the poliCies of
Pope. Leo and Clement.

He was guilty of their f'ailure",.

In his detense of

7"Ragloni che consigliano a Clemente VII di accordarsi con Carlo V,"
Scx-itti politici, p. 176.

8!'ialo~1

p. 17.

'11.1111

II,:

'1.

1

'I,i:
,

himself ar:ainst these charges, the most emotional part is that dedicated to the
lost world of politics.

Guicciardini'e attention to polit1eal life was in a

fundamental sense hie religion, and his entire eXistence vas devoted to it.

153.5, when

By

he had no more decisions to make and in an atmosphere 1es8 oharged

wi th tensions and anxieties, he could contemplate the major problems of his age

and his own role.

He oould look at events trom the very personal vantage point

which only few men poasea_d.

At the sarne time as he demonstrated for himaelt the legitimacy and the
neeessi ty of his past conduct, he oftered to future judges all the material
necessary for an impartial and definitive Verdict.

An historian of 1964 cannot

I,

I'I

I

'I

.

find sufficient evidence to render a guilty verdiot.
save his eatria and Italy in the only way he knew.

I

Guiociardini tried to
Though Italy fell into the

slumber of the Barocc!t she awoke again in the Ri8oreEm't9.

Guiociardin1

could not foresee this but then the un1ty which finally came to Italy might not
have satisfied one so pusionately ded1catd to the ideal of separate and

distinct states in the Italian peninsula which would cooperate for the welfare
of the whole.
To find in the failure of Cuiceiard1ni' 13 own career the basic reason for

his pessimism 1s tar too simple an explanation.

Certainly OUice1ardini was

motivated by ambition, an lnC'..entive which "Jias more meaningful to him than any

other.

"'l'he more men are feared, reverenced and honored, the nearer they _em

to approach, and, a8 it were, to resemble God, to whoe likeness who would not
9
"dsh to attain. It Action upon this opportunistic motive can partially explain

II
I
I

III

9Ricordi,

n,

16.

\ til
I
I

,I
,.

III
"
I

the lack cf coherence in his words and actions.

Althou€::h he realized that it

is natural tor men to seek honors and preferment, he advised them, on the basis

or his

own experience, to try to rid themselves of all vain desires.

;'J'hlle God

and his own good fortune had ra.ised h:im to higher peaks than he had ever hoped
to

l'

each, he sadly admitted that he had never found in them the satisfaction

and contentment he

8('

sincerely deeired.10 Quicciardini had to find

satisfaction 1n rJ..s religion, and his religion vas success in the materialization of his broad political ideals and in his practical political commitments.

I,

II'I"
1, I,

i

-

-

lOXbid., 15J cf. also ibid., I, 59.
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